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SAFETY AND ECONOMIC COMPARISON OF
FUSION FUEL CYCLES
Abstract
The DT, DD and DHe fusion fuel cycles are compared on the basis of safety
and economics. The designs for the comparison employ HT-9 structure and helium
coolant; liquid lithium is used as the tritium breeder for the DT fuel cycle. The
reactors are pulsed superconducting tokamaks, producing 4000 MW thermal power.
The DT and DD designs are developed utilizing a plasma beta of 5 %, 10 % and
20 %. assuming first stability scaling laws; a single value of 10 % for beta is used
for the DHe design. Modest extrapolations of current day technology are employed,
providing a reference point for the relative ranking of the fuel cycles. Technological
advances and improved understanding of the physics involved may alter the relative
positions from what has been determined here.
The cost of electricity (COE) produced by the DT fuel cycle is projected to be
57 mills/k h in 1986 dollars. This cost is a decreasing function of plasma beta
up to a value of 10 %, beyond which no further improvement is seen. The lowest
COE for the DD fuel cycle is 85 mills/kWh at 20 % beta. The cost of electricity
produced by the DHe fuel cycle is 79 mills/k Wh, assuming a helium-3 cost of 40
kS/kg. The COE is shown to increase by roughly 10 % as the helium-3 fuel cost
increases by ten fold. Parametric studies indicate a strong dependence of the COE
on the mass utilization factor, or fusion island mass per unit of thermal power
produced. A fusion island mass of - 10,000 tonne and a fusion island volume of
~ 3,000 m3 place DT tokamaks in the economically competitive region. The DD
tokamaks appear to be too large and massive to be economically viable. A strong
influence of the neutron fluence limit on the COE for the DT fuel cycle is evident
up to 15 ^f ; ; above this value, the decrease in COE per unit increase in fluence
limit is not large. The neutron fluence limit has an impact on the COE for the DD
fuel cycle up to a value of 5 M .
Tritium inventories for the advanced fuel plants are considerably reduced from
the DT plants. The total vulnerable inventory is reduced by a factor of 20 for the
DD and DHe fuel cycles compared to DT. The total onsite inventory, including both
vulnerable and non-vulnerable forms. is reduced by nearly two orders of magnitude
for the advanced fuels. Tritium breeding and blanket processing are not the major
contributors to the DT plant tritium inventory. In all cases, the bulk of the tritium
resides in the exhaust processing system. The avermge tritium source term at the
DD and DHe plants is roughly one one-hundredth that at the DT plants. A single
detritiation unit is needed to maintain the plant atmospheric tritium concentration
at an acceptable level for the DT plants; the steady state tritium concentration in
the atmospheres of the advanced fuel reactor halls is low enough without the use of
a detritiation unit to permit access of unprotected personnel.
There appears to be no great advantage in terms of blanket activation with
the advanced fuels for the materials considered in this study. These conclusions
are a reflection of the material used and cannot be regarded as a generalization.
Because of the large volume of structure used, activity and afterheat !evels in the
DD blankets exceed that in the D T blankets. The levels found in the DHe blanket
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are lower than both DT and DD, but are still of significance. Since equal volume
fractions of structural material are found in the first walls, activity and afterheat
levels are greater for DT. This reflects the high neutron energy and greater flux
intensity associated with the DT designs. Higher levels of activity are seen at higher
values of beta for a given fuel cycle. None of the wastes produced at the fusion
plants qualifies for shallow land burial, although material modifications may allow
the criteria to be met. Waste from the DD plants poses the greatest threat, while
that from the DHe plant is least hazardous. Gamma dose rates encountered by plant
workers are greatest for the DTfuel cycle. Steam generator dose rates dominate the
occupational exposures.
The use of an alternate blanket, consisting of a reduced activation ferritic steel
(RA F) first wall and an Fe2CrlV alloy blanket, for the 10 % beta DD design,
reduces the COE from 94 mills/kWh (with an HT-9 blanket) to 85 mills/kh.
The savings is due to a higher blanket multiplication factor, resulting in a smaller
reactor size, and a lower cost blanket material. The safety analysis for normal plant
conditions revealed that this alternate blanket results in similar levels of short lived
species (compared to HT-9), but leads to a significant reduction in long lived isotopes.
Shutdown decay heat levels are similar for both blanket materials. No reduction in
occupational exposures is expected with the R.AF/Fe2Crl V blanket compared to the
HT-9 case. However, the alternate blanket does considerably reduce waste disposal
hazards.
Investigation of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) for the HT-9 designs indi-
cated that the DHe fuel cycle presents the least risk. Little difference is seen in the
total onsite dose incurred subsequent to the accident for the DT and DD fuel cycles.
The largest economic impact of the L OCA results for the DD fuel cycle, mainly as a
consequence of the greater repair costs. Offsite impacts of this accident are minimal
in all cases.
A methodology for cost/benefit analysis is applied to determine if the increased
costs of the alternate HT-9 designs relative to the 20 % beta DT case are justified
by the improved safety which they provide. Normal conditions and the health and
economic risks posed by a loss of coolant accident are considered. It is revealed that,
of the HT-9 designs considered in this study, only the 10 % beta DT design is cost
effective. A rough assessment of the cost effectiveness of the DD and DHe designs
using an unspecified, very low cost, very low activation blanket and shield material
still indicated that use of the advanced fuels is unjustified. This conclusion may
be altered, however, if consideration is given to cost reductions during construction
of the advanced fuel plants due to application of less costly practices employed in
non-nuclear power plants.
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ISummary, Conclusions and Recommendations
The aim of this study was to compare, on an equal basis, the safety and eco-
nomic characteristics of the DT, DD and DHe fusion fuel cycles. Representative
designs were established based on consistent design criteria using only modest ex-
trapolations of present day technologies. An economic analysis of these designs was
performed within a consistent framework, with some flexibility in areas where the
fuel cycles differed so that an accurate determination of the cost of electricity could
be made. Safety analyses were performed to evaluate tritium inventories, routine
tritium releases, inventories of activation products and the level of hazard associ-
ated with plant wastes. The annual dose incurred by plant workers was estimated
for all fuel cycles. The impact of the use of an alternate blanket material on the
economics and safety during normal conditions of the DD fuel cycle was examined.
A loss of coolant accident (LOCA) was investigated to determine the relative safety
and economic impact of this event for the various fuel cycles for designs employing
the same structural material. Finally, a cost/benefit analysis was performed to as-
sess the cost effectiveness of the alternate designs and to determine if the increased
costs associated with these designs is justified by the improved safety which they
provide. A summary of the findings and conclusions from the study are discussed
in the next section. This is followed by recommendations for future work.
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Summary and Conclusions
The representative reactors on which the safety and economic comparison was
based were pulsed superconducting tokamaks. The DT designs employed a lithium
breeder for tritium production with HT-9 structure and helium coolant. The blan-
kets of the DD and DHe reactors were designed for energy multiplication and uti-
lized HT-9 structure with helium coolant. An alternate DD design which employed
a reduced activation ferritic steel (RAF) first wall and Fe2Cr1V alloy blanket with
helium coolant was also studied. The advanced fuel reactors are larger than their
DT counterparts because of the lower fusion power density associated with these
fuel cycles. Although the designs all produced a thermal power of 4000 MW, the
power produced by fusion in the plasma was not the same in each case. The DD
reactors show a larger total gain in energy from neutron interactions in the blan-
ket. This reflects the blanket material, the neutron energy spectrum and the total
number of neutrons entering the blanket. The DT designs have the greatest blan-
ket/shield thickness due to the greater quantity and higher energy of the fusion
neutrons. Designs were developed for a range of values of plasma beta, assuming
first stability scaling laws. As beta was increased, the reactor size decreased but
the wall loading increased. This was found to have an important effect on reactor
economics.
The fuel handling systems were characterized for the various fuel cycles. The
blanket tritium recovery system and coolant tritium removal capabilities are needed
only for the DT fuel cycle. Other fuel handling components, including the vacuum
system, impurity removal system, isotope separation systems, storage facilities, fuel
delivery system, tritium waste treatment system and atmospheric tritium recovery
system are needed at the advanced fuel plants because a circulating tritium inven-
tory exists. Some of these components, however, may be scaled down from those
needed for the DT fuel cycle because of the lower tritium throughput. Others, such
as the vacuum system, are larger for the advanced fuels because of the more severe
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plasma purity requirements. The hydrogen isotope separation systems do not dif-
fer greatly amongst the fuel cycles. A third column for the advanced fuels is only
needed during and shortly after pulse initiation, since tritium is being fueled at
this time and the plasma exhaust will contain a higher tritium concentration which
must be reduced before discharge to the environment. Helium isotope separation
capabilities are greatest for the DHe fuel cycle. Since 'He is present in the plasma
exhaust from the DT reactor chamber in very small quantities, no helium isotope
separation equipment is needed for this fuel cycle. Other components of the fuel
cycle systems are not expected to be largely different amongst the fuel cycles. No
difference in equipment needs is seen for the different values of beta for a given fuel
cycle.
The economic comparison was founded on the projected cost of electricity-
(COE) for each fuel cycle. The COE was determined from the plant capital cost, the
operating and fuel costs, the plant capacity factor, the plant lifetime and financing
parameters. The costing generally followed a standard set of accounts. Assump-
tions included a six year construction time, 30 year plant lifetime and 6 % inflation
for current dollar calculations. Results of the economic analysis indicated that the
advanced fuels are at a clear economic disadvantage with respect to the DT fuel
r cycle. The COE in 1986 dollars obtained for the DT fuel cycle was 57 mills/kWh
(at 10 % and 20 % beta). At best, the DD fuel cycle produced electricity at a cost
of 85 mills/kWh (48 % greater than for DT). This occurred for the 20 % beta HT-9
design and for the 10 % beta RAF/Fe2Cr1V design. Both of these tokamaks were
smaller as a result of the higher power density in the 20 % beta HT-9 case, and as
a result of the higher blanket multiplication factor in the 10 % beta RAF/Fe2CrlV
case. The cost of electricity produced by the DHe fuel cycle was 79 mills/kWh at
10 % beta (38 % greater than for DT), with a cost of helium-3 of 40 k$/kg. The
COE will be higher if the cost of helium-3 fuel is much greater than this. It should
be noted that these costs are for pulsed systems, which are more costly than steady
state systems because of the large investment required for the thermal storage sys-
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tem and greater poloidal field magnet costs. It was estimated that the pulsed burn
mode adds 8 to 10 mills/kWhto the C compared to that for a steady state
system.
Several parametric studies were performed for DT fuel cycle. It was revealed
that for the designs considered in this work (Li/He/HT-9, aspect ratio of 4, elonga-
tion of 2.5, 4000 MXt) there is no economic incentive for pursuing values of plasma
beta above 10 %. This optimum results from the competition between decreasing
costs due to a smaller reactor versus the increasing costs due to more frequent com-
ponent replacement as beta is increased. It was found that for 10 % beta, a high
aspect ratio and an elongation of 2.0 are desirable. The COE for DT was found to
be linearly dependent on the cost of shielding, and almost unaffected by the cost
of deuterium fuel. A fairly strong dependence of the COE on the mass utilization
factor (g) was seen. The fusion island mass of a 4000 MWt plant must be in the
area of 10,000 tonne, and the fusion island volume must be on the order of 3,000 m3
in order for DT tokamaks employing conventional power conversion systems to be
competitive with fission. The neutron fluence limit was seen to have a large impact
on the COE up to values of 15 TP. Above this value, the decrease in the
COE per unit increase in fluence limit is not large.
Higher beta appears to have a greater impact on reducing the COE for the
DD fuel cycle than for DT. However, the unit reduction in cost per unit increase
in beta becomes small beyond a beta of 10 - 15 %. This is again a consequence
of the competing effects of decreasing costs due to smaller component sizes and
increasing costs due to more frequent replacement at high beta. To minimize the
COE for DD reactors, a moderate value of beta (10 - 15 %), a high aspect ratio
and elongation of 2.0 to 2.5 should be sought. A longer blanket lifetime is more
important for this fuel cycle because the larger reactor components result in more
costly blanket changeouts. Varying the fluence limit showed that no impact on the
COE is felt beyond a value of ~ 12 "Sy . The use of a material having a higher
blanket multiplication factor (Fe2Cr1V vs HT-9) resulted in an improved COE. This
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is due to the lower fusion power, and hence smaller and less costly reactor, required
to produce 4000 M\Wt. The lower unit cost of the blanket material (20 $/kg for
Fe2CrLV vs 50 $/kg) also contributes to the reduction in the COE. The mass and
volume of the least costly DD designs (20 % beta HT-9 and 10 % RAF/Fe2Cr1V)
were seen to be far too large to result in a competitive COE.
The DHe fuel, cycle was found to produce electricity at a cost lower than for
DD, but still significantly above that for DT. An important factor in determining
the COE for this fuel cycle is the cost of fuel. An increase of 7 mills/kWh in the
? COE was seen as the cost of helium-3 was increased from 40 kS/kg to 500 k$/kg.
A major concern is the availability of fuel to supply an economy dependent on this
fuel cycle. Terrestrial reserves may be sufficient to support an experimental research
program, but would be insufficient to support a mature fusion economy based on
this fuel cycle. The lunar soil has been identified as a potential source of helium-3.
However, the feasibility of mining and transporting this helium-3 back to earth has
not been determined at this time.
A recategorization of costs from the standard accounts allowed for a direct com-
parison of costs directly associated with the fuel cycle. Fuel cycle costs included
initial and replacement first wall/blanket, limiter and auxiliary heating costs, mis-
cellaneous scheduled replaceable items costs, fuel costs and waste handling costs.
These were seen to be similar for DT and DHe, both being much below the costs
for DD. The greater cost for DD is mainly a consequence of the larger volume of
materials use for components compared to DT, and the greater replacement fre-
quency compared to DHe. These costs are somewhat lower for the RAF/Fe2Cr1V
DD design (compared to the HT-9 DD design) due both to the smaller blanket and
V the lower unit cost of the blanket material. The contribution of fuel costs to the
fuel cycle costs are.greatest for DHe; the contribution of waste handling costs are
least for this fuel cycle. This reflects the reduced volume and activity of the wastes
to be handled.
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An advantage of using an advanced fuel is that there is no need to breed
tritium. This is a major difficuliy fIr'DT reactors which strive to achieve a tritium
breeding ratio of one. This constraint is alleviated for the advanced fuels, giving
more flexibility in the blanket design. However, for the designs considered here,
the advanced fuels have more costly blankets and produce energy more expensively
despite the elimination of tritium breeding and the potential for enhanced neutron
energy multiplication. The absence of a lithium compound and breeder tritium
extraction equipment do not result in a great cost reduction for the DD and DHe fuel
cycles. To provide for plasma exhaust purification, tritium handling and hydrogen
isotope separation equipment is still required, although on a smaller scale than for
DT. Some cost savings is seen, but these are largely overshadowed by the much
larger expense associated with the advanced fuel blankets and other components of
the fusion island.
An economic benefit of the lower occupational hazards of the DD and DHe
fuel cycles is seen in the improved plant capacity factor experienced with these
fuel cycles. Lower tritium inventories and release rates allow workers to perform
tasks unencumbered by bubble suits, as they would be performing the same tasks
at a DT plant. The reduced gamma dose rates at various locations throughout
the plant for the DD fuel cycle, and especially for the DHe fuel cycle, allow for
contact maintenance in areas where the same task would be performed remotely at
a DT plant. This results in substantial savings in downtime. After consideration
of these effects, improved plant capacity factors of 69 % for DD and 72 % for DHe,
compared to 65 % for DT, were found. This partially offsets the increased costs
for the advanced fuel cycles seen in other areas, but does not have a strong enough
impact to render the advanced fuels economically competitive.
The DT fuel cycle is superior in terms of material and volume utilization per
unit power produced. It also requires much less magnetic energy for power pro-
duction. The DT fusion island is less capital intensive, but has a greater need for
component replacement as reflected through the wall loading. Nevertheless, the
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economics of the DT fuel cycle are far more attractive than that of the advanced
fuels.
Although the advanced fuels are at an economic disadvantage with respect
to DT, they have a clear advantage over the DT fuel cycle in terms of tritium
hazard. The tritium circulating throughout the plant, tritium inventories in plant
components, tritium release rates from these components and tritium exposures
incurred during -maintenance activities are all significantly reduced for the DD and
DHe fuel cycles.
The tritium exhausted from the DD and DHe reactor chambers is over two
orders of magnitude lower than for DT. This is a consequence of reduced tritium
fueling and the higher fractional burnup of tritium for the advanced fuels due to their
higher operating temperatures. This is important because the tritium inventories
established throughout the plant are largely dependent on the tritium exhaust rate
from the plasma.
Reductions in tritium inventories for the advanced fuels relative to DT are
found at all locations in the fuel cycle. The first wall tritium inventory is reduced
by two orders of magnitude; the tritium retained in the blanket structure is reduced
by three orders of magnitude. A large reduction in the quantity of tritium found in
the cryopumps and fuelers is seen for the advanced fuels. Although the amount of
tritium found in the coolant is small for all fuel cycles, the two orders of magnitude
reduction for the DD and DHe fuel cycles is significant because permeation of tritium
into the steam cycle and subsequent leakage from this system is a major tritium
pathway to the environment. Concerns associated with tritium in the breeding
blanket and blanket processing systems are completely eliminated for the advanced
fuels. The total vulnerable tritium inventory is reduced by over a factor of twenty
for the DD and DHe fuel cycles compared to DT. The total inventory at the site,
including both vulnerable and non-vulnerable forms, is reduced by nearly two orders
of magnitude for DD and DHe. The tritium throughput and resultant tritium
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inventories throughout the DHe plant are very near to that for the DD plant. The
plasma exhaust rate on which the tritium inventory is largely dependent, is based
on the tolerable level of alpha ash in the plasma. The higher formation rate of
alpha ash in the plasma of a DHe reactor requires a greater plasma exhaust rate
to maintain the ash concentration at an acceptable level. This results in relatively
high recirculation rates of all species and a higher tritium inventory throughout the
plant than would be expected from the tritium concentration in the DHe plasma.
Upon examination of the distribution of the tritium inventory throughout the
plant, it was shown that the tritium inventory in the DT blanket and blanket
processing system is somewhat less than that in the exhaust processing system and
much smaller than that in storage. Tritium breeding and blanket processing are not
the major contributors to the plant tritium inventory. It is the need for tritium as a
component of the fuel, and the relatively high tritium concentration in the exhaust
which leads to the higher tritium inventories. For the advanced fuels, the bulk of the
inventory is also located in the exhaust processing systems. However, this is much
reduced relative to DT so that the advanced fuels are much more desirable from a
tritium handling viewpoint. The elimination of the tritium breeding function for
the advanced fuels does not eliminate the need for tritium handling equipment such
as cryopumps, inolecular sieves, cryogenic distillation columns and fuelers. These
components are required whether or not tritium is bred, although on a smaller scale
than for DT.
The occupational tritium hazard and tritium releases to the environment are
dependent upon the releases to the reactor building during normal operation and
maintenance. The average tritium source term is reduced by two orders of mag-
nitude for the advanced fuels. As a consequence of this, the steady state tritium
concentration in the reactor hall is low enough that unprotected personnel access is
permitted, and the building atmosphere can be directly vented to the environment
without processing. Emergency tritium removal capabilities were assessed based
on the release of the maximum vulnerable tritium inventory. This was located in
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the blanket processing system for the DT reactors, and in the cryopumps for the
advanced fuels. Eight units would be needed to reduce the tritium concentration
i to 500 _pCi/m 3 within 48 hours for the DT designs; four units would accomplish
this objective for the advanced fueL. A single unit would be used during normal
operation at the DT'plants. The others would be on standby for off normal events.
This would be the case for all units found at the DD and DHe plants.
Tritiated wastes are significantly reduced for the advanced fuels, as would be
expected from their lower tritium inventories. This results in reduced exposures
during waste handling. Some cost savings also results for these activities for the
advanced fuels because of the lower volume and activity of the wastes being handled.
The HT-9 DD and DHe designs considered in this work showed no distinct
advantage in terms of induced radioactivity hazard over the DT fuel cycle. A
considerable reduction in long term concerns resulted with the RAF/Fe2Cr1V DD
design compared to the HT-9 design. A similar reduction in long term hazards
would also be expected with this materials change for the other fuel cycles.
The higher energy neutrons and greater flux intensity associated with the DT
designs lead to a greater concentration of radionuclides in their first walls. With
the increase in flux at high beta, activity concentrations are greatest for these
designs. The design presenting the most concentrated first wall activity level is the
20 % beta DT design. Short lived species dominate at shutdown in all cases. The
relative contribution of these short lived isotopes to the total shutdown activity is
greatest for DT. Long lived isotopes are present in equal or greater amounts in the
HT-9 DD first walls compared to the DT first walls. This is not the case for the DD
design with an RAF first wall where a reduction of nearly four orders of magnitude
is seen in the long lived species compared to the HT-9 first wall. The DHe first wall
contains a non-negligible amount of long lived species. This is both a consequence
of the softer neutron spectrum characteristic of the advanced fuels and of the longer
blanket lifetime. As would be expected from the higher level of activity associated
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with the DT designs, decay heating levels in the first wall at shutdown are greatest
for this fuel cycle.
The bulk of the blanket presents a slightly different situation than does the
first wall. The average blanket activity is lower than the first wall activity for
the DT designs because of the reduced amount of HT-9 structure located here.
The case is reversed for the advanced fuels, where the volume fraction of steel is
much greater in the blanket and the resulting activity levels are higher than in
the first wall. The activity concentrations and decay heat levels are greatest for
the 20 % beta DD design. As with the first wall, short lived species dominate the
shutdown activity of the blanket. Both short and long lived species are present
in greater quantities for the DD and DHe fuel cycles. This may be surprising,
especially for the DHe fuel cycle. It strongly suggests using a lower activation
material in the blanket, or employing boron to capture neutrons in the DHe case,
where useful energy multiplication is not crutial. The use of a Fe2Cr1V blanket,
with a reduced nickel and molybdenum content, showed reduced levels of long lived
isotopes compared to the HT-9 DD case, but resulted in higher levels than the DT
case (due to the higher fraction of structure in the DD blanket). These levels would
likely fall below the DT HT-9 levels if RAF was used in the blanket (RAF has
an even lower nickel and molybdenum content, so that long lived species would be
produced in sm aller amounts). This, however, would come-at a cost penalty.
Dose rates encountered by plant workers during normal operation were found
to be highest for the DT fuel cycle. Steam generator doses, followed by those
incurred during blanket changeouts, dominate occupational exposures in all cases.
This suggests that doses incurred during maintenance could be significantly reduced
by the use of a lower activation material. The RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket DD
design resulted in slightly higher doses to plant workers because of slightly higher
levels of short lived species compared to the HT-9 case. An additional hazard also
exists for the DT fuel cycle, during processing of the breeder material. However,
the dose incurred while carrying out breeder processing tasks is not large relative
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to (loses resulting from other maintenance activities. Offsite impacts of induced
radioactivity are expected to be negligible for all fuel cycles. Routine releases of
aqueous effluents and releases of activated atmospheric gases are expected to he lov.
The hazard presented to the public from induced activity under normal conditions
was not evaluated, but is expected to be small for all fuel cycles.
None of the wastes produced at the fusion plants qualifies for shallow land
burial. The advantage of the RAF/Fe2Cr1V design is seen in the reduced levels of
long lived isotopes. However, shallow land burial is not possible since the disposal
limit was still exceeded with this material. Shallow land burial may be possible if the
blanket had been made entirely of RAF. The economic penalty of using this more
expensive blanket material (compared to Fe2Cr1V) may be offset by the savings in
waste disposal costs. This would be true for all fuel cycles. Because the quantities of
long lived species are greatest for the HT-9 DD designs, it poses the greatest waste
disposal hazard. Blanket wastes from the DHe design still pose a waste disposal
threat. These conclusions should be regarded with caution since they are dependent
on the material used.
The effect of plasma beta on plant safety is more evident in terms of component
activation than tritium hazard. Very little difference was seen in tritium inventories,
release rates and occupational exposures for a given fuel cycle at various values of
beta. Hazards due to material activation and waste handling were seen to increase
with plasma beta. This is a consequence of the decreased reactor size, resulting in
a higher first wall flux and greater activity concentration. Because doses incurred
at the advanced fuel plants are almost exclusively due to exposure to gamma fields,
high beta designs for these fuel cycles are less desirable from a safety standpoint.
The advanced fuels appear to have greater quantities of stored energy in their
reactor systems and hence, a greater potential for release of radioactive material.
This is largely a consequence of the greater magnetic fields and the higher operating
temperature associated with these fuel cycles. The DD fuel cycle has the greatest
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quantity of stored energy in the form of decay heat, for the blanket material used
here (HT-9). This is a result :of the larger amount of structural material relative
to DT and the higher neutron flux relative to DHe. An additional source of stored
energy exists in the lithium blankets of the DT designs. The chemical energy which
could be released upon burning lithium presents a potential concern for this fuel
cycle. The magnitude of this source of stored energy is comparable to that stored
as kinetic and magnetic energy. in the advanced fuel plasmas.
To evaluate the impact of a potential accident, a loss of coolant accident was
investigated. The scenario envisioned was a complete loss of coolant to all modules
with a simultaneous breach of the vacuum vessel. This would allow ingress of air,
resulting in oxidation and volatilization of radioactive species. In terms of overall
impact of the accident, the DHe fuel cycle presents the least hazard. The temper-
ature achieved during the transient was the least for this fuel cycle. Although the
relative amounts of the different nuclides released are different, the total amount
volatilized is nearly the same for DT and DD. The total activity released for these
cases is over three orders of magnitude higher than for the DHe fuel cycle, but
significantly less than that released during the accident at Three Mile Island. The
impact of this accident was not evaluated for the RAF/Fe2Cr1V DD design. How-
ever, a similar first wall temperature response to the HT-9 case would be expected
due to the similar levels of short lived species. It would be expected that similar
quantities of the isotopes contributing most to the dose would be released so that
the impact of this accident would not be largely different between the two materials
considered.
Because of the very small radioactive release for the DHe fuel cycle, decontam-
ination was not required after the accident. The clean up effort was greatest for the
high beta DT and DD designs. They required a longer duration decontamination
program because of the greater amount of material mobilized, and resulted in a
greater occupational exposure. It was determined that the structural damage from
the accident would be limited to the single breached module. Repair then involved
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the replacement of a. single module in all cases. Doses during repair were found
to be higher for the low beta cases, mainly because of the longer time required to
replace the larger modules.
Little difference is seen in the total onsite dose incurred subsequent to the
accident for the DT and DD fuel cycles. There is a significant reduction in the
onsite dose incurred for the DHe fuel cycle. The doses are slightly greater for the
high beta designs, although the variation over the range of betas examined is less
than 20 % for both the DT and DD fuel cycles. Offsite doses are small in all cases.
However, the offsite impact is least for the DHe fuel cycle. It should be stressed
that the impact of this accident is minimal. The chronic dose at the site boundary
for the worst case just exceeds the limiting annual dose for a member of the general
public. If this scenario is representative of a design base accident, the minimal
offsite impact may allow less restrictive codes to be employed for construction.
The economic impact of the accident appears to be greatest for the DD fuel
cycle. This is largely due to the replacement component costs. Replacement power
costs are also a significant contributor to the accident costs. These are fairly similar
for the DT and DD designs at a given value of beta. This cost is somewhat lower
for DHe because there is no need for a decontamination program and the outage
duration is somewhat reduced. The economic benefit of the lower accident hazard
associated with the DHe design is clear.
A cost/benefit analysis was carried out to determine if the increased costs as-
sociated with the alternate designs were justified by the improved safety which they
provided. The analysis was performed relative to the 20 % beta DT case, the de-
sign which results in the lowest COE and the highest exposures. A cost/benefit
expenditure ceiling was evaluated which included an allowance for spending to im-
prove plant safety under normal conditions and accident conditions, as well as an
allowance to provide some protection for the utility's financial investment in the
plant. Spending limits ranged from 5.07 V-mn-rem where no consideration was
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given to financial risk, to 11.4 -rem, where some protection was provided
for the entire capital investment. When consideration is given only to normal con-
ditions, the spending limit was found to be 4.79 wm- . A cost/benefit figure
of merit was evaluated for each alternate design. This figure of merit considered
normal operation costs (COE) and doses incurred during normal operation, mainte-
nance and waste handling activities. For the HT-9 designs, costs and doses resulting
from the loss of coolant accident were also included. The results showed that for the
designs considered in this work, only the 10 % beta DT design is cost effective. The
main reason why the other designs are not cost effective stems from their higher
COE's. If the COE of the alternate designs can be reduced, they may then approach
the region of cost effectiveness. Note that this conclusion would still apply if only
normal operation had been considered for the HT-9 designs. However, it may not
be the case if more accident scenarios had been examined. Other accidents may
result in a lower economic impact relative to the high beta DT design in addition to
some dose savings. This would lower the cost/benefit figure of merit, and perhaps
would render some of the other designs cost effective.
Examining the results of the cost/benefit analysis for the DT fuel cycle alone,
previous indications of an optimum value of plasma beta of 10 % are confirmed.
Based on the outcome of the safety/economic tradeoffs, determined by the cost/benefit
analysis, a plasma beta of 10 % is most cost effective. This result is also seen for
the DD fuel cycle. The 10 % beta case results in the lowest cost/benefit figure of
merit of the three DD designs considered. A value of plasma beta of 10 % is also
most cost effective for the DD fuel cycle for the designs considered here.
A rough estimate of the cost effectiveness of the advanced fuel designs using a
low cost, low activation blanket material was made. Assuming a cost of 10 $/kg,
no operational gamma doses to workers, and no accident health impacts, it was
still found that the advanced fuel designs were not cost effective. It appears that
the safety advantages potentially available with the advanced fuel designs cannot
overcome their economic disadvantage. The low cost, low activation case was not
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examined for the DT fuel cycle. However, it is expected that designs with both 10%
and 20% beta would be cost effective relative to the base case design.
Including the effects of potential financial losses in determining the expenditure
ceiling did not affect the outcome of this study. However, it is important that this
aspect of the accident consequences be considered. The contribution of the capital
investment loss to the economic impact of the accident studied here is significant.
W\ith the potential for large financial losses, it would be wise to provide some
allowance for their protection.
The overall conclusion from this study is that a fusion plant utilizing the DT
fuel cycle with a plasma beta of 10 % is the most cost effective option of the
alternatives considered here. This conclusion applies to the designs studied in this
work and should not be taken as a generalization. Optimized designs using different
materials and/or energy conversion systems may well lead to a different conclusion.
Recommendations for Future Work
The broad nature of this study uncovered many areas which require further
study. These will be highlighted in this section.
The designs compared in this study were based on a consistent set of crite-
ria such that the differences between each would solely be a consequence of the
difference in the fuel cycle or the difference in plasma beta. Materials used and
plant systems which were not dependent on the fuel cycle, were the same for the
comparison amongst the fuel cycles so that the impact of the change in fuel cycle
would be clearly seen. An alternate material was investigated for a single fuel cycle
(DD) to determine the impact of such a change. Knowing the relative positions of
the fuel cycles with respect to safety and economics, it may now be useful to carry
out the analysis with the optimized designs for all fuel cycles. This would involve a
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substantial amount of design work and consideration of potential tradeoffs.
A rough assessment of the cost effectiveness of the advanced fuel designs using a
low cost, low activation material was made. It may be appropriate to more carefully
examine the use of such a material. The HT-9 structure was chosen for the compar-
ison amongst the fuel cycles in this work so as not to introduce a materials variation
into the analysis. As the results indicated here, this lead to considerable activity
in the advanced fuel blankets, impacting occupational hazards, waste disposal con-
cerns and accident consequences. However, in choosing a material, the purpose of
the blanket as an energy multiplication medium must be kept in mind. The DD
reactors illustrated the advantage of high energy gain in the blanket in that smaller
reactors producing less fusion power were needed to produce the same amount of
thermal power from the plant. The DD reactors also illustrated the safety disad-
vantages resulting from a high level of activity in the blanket. An alternate material
(reduced activation ferritic (RAF) first wall/Fe2Cr1V alloy blanket) was examined
for the DD fuel cycle. This showed improved blanket multiplication and reduced
long term hazards, but the short term concerns were still present. A material less
subject to neutron activation, but still an effective energy multiplication medium
would be desirable. These may be opposing constraints, so that some tradeoffs will
be necessary in selecting the most appropriate blanket material. The importance of
using a low cost material must also be given attention. Although utilizing a lower
activation material may result in some loss of blanket energy gain, this loss may
be offset by economic gains from reduced occupational hazards and waste disposal
issues. In fact, some materials may result in wastes qua'ifying for shallow land
burial which would likely lead to considerable savings. The challenge is then to find
a suitable low cost/low activation material. The RAF/Fe2Cr1V design showe'd a
reduction in cost and long term safety concerns, but a material which resulted in
lower short lived inventories would be more desirable. The cost/benefit approach
proposed in this work is well suited for application to problems such as this and it
may be useful to apply it to designs employing a vanadium alloy or ceramic (such
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as silicon carbide).
A more efficient energy conversion system could be employed to take advantage
of the larger fraction of energy released as charged particles with the advanced fuels.
Use of direct conversion of charged particle energy or MHD conversion of radiated
energy, especially in the case of the DHe fuel cycle, may be a much more effective
way of obtaining the energy released in the plasma. An investigation into different
energy conversion options should be undertaken. The use of a more efficient energy
conversion system in combination with a low cost, low activation blanket material
would take advantage of the safety benefits offered by the advanced fuel cycles
(especially DHe) and may render these designs costs effective.
It may be interesting to explore different operating regimes for the DHe fuel
cycle. Operating at a higher temperature where the reactivity is greater may be
more economical. Furthermore, enriching the fuel to a larger fraction of helium-3
may improve the cost effectiveness of this fuel cycle. A higher concentration of
helium-3 would suppress the neutron yielding DD side reactions, further improving
this fuel cycle's standing in the safety arena.
The potential for high q, and hence low current operation in the second stability
regime at high beta is presently being investigated. Should operation in this mode
be realized, cost reductions can be expected. Lower current will impact magnet,
power conditioning and current drive (for steady state operation) costs. This will
be important for the advanced fuels.
A further area where recent strides have been made is in superconducting
magnet technology. Higher temperature superconductors will result in significant
reductions in magnet operating costs. This again would be of greater significance
for the advanced fuels, which utilize higher magnetic fields.
An additional aspect which was not considered here for the DHe design was
the possibility of reduced construction time. Since there is the potential for lower
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activation, the construction timeAy be reduced because of easier siting and li-
censing. Furthermore, the use of readily obtainable non-nuclear grade components
in many areas of the plant may avoid unnecessary delays during plant construction.
It may be worthwhile investigating this consideration.
The negative conclusion on advanced fuels may be changed if N-stamp con-
struction requirements are reduced. This could provide considerable savings in both
construction time and materials costs. Additional economic savings could be envi-
sioned if consideration was given to reduced safety systems costs for the advanced
fuels.
It may be enlightening to include additional accident scenarios. The loss of
coolant accident studied here represents only one of an entire spectrum of possible
offnormal events. Examining the impact of a several forced outages or small conse-
quence events, and the consequences of a more severe accident would provide more
evidence for the relative ranking of the fuel cycles in terms of safety and economics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Fusion's ultimate acceptance.as an energy source will depend on how success-
fully its potential safety and environmental advantages are utilized. More specifi-
cally, it will depend on whether achieving ambitious environmental and safety goals
in fusion reactors can be managed economically. Fusion studies to date have gen-
erallv focussed on the DT fuel cycle because of its high energy release and high
reactivity at relatively low temperatures. While these factors seem significant at
this stage of fusion reactor development, the ultimate goal of advanced fuel cy-
cle operation cannot be ignored. If physics and technology issues do not preclude
their use, advanced fuel cycles may enhance fusion's position in the area of safety.
Elimination of the need to breed tritium avoids having to deal with the hazards
of lithium or its compounds, and reduces radioactive gas handling and inventory.
These considerations, in addition to the potential for lower structural activation
due to a reduction in the high energy neutron flux, provide a strong impetus for
examining alternate fuels. However, there may be an economic penalty associated
with the use of such a scheme.
The DD fuel cycle is the advanced fuel cycle which has received the most
attention to date. In this study, the economics and safety of this advanced fuel cycle
will be examined and compared to that of the DT fuel cycle. Some investigation of
the DHe fuel cycle, in which interest has recently grown, will also be undertaken.
It is hoped that some conclusions regarding the cost effectiveness of the advanced
fuel cycles relative to the DT fuel cycle will emerge.
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1.1 Fuel Cycles for Fusion Reactors
Most efforts in the fusion community have been devoted to the development of
the DT fuel cycle. The large reaction cross section at relatively lower temperatures
makes DT fuel the easiest of fusion fuels to ignite. Furthermore, the relatively large
energy release of the DT reaction provides the highest possible fusion power density.
The reaction between deuterium and tritium is given by:
D + T -+ 4He (3.5 MeV) + n (14.1 MeV)
The advanced fuel cycle which appears the most attractive for use in fusion
reactors is the DD fuel cycle since its ignition requirements are not vastly greater
than for the DT fuel cycle and are potentially achievable. DD fusion is advantageous
since deuterium, a naturally occurring and easily separable isotope of hydrogen, is
the only fuel required. Two possible reactions, the neutron branch and the proton
branch, take place with almost equal probability. The tritium produced in the
proton branch and the helium-3 formed from the neutron branch can also react
within the plasma. The sum of all these reactions form the catalyzed-deuterium or
cat-D fuel cycle:
D - D T (1.01 MeV) H (3.02 MeV)
D - D - 3He (0.82 MeV) + n (2.45 MeV)
D - T - 4He (3.5 MeV) - n (14.1 MeV)
D - 3He -+ 4He (3.6 MeV) - H (14.7 MeV)
At sufficiently high temperatures, the four nuclear reactions shown above would
occur, with the two neutrons produced leaving the plasma and depositing their
energy elsewhere. From six reacting deuterons, the total energy release would be
43.2 MeV or 7.2 MeV per deuteron.
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[he pcpsibility of utilizing a cat-D-T iode of operation also exists 1.1, 1.2.
This mode operates in the regime between the DT and cat-D fuel cycles where
the DD and DT reactions occur simultaneously in the plasma. The relative rates
at which these two reactions occur would be determined by the average num-
ber of tritons fed into the reactor. The cat-D-T mode of operation may allevi-
ate some of the difficulties encountered with both the DT and cat-D fuel cycles
and may be envisioned as an optimum fuel cycle. Feeding the plasma with ex-
ternally produced tritium can increase its average reactivity and power density
relative to a cat-D plasma and may lead to a relaxation of the confinement re-
quirements of cat-D reactors. On the other hand, a simpler and possibly safer
and cheaper blanket design compared to DT may result from a. reduction in the
number of tritons which must be produced per fusion neutron. A further alterna-
tive known as the semi-catalyzed deuterium (SCD) fuel cycle has also been given
some attention 1.11. In this case, all the tritium, but little of the helium-3 pro-
duced in the DD reactions, fuses in the plasma. If tritium produced by external
sources is also added to the plasma, the fraction of the DT reactions occurring can
be increased, causing the plasma to be operated in the SCD-T mode. Since the
helium-3 reaction rate is low at moderate temperatures compared to DT, the use
of tritium to improve the plasma reactivity appears more effective than the use of
helium-3.
In the case of the DHe fuel cycle, the fourth reaction indicated above would
dominate. DD side reactions and the subsequent burning of tritium produced in
the proton branch of the DD fuel cycle result in the DHe fuel cycle not being com-
pletely neutron free. However, undesirable neutron production can be minimized
by enriching the fuel in helium-3 and/or operating at a much higher temperature
where the DHe reaction cross section far exceeds the DD reaction cross section.
The advantages of the DHe fuel cycle have been-emphasized in previous work
[1.3, 1.4, 1.5-1.12]. The high fraction of energy released as charged particles make
the use of direct conversion techniques attractive, providing the potential for more
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efficient energy recovery. The main advantages lie in the greatly reduced neutron
production, leading to decreased shielding and lower material activation, and the
large amount of energy released in charged particles, making more efficient energy
conversion schemes possible. However, there, are several disadvantages associated
with this fuel cycle. The low power density, compared to DT, necessitates high mag-
netic fields or high beta. High beta would allow the magnetic field to be reduced,
leading to lower magnet costs and reduction of cyclotron radiation losses. However.
the attainability of high beta is uncertain at this time. There is some concern about
the relatively high heat fluxes impinging on the first wall of DHe reactors. These sur-
face heats loads may be tolerable, in light of the the low neutron fields [1.3, 1.4, 1.13'
which also exist. The use of materials with relatively high thermal conductivities
will further mitigate this issue because they will lead to lower temperature differen-
tials and thermal stresses [1.147. The major shortcoming which has deterred research
efforts on this fuel cycle is the supply of fuel. The availability of helium-3 on earth
is limited. Sources are listed in table 1.1. The quantity available could supply an
experimental research program, but would be insufficient to support a mature fusion
economy based on the DHe fuel cycle. The idea of using DHe satellite reactors with
DT or DD reactors as generators of helium-3 has been the only suggestion up to this
point to circumvent the fuel supply problem [1.3, 1.7-1.9'. However, a recent study
[1.10~ has identified the lunar soil as being a potentially large source of helium-3.
The moon has served as a collector of solar wind particles for more than four billion
years. The helium nuclei in this wind irrpinge upon the lunar surface at a flux of
6 x 1010 particles/cm2 . s, and the isotopic abundance of helium-3 is high (--- 480
appm). It is estimated that the soil of the moon contains a million tonnes of helium-
3, enough to provide 10' GWe. yr of electrical power (in a 50 % efficient DHe fusion
reactor). Expressed in a different manner, the entire U.S. electrical consumption
in 1985 could come from mining an area on the moon's surface equivalent in area
to the size of Washington D.C. If it is possible to efficiently, mine and transport
the helium-3 back to earth, then the major drawback of this fuel cycle would be
overcome.
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Table 1.1: Terrestrial Resources of Helium-3 [1.10]
Isotopic
Abundance
3He
'He
(appm)
Cumulative
Amount to
Year 2000
(kg)
Production
Rate Post
year 2000
(kg/yr)
U.S Stored Helium
Reserves
U.S Natural Gas
Wells
Volcanic Gases
Atmosphere
Decay of T2 :
DOE
CANDU Reactors
U.S. Weapons
29
187
3
4 x 106
Source
0.2
0.2
~-16
1.4
> 13.4 1.3
10 2
~ 300 ~-15
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The probability of a reaction occurring is given by the reaction cross section.
Values for the reactions of interest here are shown in figure 1.1 (from reference
[1.16]). The DT curve exhibits a maximum at an energy of 110 keV. Below about
100 keV, the total DD cross section is roughly 100 times smaller than the DT cross
section. The DHe cross section in this same energy range is less than the DD
value and much below the DT value. However, the DHe cross section is a rapidly
increasing function of energy and exceeds the DD cross section above 120 keV. The
DD curve gives the sum of the cross sections for the two DD reactions. Up to
deuteron energies of 120 keV, the value for each individual reaction may be taken
as half the total.
The rate of a particular reaction is reflected by the value of the reaction rate
parameter (o v), which is simply the reaction cross section averaged over the particle
velocity distribution. Often a maxwellian velocity distribution is assumed. Integra-
tion of the cross sections of figure 1.1 over a maxwellian distribution of velocities
leads to the results shown in figure 1.2 (also taken from reference [1.16]). The peak
of the DT curve occurs at roughly 70 keV. The DD and DHe curves peak at much
higher temperatures. The reaction rate parameter, along with the energy released
per interaction, is important in determining fusion power density. Since both of
these factors are reduced for the DD reactions compared to the DT reaction, the
fusion power density for a DD reactor would be somewhat lower than that for a
DT reactor. Hence, to obtain the same total power output, a DD reactor would
have to be larger if other factors affecting power output remain fixed. This results
in an economic penalty due to the greater materials needs of a larger reactor, but
may provide the benefit of lower specific activation. Although the DHe reactivity
is lower than DT, the energy yield for this reaction is large (18.3 MeV compared to
3.6 MeV on average for DD, and 17.6 MeV for DT). Above about 22 keV, the DHe
reactivity exceeds that of the DD reaction. Thus, for the same fusion power, the
DHe reactor would be smaller than its DD counterpart, but still somewhat larger
than its DT counterpart.
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The lower reactivity of the advanced fuels could be partially compensated for
by operating at a higher temperature. This is technologically more difficult to
achieve and would result in larger radiative losses, requiring a correspondingly longer
energy confinement time [1.17]. Because of the higher ignition temperature, greater
heating is required to achieve ignition in a DD or DHe reactor. This problem is not
insurmountable, however, since it may be possible to minimize external heating by
igniting a DT plasma and allowing thermal runaway.
Energy losses are of greater concern for advanced fuel reactors. At temperatures
above 10 keV, bremsstrahlung losses are insignificant compared to fusion power in
a DT reactor (Ti*-DT = 4 keV). Bremsstrahlung losses become equivalent to the
energy released from DD fusion at 36 keV (Ti.do = 36keV, T i =-25 keV)
and at 29 keV for DHe fusion (Tideal 29 keV) [1.18]. Above this temperature,
fusion power produced exceeds bremsstrahlung power, but by less than an order of
magnitude, so that these losses are significant in an advanced fuel system. In the
presence of high fields, cyclotron losses also become large.
The distribution of energy between charged particles and neutrons is of im-
portance. Since charged particles can be confined in a magnetic field, they will be
retained in the reaction region, while the neutrons will escape and liberate their
energy in a different location. Thus, only the energy of the charged particles will
be available internally to compensate for energy losses and to sustain the reacting
plasma. In a thermonuclear reacting system consisting of deuterium alone, the two
DD reactions would occur at nearly equal rates, and the tritium formed in the
proton branch would then react, relatively rapidly, with deuterium. In this svs-
tem (semi-catalyzed DD), 8.3 MeV out of the total 24.9 MeV released, or about
33 %, would be carried by charged particles; the other 16.6 MeV of energy
(67 %) carried by neutrons, would be recoverable only as heat. In a reacting
system consisting of an equal mixture of deuterium and helium-3, the majority
of reactions would result in no neutron production. However, the unavoidable DD
side reactions produce 2.45 MeV neutrons and tritons, which then react to pro-
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duce 14 MeV neutrons. The relative importance of the DD side reactions and
the consequent neutron production depend on the operating temperature. How-
ever, the fraction of energy carried by neutrons for the DHe fuel cycle is below
10 % at modest temperatures and can be as low as 1 - 2 % if high temperatures
and helium-3 rich fuel are utilized. The higher fraction of energy carried by charge
particles imply high surface particle and radiation loads for advanced fuel reactors.
Countering this, neutron damage and activation in a DT reactor would be more
severe due to the greater number of high energy neutrons.
1.2 Design Considerations For Advanced Fuel Reactors
The design of an advanced fuel reactor involves the consideration of many
factors. These include reduced high energy neutron production, increased fusion
energy carried by charged particles and the elimination of the need for tritium
breeding. The contribution of a lower reaction cross section, higher required plasma
temperature and increased radiation losses make efficient confinement more difficult.
Thus, advanced fuel cycles provide simplification in some reactor design aspects, but
lead to greater complexities in other areas.
Upon considering technology issues for various fuel cycles, neutron yield is of
prime importance. In the DT cycle, approximately 80 % of the power is given to
the neutrons. In the cat-D cycle, the neutrons carry away roughly 40 % of the total
power, while less than 10 % of the energy resides with the neutrons for the DHe fuel
cycle. This impacts the design of the first wall/blanket and shielding requirements.
Lower neutronic heating puts a less severe demand on the blanket heat transport
system. The smaller number of energetic neutrons per unit area impinging on the
first wall reduces damage and lengthens the first wall and blanket lifetime. An
assessment by Baxter et al. [1.19] indicated that the first wall and blanket lifetime
would be four to five times longer for a DD tokamak compared to a DT tokamak.
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This situation would be even more favorable for the DHe tokamak, and lifetime
blankets may even be possible. Furthermore, maintenance and replacement opera-
tions for a DHe device may be more easily and quickly accomplished, resulting in
improved availability. However, the high surface heat loads present a concern for
first wall materials and require an efficient heat removal system. The lower bulk
neutron heating in the advanced fuel blanket necessitates the use of materials that
produce a high energy multiplication in order to improve the economic viability of
the system. Removing the need for tritium breeding in the advanced fuel designs
allows the system to be optimized for energy multiplication. Optimization can be
achieved by selecting materials with a high (ny) reaction potential since this type
of reaction generally releases a large amount of energy. Since the (n,y) cross sec-
tions generally decrease as neutron energy increases (a oc 1), energy multiplication
can be maximized if measures are taken to moderate the neutrons. However, care-
ful material selection is essential so that material activation and afterheat do not
present a major concern.
The higher fraction of energy carried by charged particles suggest alternate
approaches to energy conversion for the advanced fuel reactor. Direct conversion
of charged particle energy provides more efficient conversion from fusion to electric
power. If this option is not employed, elimination of the breeder function of the
blanket allows more freedom in materials choice so that, in the case of the DD
reactor, which still has a relatively high neutron yield, the blanket can be designed
to-optimize energy gain. This will offset the lower fusion power density of the DD
reactor, allowing for a smaller reactor to produce the same total thermal power.
Tn the case of the DHe fuel cycle, which has a relatively low neutron yield, clever
schemes of obtaining the radiative energy released, such as MHD conversion, may
be more efficient. This would alleviate concerns due to high surface wall loads.
In a previous study [1.20], a nuclear analysis was performed to identify the
impact on technology requirements of alternate fuels. It was found that cat-D
systems yield relatively high nuclear heating and atomic displacement rates when
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compared to DT systems having a eutron wall load as much as twice as high.
However, the radiation damage due to gas production was found to be more se-
vere in DT systems since the associated damage cross sections have high threshold
energies. The reduced danage in the DD reactor may lead to increased first wall
lifetime and improved plant maintenance capability. The study also assessed reac-
tor shielding requirements for the alternate cycles. For an epoxy-based insulator for
superconducting magnets with a limiting dose of 5 x 10' rad and a plant lifetime of
30 MW -yr/m 2 , about 1 m of shielding would be required for the cat-D cycle. With
the low neutron yield of the DHe fuel cycle, radiation damage, induced activity and
shielding requirements are considerable reduced. Baker et al. [1.20] estimated a
shielding thickness of 0.7 m for this fuel cycle. A smaller blanket can also be used
since there will be little neutron heating and the radiative energy can be captured
in a relatively small thickness [1.7]. The smaller blanket/shield thickness reduces
materials costs and will also allow for smaller, less costly magnet structures. Ac-
cording to Baker et al. [1.20], the breeding blanket and shield would be about
1.5 m thick for the DT cycle. The smaller thickness of the advanced fuel blankets
would allow for greater coupling between the magnet, other auxiliary systems and
the plasma. A thinner inboard shield would permit higher fields in the plasma and
thus would enhance its power density. Since the thickness of the outboard blan-
ket/shield is less critical, this portion of the blanket could be designed to increase
neutron multiplication.
An advanced fuel tokamak reactor will require toroidal magnetic fields and
plasma currents larger than those contemplated in design studies for DT tokamak
reactors. To initiate and sustain the larger plasma current, a larger flux swing in the
ohmic heating (OH) coil system will be required. This will necessitate a larger area
within the OH solenoid. The larger toroidal field will require thicker TF coils, with
a larger radius of curvature, demanding more support. The cost of these magnets
would be high. If such high fields were employed in DT designs, a higher power
density would result leading to shorter first wall and blanket lifetimes. Hence, the
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high field option for DT reactors may not be beneficial.
To alleviate fatigue problems associated with pulsed operation, considerable
attention has been given to steady state current drive. The STARFIRE reactor
[1.21] employs lower hybrid waves for steady state operation with DT fuel. The very
large toroidal current in an advanced fuel reactor makes the rf power prohibitive
for this type of current drive. 'The WILDCAT reactor design [1.22], which is the
DD counterpart to STARFIRE, employs the compressional alfven wave rf current
drive for steady state operation. Use of this mode presents a larger penalty in
terms of percentage of total plant output required for current drive power. This is
unfortunate, since the DD reactor has a higher fraction of the total wall load in the
form of charged particles and radiation which provides incentive to operate in the
steady state mode in order to prevent encroaching on heat load limitations.
Another important parameter to be considered in fusion reactor studies is the
plasma beta. This parameter contains constraints imposed by both physics and
technology. The value of beta can never exceed unity, since the plasma energy den-
sity cannot be larger than the magnetic energy density in a stable tokamak plasma.
However, the closer beta approaches unity, the more effectively the existing mag-
netic field is being utilized. It can be easily shown that the power density of a
fusion reactor scales with J 2B4 . Since current designs employ magnetic fields of
14 - 15 T, which represent the upper limit of current superconducting magnet tech-
nology, a larger total power output can be achieved with a higher value of beta. It
has been shown [1.23] that over the range of beta which is permitted by tokamak
stability considerations (0.02 - 0.09), DT tokamaks have power densities ranging
from 0.6 MW/m 3 to 5.0 MW/M 3 . It was also noted that the power density of
5.0 MW/m 3 can be achieved in a cat-D tokamak at a value of beta of about 0.2.
Hence, if high beta can be achieved, the advanced fuel reactor should be competitive
with the DT tokamak on the basis of maximum achievable power density. Further-
more, this study indicated that if high beta fusion reactors become feasible, the DT
reaction loses its primary attraction of high reactivity, since wall loading limitations
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prevent this advantage from being fully exploited.
A further consideration for advanced fuel reactor designs is the maximum im-
purity concentration in the plasma that will permit ignition. The allowable concen-
tration decreases exponentially with the charge of the impure species. It has been
shown that a DD reactor must be an order of magnitude cleaner than a DT reactor
[1.241. The ash products to be removed from a DD reactor are protons and alphas,
compared to only alphas for DT. Since protons charge exchange, they are more
difficult to remove. However, since the average mass of a DD plasma is lower than
the average mass of a DT plasma, sputtering of the boundary coating is somewhat
less of a problem for a DD reactor. This is an advantage since it alleviates, to a
degree, the more stringent requirements on the impurity control system needed to
ensure a cleaner plasma. In the DHe plasma, almost as much alpha ash is produced
as in a DT reactor. However, because of the need for a much cleaner plasma for this
system (to minimize radiative losses at the higher operating temperature), demands
on the impurity removal system are greater than for DT.
1.3 Safety and Economic Considerations
A viable reactor system would produce sufficient fusion power to overcome
plasma losses, supply enough electric power to operate the fusion plant and have
a sufficient amount of net power available for sale so that the cost of building and
maintaining the plant are justified. Safety and environmental concerns must also be
considered when assessing the cost effectiveness of the fusion plant. A safety benefit
of employing the cat-D fuel cycle is the possibility of reduced structural activation
resulting from the decreased high energy neutron flux [1.25, 1.261. Baxter et al.,
[1.191 have stated that the inventories of activated structural materials and activated
corrosion products are less for a DD tokamak than for a DT tokamak for short times
after shutdown (less than 10 years) since the inventory is dominated by short half-
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life radicinuclides with an equilibrium inventory proportional to the neutron flux
(which is smaller for DD than for DT reactors). However, they also indicated that
for the same total neutron fluence (15 MW.yr/m 2 for STARFIRE and 20 full power
years for a DD tokamak operated at a thermal wall loading of 1 MW . yr/m 2 ), the
long-lived radioactive inventories are approximately the same. Baker et al. '1.20]
have shown that the hazard associated with the induced radioactive inventory of a
DHe device (as indicated by the BHP) is one to two orders of magnitude lower than
for a DD or DT device. For the same total power output. the specific afterheat of
DD and DHe reactors will be lower than the DT design due to the decreased neutron
power, resulting in smaller radioactive inventories and the larger volume in which
they are contained. The reduced specific activity also has beneficial implications
for waste disposal. There may also be a reduction in total waste volume due to
longer blanket lifetime. Further gains in alleviating waste disposal concerns can be
achieved through the flexibility of the advanced fuel reactor blanket, allowing low
activation materials to be more easily accommodated.
The tritium inventory in the advanced fuel reactor may be more than two orders
of magnitude lower than in a DT reactor. Systems for recovery and processing
of tritium from vacuum exhaust are still required for the DD and DHe reactors.
However, systems for recovery and containment of tritium in the blanket and heat
transport system are not needed. Consequences of tritium accidents would be much
less for the advanced fuel cycles compared to the DT cycle.
Sources of stored energy provide a mechanism for the release of radioactiv-
ity. The advanced fuel reactors have greater plasma kinetic energy. For example,
WILDCAT has approximately 8300 MIJ in plasma kinetic energy compared to ap-
proximately 900 MIJ for STARFIRE '1.27. Additionally, the DD and DHe reac-
tors have more energy stored in the magnets due to the higher fields used (e.g.
14.4 T for WILDCAT compared to 11 T for STARFIRE). Another source of stored'
energy is decay heat. This is expected to be lower for the advanced fuel reactors
than for DT; blanket damage or melting would take much longer. Hazards associ-
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ated with the chemical reactivity of lithium and its compounds can be completely
avoided with the elimination of tritinum beeding in the advanced fuel designs. Over-
all, it appears that advanced fuel tokamaks present a lesser risk than DT tokamaks.
1.4 Recent Design Studies
,Since the tokamak is the reactor concept currently closest to realization, toka-
mak reactors have been most studied. The most well known DT tokamak reactor
study is STARFIRE [1.21]. Some smaller scale studies have been performed for DD
reactors, the most well known of which is the WILDCAT study [1.22'. Even less
work has been performed for the DHe fuel cycle. The STARFIRE reactor was de-
signed with a relatively low plasma beta of 6.7 % and a magnetic field of 11 T. The
net electric power output of the STARFIRE reactor is 1200 MW. WILDCAT was
designed with a plasma beta of 11.5 %. A magnetic field of 14.4 T, which represents
the upper limit on superconducting magnet technology, was -necessary to obtain a
favorable power balance. WILDCAT was designed to produce 810 MWe and the
cost was determined to be 62 mills/kWh. If the reactor is scaled up to a net power
production of 1200 MWe, as for STARFIRE, the COE drops to 44 mills/kWh [1.191.
This is only marginally above the COE for STARFIRE of 35 mills/kWh (1980 S).
If beta is increased to 15 % in STARFIRE, and the maximum magnetic field is
decreased from 11 to 7.5 T to maintain a constant fusion power density and plasma
size, the COE is only slightly reduced [1.25". It is apparent, then, that the effects
of high beta operation are more strongly felt by DD reactors. If high beta can be
achieved, DD reactors may be more cost effective than DT reactors.
Another DD tokamak reactor assessment was performed by Science Applica-
tions; Inc [1.261. Their study was based on a 1200 MWe DD reactor. Variations in
magnetic field, beta and reactor size were investigated. They determined that the
cost decrease per unit increase in beta is small for beta larger that 15 %, where the
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COE is roughly equal to 37 mills/kWh. Hence in agreement with the WILDCAT
study conclusions, if high plasma beta can be achieved, the COE of DD tokamaks
approach that of DT tokamaks.
Some smaller scale studies have been performed for the DHe fuel cycle *1.3,
1.41. The main reason that designs for this fuel cycle have not been developed to
the same extent as for the DD fuel cycle is the inability to guarantee a supply of fuel.
To circumvent this problem, some studies have focussed on the DD breeder/DHe
satellite system !1.7, 1.12". This scenario utilizes free neutrons from a cat-D reactor
to breed tritium which is then allowed to decay to helium-3, supplying fuel for a
satellite DHe reactor. Other DHe reactors have been designed assuming fuel would
be available. Values of plasma beta from 0.1 to 0.3 have been used, with on axis
fields of 5.5 to 7.0 T '1.3, 1.41. No estimates for the cost of electricity from these
designs was made.
1.5 Scope of Present Work
The advantages and disadvantages of the DD and DHe fuel cycles relative to
the DT fuel cycle have been briefly presented in this introductory chapter. For a
given geometry, size, toroidal field and plasma beta, the power production of an
advanced fuel reactor is substantially lower than that of a tritium fueled reactor.
Consequently, a DD or DHe reactor must be significantly larger and/or operate at
higher magnetic fields or higher plasma betas than a DT reactor of comparable
fusion power. Larger devices with higher field magnets are more difficult to de-
sign. Larger devices would also imply larger auxiliary systems and higher parasitic
power losses resulting in lower efficiency and reduced net electric power. Higher
temperature operation for the advanced fuel reactor results in greater cyclotron
and bremsstrahlung losses and necessitates a larger confinement parameter, n-r,
and fewer impurities in the plasma in order to achieve ignition. The larger fraction
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of total po%%er in the form of charged particles and radiationi makes heat load a
concern in the first wall/blanket design. The overall result of these factors may
be to increase the cost of electricity for advanced fuel reactors. However, no cost
studies have estimated the economic benefits of lower occupational, accident and
waste disposal hazards anticipated for the advanced fuel cycles. Furthermore, even
if these effects do not make DD or DHe reactors a cheaper source of electricity, it
has yet to be determined if the safety benefits from these fuel cycles justify a more
expensive source of power. An attempt to achieve some conclusions with regards
to the cost effectiveness of the DD and DHe fuel cycles is made in this work.
The representative designs for the comparison are described in chapter 2. In
chapter 3, a discussion of the economic evaluation is given. Chapter 4 discusses in
more detail, the components of the fuel handling system required for each fuel cycle.
In chapter 5, the tritium hazards of the fuel cycles are estimated by scaling and
extension of previous studies. Induced radioactivity hazards and waste management
issues are also addressed. In chapter 6, the safety and economic repercussions
of a loss of coolant accident are assessed and compared. Chapter 7 applies an
approach to cost/benefit analysis to determine the cost effectiveness of the various
designs. Conclusions and recommendations are are summarized at the beginning of
the report.
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Chapter 2
Reference Reactor Designs
The primary objective of this study is to assess the impact of the fusion fuel
cycle on reactor safety and economics. In order to investigate the impact of using
an advanced fuel instead of DT fuel, the fusion reactors for each fuel cycle must
first be defined. Several reactor designs have been developed for this purpose, each
being a pulsed, superconducting tokamak. The designs were characterized using
the superconducting design code described in appendix A, and are discussed in this
chapter. An effort has been made to develop consistent designs. Thus, only neces-
sary modifications to a base case DT design were made in order to accommodate
DD and DHe fuel cycles. In this way, it is hoped, the impact of changing the fuel
cycle will not be obscured. It should be noted that these designs do not represent
the optimum scheme for each fuel cycle, but rather provide the foundation for com-
paring the fuel cycles on an equal basis. In this section, the parameters common
to all designs will be outlined. Specific designs for each of the fuel cycles will be
presented. The reasoning for the choice of specific values of parameters will be
discussed.
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2.1 Reactor Parameters
2.1.1 Plasma Beta
The effectiveness of utilizing the magnetic field for confinement of a plasma,
as measured by the plasma beta, is a key physics parameter which impacts overall
cost. This is particularly true for schemes like the tokamak which rely primarily
on strong magnetic fields generated by external conductors for confinement of the
plasma. Experimental values of plasma beta achieved to date have been limited to
5 % [2.1]. Studies [2.2, 2.3] have suggested that a substantial decrease in the cost
of energy could be realised by operating at a higher value of beta than currently
possible, since a greater fusion power density would be achieved (fusion power ~ p2).
A smaller reactor could be used to produce a given amount of power. This issue is
more important when considering the advanced fuel cycles, because the economics
may only be attractive with higher beta [2.4 - 2.83. Furthermore, high beta would
relax the requirement for high magnetic fields for advanced fuel devices, lowering
magnet costs and reducing synchrotron losses. If limitations on beta imposed by
the physics render such high values unattainable, the design is driven to a more
expensive region of parameter space. It is possible, however, that a very high beta
may not be beneficial for DT reactors [2.8]. As beta is increased, the power density
increases, allowing the reactor to be smaller for the same total power output. Wall
loading and materials limitations may then be encountered. Although operation
at higher beta permits the use of lower magnetic fields for the same power output,
more frequent replacement of components at higher wall loadings may render high
beta DT reactors uneconomical.
Because MHD instabilities have the potential to limit beta to low values, ex-
tensive studies at several laboratories have been performed to determine ideal MHD
limits for various configurations. The maximum stable value of beta has been found
to increase with inverse aspect ratio, elongation and triangularity. Scaling laws for
the beta limit have been developed-as a function of principal geometric factors.
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Several are given in table 2.1. These apply to the first region of stability. Experi-
ments on Doublet III covered a wide range of plasma shapes in order to compare
experiments with theory [2.9]. Betas of up to 4.7 % were achieved [2.9] and good
agreement with the theoretical ballooning mode predictions of Tuda and Sykes was
found [2.10].
The existence of a high beta second region of stability has been predicted
by various theoretical studies [2.5, 2.9, 2.11 - 2.131. For the BIG DEE tokamak,
which will be constructed from the Doublet III tokamak, the theoretical beta limit
was found to vary from 11 % to over 21 % 2.5]. Yamazaki et al. [2.11] indicate
that higher elongation and more pronounced triangularity of the plasma shape are
favourable for achieving higher beta values. Furthermore, they propose that strong
bean shaping has the essential feature of allowing access to the second stability
region.
Grimm et al. [2.121 suggest that bean shaping could provide for a ballooning-
mode-stable path to very high beta values ( > 20%) in medium aspect ratio,
slightly elongated tokamak plasmas. Chance et al. [2.13] state that indentation of a
tokamak plasma on its inboard side aids in achieving high beta stability against bal-
looning modes and that moderate indentation provides accessibility to the second
region of stability. Sheffield [2.17], Dobrott [2.6] and Baxter et al. [2.7] appear opti-
mistic regarding the achievability of higher beta. However, others [2.18, 2.19] have
expressed their skepticism towards the attainment of the second stability regime.
No scaling laws describing achievable beta in the second stability region as a
function of relevant parameters currently exist. Because of this, and the relatively
large uncertainties associated with second stability beta, it is difficult to explore
possible commercial reactor designs using the high beta approach. The second sta-
bility regime is significantly displaced from present tokamak physics and a number
of theoretical questions remain. Despite this, it was felt important to examine the
potential of high beta designs. Representative high beta cases have been generated
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assuming confinement continues to follow present trends at high beta. Access to the
second stability regime was assumed to be obtained through strong plasma shaping.
In all fairness, the fuel cycle comparison should be made at the same value
of beta. It appears to be most desirable to operate at high beta, but whether or
not such values can be achieved is uncertain. Consequently, reactor designs for a
range of values of beta were developed for the DT and DD fuel cycles (from 3 % to
20 %). A single intermediate value of beta of 10 % was chosen for the DHe fuel cycle
since it was felt that scoping the entire range for this fuel cycle would not reveal
any new information in addition to that found for the DD fuel cycle. In a recent
DD reactor assessment [2.73, it was shown that economic gains beyond a beta value
of 20 % are small. At values of beta in this vicinity, the cost of energy from a DD
tokamak was shown to approach that of a DT tokamak. For this reason, an upper
limit for beta of 20 % was chosen.
2.1.2 Blanket Materials
The blanket concept selected for the DT designs employs a liquid lithium
breeder, helium coolant and HT-9 (ferritic steel) as the structural material. This
combination of breeder/coolant/structure was one of the top ranked tokamak blan-
ket designs recommended for further investigation by the Blanket Comparison and
Selection Study [2.20]. It was selected as the most attractive option for the present
study over Li/Li/V (ranked #1) and Li 2 0/He/HT-9 (ranked #2). The use of He
as blanket coolant was desirable since it can be used for all fuel cycles, and the
safety concerns associated with a liquid lithium coolant in the DD and DHe designs
would be avoided. The use of a liquid breeder for the DT designs was felt to be
advantageous since it can be circulated through the blanket, allowing for the bred
tritium to be extracted external to the blanket.
64
With the advanced fuel designs,the need for tritium breeding is eliminated.
The blanket can be designed to maximize energy multiplication. The material
chosen for the DD and DHe blankets is HT-9, cooled by helium. By keeping the
structure and coolant the same as in the DT designs, the effect of eliminating tritium
breeding should be evident.
It was also of interest to investigate the impact of a materials change on safety
and economics. This was carried out only for the DD fuel cycle. The alternate first
wall material selected was a reduced activation ferritic steel (RAF) (see appendix A
for exact composition). Relative to HT-9, the major differences in this material are
that it contains much less molybdenum (0.00027 % compared to 1.0 % by weight)
and less nickel (0.006 %.versus 0.5 %). Because of the less severe environment in the
blanket compared to the first wall, a lower cost material having reduced performance
characteristics could be employed in the blanket region. The material used in the
bulk of the blanket was the alloy Fe2Cr1V. Relative to HT-9, the iron content of
this material is greater (95.13 % compared to 85.0 % by weight), the chromium
content is reduced (2.4 % versus 11.5 %), as is the manganese content (0.3 % versus
0.55 %). The quantities of nickel and molybdenum are greatly reduced (nickel from
0.5 % to 0.05 %, molybdenum from 1.0 % to 0.02 %) and the alloy contains no
tungsten. With these alterations to the material composition, it is expected that
there may be an increase in short lived species, but a significant reduction in long
lived isotopes (which arise mainly from nickel and molybdenum). Thus, for this
design, a reduction in long term waste disposal hazards can be envisioned.
The main shielding material used was Fe1422 (Fe/14% Mn/2% Ni/2% Cr).
A previous study [2.21] recommended this material based on satisfactory perfor-
mance, low cost and resource availability. A further motivation for its use is the low
concentration of Ni and Cr. Low chromium content minimizes the consumption of
strategic materials; low nickel content reduces the dose equivalent after shutdown
and the production of long-lived isotopes. The shield is comprised of several sec-
tions. The main section is the steel shield, consisting of water coolant (20 % by
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volume) and Fe1422 (80 %). Behind this is a B4 C shield consisting of 60 % B4 C,
20 %. Fe1422 and 20 % H20. The B4 C acts as a neutron absorber to decrease the
activation of reactor components and structural materials. A density factor of 0.7
was assumed for the B4 C to avoid the fabrication costs associated with the high
density form. The outboard shield has one further section, comprised entirely of
lead, which acts as a gamma ray attenuator.
It has been suggested [2.22] that the Fe1422 in the shield be replaced by
HT-9. The afterheat in the shield during the first several hours after shutdown is
dominated by 5 6 Mn, which is produced primarily by reactions with Mn in Fe1422.
The Mn content of HT-9 is 26 times less than Fe1422 (0.54 % vs 14.0 %). If the
Fe1422 in the shield is replaced by HT-9, it has been shown that the short term
afterheat is reduced by an order of magnitude [2.22. Furthermore, the maximum
temperature of the blanket during a post accident scenario has been shown to be
lowered by 500 K. This lower post accident blanket temperature reduces release
fractions of most constituents from 30 to 150 times. Massidda [2.23] has shown
that nearly an order of magnitude of reduction in decay heat density at shutdown
will result in the manifold region if HT-9 is used in place of Fe-1422 for designs
with lithium coolant and vanadium structure. The temperature rise of the first wall
subsequent to a loss of coolant accident was found to be reduced by 550 0C for
the same designs. Because of these potential safety benefits, several reactors were
designed using HT-9 as the major shielding material. There appears to be little
difference in shielding performance between the HT-9 and the Fe1422, but the cost
of HT-9 is somewhat greater. There may be a cheaper alternative to HT-9 which is
also low in manganese. However, further investigation of this issue was beyond the
scope of the present work.
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2.1.3 Plasma Operation
DT ignition will be achieved via ohmic heating with some supplemental rf
heating. The start-up scheme proposed for advanced fuel tokamaks involves DT
ignition followed by thermal runaway [2.24]. The "matchhead effect" is achieved by
first igniting a low density DT core. The excess of fusion energy can then be used
to heat new cold fuel, building up the plasma density. Simultaneously, the core
can be expanded and transformed to a non-circular shape. This can be followed by
non-circular burn propagation and thermal runaway. As the desired temperature
is approached, some supplemental heating may be applied and the fueling rates of
components can be adjusted to the level required by the particular advanced fuel
cycle.
The plasma burn mode adopted for all designs is a 5000 second pulse. A major
concern with a pulsed reactor is material fatigue. A comparative study for tokamak
burn modes [2.25] has indicated that if the fusion period is greater than I h,
thermal fatigue is not life limiting for the first wall and limiter. Their study was
performed with PCA (Prime Candidate Alloy, an austenitic stainless steel) as the
structural material. Thermal wall loadings of 1.5 - 3.5 MW/m 2 on the limiter front
face were considered. Since HT-9, the structural material chosen for this work, has
superior thermal performance properties compared to PCA [2.20], these conclusions
should still apply to the designs examined here. Since plasma disruptions may also
contribute to the thermal fatigue of materials, a 5000 second pulse length was used
to provide some allowance for these events. The pulsed mode of operation was
also adopted in the BCSS [2.20] since it was felt that this design basis would be
more credible to the fusion physics community. The long pulse can be achieved by
driving a toroidal current with a transformer and then maintaining the current with
a non-inductive current driver while the transformer is being reset (at low plasma
temperature and density). During the reset period (- 40 seconds), the thermal
storage system will ensure a steady flow of steam to the turbine. The cost of this
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system and the additional pumping power required for its operation are significant.
However, there is a considerable reduction in the power consumed to charge the
coils, compared to the power consumed by the steady state current drive system.
Since the same burn mode is utilized for all fuel cycles, the decision to have a pulsed
design will not affect the comparison between fuel cycles.
2.1.4 Other Considerations
The designs employ a pumped limiter as the means of impurity control. This
has been shown to be an attractive concept with many inherently simple features
which would be desirable in a commercial power reactor '2.261.
An aspect ratio of 4 was chosen for all designs. At low beta, where first stability
physics applies, a low aspect ratio is attractive, since devices can be smaller and
less costly. Because of the inverse scaling of beta with aspect ratio (see Doublet
III and Tuda scalings in table 2.1), lower fields can also be used to achieve the
same power output. LeClaire 72.271 has performed some design optimization work.
He chose an aspect ratio of 3 for his low beta designs. At high beta, the second
stability regime is not accessible at low aspect ratio '2.121. LeClaire selected an
aspect ratio of 5 for his high beta designs. For the main designs considered in the
present work, an aspect ratio of 4 was chosen after consideration of these issues.
The impact of varying the aspect ratio on other design parameters and economics
has been examined for the DT and DD fuel cycles and is discussed later in this
report (see Sections 2.2.2, 2.3.2, 3.2.2 and 3.3.2).
Because of the scaling of beta with elongation, the maximum value of this
parameter is desirable. Yamazaki et al., [2.11] used values of elongation up to 3 in
their investigations. The BIG DEE tokamak is to have a plasma elongation of 2.15
[2.4]. The Generomak study chose an intermediate value of 2.5 for the elongation
of their tokamak variation [2.28,. This value was also chosen for the current study.
With the elongation and aspect ratio fixed, the different values for beta can be
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achieved from scaling laws by varying the plasma indentation. Yamazaki considered
strong bean shaping, with triangularities up to 1.5 [2.11]. Strong bean shaping will
result in more complex coil systems. Some consideration is given .to this in the
costing of the reactor designs.
A plasma scrape-off distance of 10 cm was used for all designs. The charged
particle flux in this zone has been shown to fall off exponentially. An e-folding
distance of ~ 2 cm has been measured [2.291. In the Fusion Engineering Device
(FED) [2.30:, a scrape-off distance of 10 cm was assumed. This would correspond
to roughly 5 times the particle flux exponential falloff distance, resulting in a small
particle flux to the wall.
The balance of plant for all fuel cycles is similar. A conventional steam cycle
transfers the energy from the primary helium coolant to the turbine. The balance
of plant for each reactor uses state-of-the-art technology wherever possible. Other
approaches to energy conversion could potentially be used for the DHe fuel cycle
to take advantage of the large fraction of energy released in charged particles (e.g.
direct conversion, MiHD conversion). However, a conventional steam cycle was
assumed here so that all fuel cycles would be compared on an equal basis.
The safety and economic comparison will be based on the designs described
in the following sections. Reactor parameters and parametric variations will be
discussed. In subsequent chapters, the effects of these variations on reactor safety
and economics will be clarified.
2.2 DT Designs
The major reactor parameters for the DT designs having plasma betas of 5%,
10% and 20% are listed in table 2.2. For these designs, the aspect ratio has been
set at 4, the elongation is 2.5, the plasma scrape off distance is 10 cm, the shielding
material is Fe1422, and the thermal power is 4000 MW. The operating temperature,
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Table 2.2: Reactor Parameters For DT Designs
Parameter Low Beta
(5 %)
Medium Beta
(10%)
High Beta
(20 %)
Major Radius (m)
Minor Radius (im)
Inboard Blanket (cm)
Outboard Blanket (cm)
Inboard Shield (cm)
Outboard Shield (cm)
Plasma Scaling Constant (3 2B4 a2 ) (T4 . M2 )
Toroidal Field at coil (T)
Toroidal Field on axis (T)
B2 a (T 2 .m)
TOH (keV)
OH Flux Swing (V- s)
Plasma Current (MA)
Total Wall Loading (MW/m 2 )
Neutron Wall Loading (MW/m 2 )
Surface Heat Flux (MW/m 2 )
nDTE (Neo-Alcator) (sec/m 3 )
Neo-Alcator Ignition Margin
7E (Neo-Alcator) (sec)
nD7'E (Mirnov) (sec/m 3 )
Mirnov Ignition Margin
rp (Mirnov) (sec)
-rp (sec)
Total Average Density (m- 3 )
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7.64
1.91
26.0
101.0
68.0
104.0
4.37
8.03
4.68
41.8
2.4
558
18.4
3.80
3.04
0.76
2.85x10 2 1
9.4
36.0
7.21x10 2 o
3.2
12.4
2.9
1.70x10 20
6.51
1.63
26.0
100.0
69.0
106.0
5.14
6.77
3.73
22.7
1.9
406
12.5
5.20
4.16
1.04
2.85x10 2
9.5
28.3
7.21x10 2 0
2.4
7.1
2.3
2. 16x 1020
5.68
1.42
26.0
100.0
70.0
107.0
5.89
5.61
2.92
12.1
1.5
298
8.6
6.76
5.41
1.35
2.85x10 2
9.5
23.1
5.27x1020
1.7
4.3
1.9
2.65x102o
Parameter Low Beta
(5%)
Murakami Density Limit (m- 3 )
Deuteron Density (m- 3 )
Triton Density (m- 3 )
Helium-3 Density (m- 3 )
Proton Density (m- 3 )
Alpha Density (m- 3 )
6.12x101 9
7.92x10 19
7.92x10 19
3.08x1016
7.71x1' 61
1.11x10 19
Medium Beta
(10%)
5.74x1019
1.01x1020
1.01x10 20
3.92x10 16
9.81x1016
1.41x10 1 9
High Beta
(20 %)
5.15x10 19
1.24x10 20
1.24x10 20
4.81x10 16
1.20x10 17
1.73x101 9
Common Parameters
Aspect Ratio
Scrape off (cm)
Plasma Elongation
Safety Factor at edge
Peak Electron Temperature (kev)
Average Electron Temperature (kev)
Peak Ioh Temperature (kev)
Average Ion Temperature (kev)
Fusion Power (MW)
Blanket Multiplication Factor
System Multiplication Factor
Thermal Power (MW)
Net Electric Power (MW)
Fraction of Energy due to DT Fusion
Fraction of Energy due to DD Fusion
Fraction of Energy due to DHe Fusion
Tritium Burned (g/day)
Tritium Bred (g/day)
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4.0
10
2.5
2.5
15.2
10.1
17.0
11.3
3645
1.122
1.098
4000
1225
0.9989
0.0011
~0
559
634
Parameter Common Parameters
Deuterium Burned (g/day) 378
Tritium Produced in Plasma (g/day) 1.6
Helium-3 Produced in Plasma (g/day) 1.6
Protium Produced in Plasma (g/day) 0.5
Alphas Produced in Plasma (g/day) 742
Tritium Exhausted (g/day) 1598
Deuterium Exhausted (g/day) 1067
Helium-3 Exhausted (g/day) 1.6
Protium Exhausted (g/day) 0.5
Helium-4 Exhausted (g/day) 742
Total Gas Load (Pa - m3 /s) 32.7
Tritium Fueled (g/day) 2156
Deuterium Fueled (g/day) 1445
VTritium Fractional Burn-up 0.259
Deuterium Fractional Burn-up 0.261
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Parameter Common Parameters
was selected to maximize the fusion power density (~ .- 9>,3 2 B4 [2.311). For DT
reactors, this occurs at roughly 15 keV (ideal ignition occurs at 4 keV). All
machines are ignited, according to both Neo-Alcator and Mirnov scaling, with a
comfortable ignition margin. Blanket and shield thicknesses were determined from
neutronics calculations using the Los-Alamos code ONEDANT [2.32]. The blanket
configuration for the neutronics analysis is shown in figure A.1 of appendix A.
The blanket and shield sizes were based on sufficient tritium breeding (1-D tritium
breeding ratio of 1.25) and adequate magnet shielding ( 1010 rad to magnet
thermal insulation). Other details are given in appendix A. It should be noted
that two-thirds of the outboard blanket and shield were assumed to lie between the
coils and one-third beneath the coils. The shield thickness beneath the coils on the
outboard side is the same as the inboard shield thickness; the external lead shield
employed between the coils for gamma ray attenuation is only found between the
coils. The outboard shield thickness in the table refers to the shielding between the
coils.
The DT reactor with 5 % beta is not greatly different from STARFIRE. Major
reactor parameters for STARFIRE are listed in table 2.6 at the end of this chapter.
Although STARFIRE operates in the steady state mode, thus alleviating the inner
bore radius constraint, its major radius is still relatively large. A value of 7 m for
STARFIRE was selected based on wall loading considerations.
2.2.1 The Effect Varying of Beta
Additional DT reactor designs were determined for plasma betas of 3 %, 7 %,
12 % and 16 %. The variations of reactor parameters with beta are indicated
in figures 2.1 through 2.10; more information regarding these designs is given in
appendix A. As beta is increased, both the major and minor radii are seen to de-
crease. This occurs since as beta increases, the fusion power density also increases,
as indicated in figure 2.3. Hence, for the same total power, a smaller plasma volume
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FIGURE 2.5: PLASMA CURRENT VS BETA
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is required. This also explains the decrease in toroidal field as beta becomes larger,
since fusion power density is also proportional to the toroidal field to the fourth
power. As a result of the decreasing plasmasize and toroidal field, the plasma
current also decreases (I2, ~ ). Increasing beta has the effect of increasing the
plasma density. Since the fusion power density, which is proportional to the square
of the plasma density, is seen to increase with increasing beta, this corresponds to
an increase in the density of the fusing particles. At higher betas, a deterioration
in particle and energy confinemernt is apparent (see figure 2.7). For neo-alcator
scaling (, E-- n a- R2 ), the effect of the decrease in reactor size is greater than
the effect of the increasing density, leading to an overall reduction in confinement
time. Mirnov scaling (- - a - I,) depends on plasma current and minor radius,
both of which decrease as beta increases, leading to a decrease in confinement time.
9 Particle confinement is also reduced as the reactor size decreases. Wall loading is
seen to increase with plasma beta, as the first wall area decreases. In figure 2.11, the
neutron wall loading is plotted against the power density of the fusion island (fusion
power divided by volume of plasma, blanket, shield, structure and coils) for the
designs corresponding to the range of values of beta examined. The power density
of the fusion island reflects the efficiency of using volume for power production. A
high value would be desirable, indicating that more power is produced in a smaller
9
volume. Larger values of the power density of the fusion island correspond to
higher values of beta, but come at the price of higher wall loadings. The greater
wall loadings result in more frequent changeouts for the first wall due to the greater
damage which results from the higher neutron and thermal fluxes. Because of this
consideration, very high beta DT reactors may not be economically attractive.
2.2.2 The Effect of Varying Aspect Ratio
The effect of varying aspect ratio (from 3 to 7) on other reactor design param-
eters has been investigated. Results are displayed in figures 2.12 to 2.20 and the
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design information is given in appendix A. These designs assume a plasma beta of
10 %, plasma elongation of 2.5, scrape off distance of 10 cm and thermal power
of 4000 MW. The shielding material used in these designs is HT-9. However, the
same trends would be observed if Fe1422 was used as the shielding material. As the
aspect ratio becomes larger, both the major and minor radii are seen to decrease.
This occurs because at higher aspect ratios, there is more space available for the
OH coil in the central bore. Thus, in a high aspect ratio machine, the major radius
can be smaller before the minor radius and inboard blanket/shield come in contact
with the OH coil/bucking cylinder. This effect seems to be less dramatic beyond
an aspect ratio of 4 or 5. Because beta is held constant and the reactor is becoming
smaller as the aspect ratio is increased, the toroidal field must necessarily increase
in order for the same total power to be obtained. This implies a higher power
density for a higher aspect ratio machine. Examining the expression for plasma
current for its dependence on aspect ratio (I - 1),it is evident that a
A2
decrease in current should be expected with an increase in aspect ratio. The higher
power density of the higher aspect ratio designs requires a more dense plasma, as is
evidenced in figure 2.16. The deterioration in confinement observed with increasing
aspect ratio shown in figure 2.17 is due mainly to the reduction in reactor size.
At aspect ratios greater than 4, the reduction in confinement time is less severe.
Finally, at larger as.pect ratios, higher wall loadings result from the decrease in first
wall area associated with the smaller reactor size.
2.2.3 The Effect of Varying Plasma Elongation
Plasma elongation may be varied to assess the effects of changing the plasma
cross section on reactor parameters. The trends exhibited by the design parameters
as elongation is varied are shown in figures 2.21 to 2.29. Designs were defined having
a beta of 10 %, an aspect ratio of 4, a scrape off distance of 10 cm and a thermal
power of 4000 MW (see table A.4 in appendix A). Once again, HT-9 was employed
85
1 ---- 7
FIGURE 2.21: MAJOR RADIUS VS PLASMA ELONGATION
BETA=10%
ASPECT RAT10=4.0
POWER-400fitWt
-e DT
-.---- DD
.--------------- -- . - --. ------
-E
2.0 2.5 3.0
PLASMA ELONGATION
FIGURE 2.22:
2.4 k
0
z I
I
.0
.8
.6
1.4
1.5
MINOR RADIUS VS PLASMA
2.0 2.5
ELONGATION
B ETAs iO%
ASPECT RATIO=4.0
POWER=4000mWt
3.0
PLASMA ELONGATION
86
11.0
10.5
10.0
9.5
9.0
8.5
8.0
7.5
7.0
3
0
-4
6.5
6 0U.U
1. 5
-- DT
-- a-- DD
A-..-----..--.--.--..-.A-A------- -- -
.- tK
0I
I I
S2
FIGURE 2.23:
9
8
7
6
4
3
TOROIDAL FIELD
8 ETA- 10%
ASPECT RAT10*4.0
PO ER=4000mWt
A DT
-A-- DD
5 2.0 2.5 3.0
PLASMA ELONGATION
FICURE 2.24:
TOTAL AVERAGE PLASMA DENSITY VS PLASMA ELONGATION
BETA-107
ASPECT RATbO=4.0
POW ER=4000MWt
.--- DT
--- A DD
2.0 Z.
PLASMA ELONGATION
3.0
87
VS PLASMA ELONGATION
a
c.
6.00
5.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
- ---..
1.5
.~.~'. -.----..- *..
FIGURE 2.25:
o-
5-U
40
30
10
0
PLASMA CURRENT VS PLASMA ELONGATION
9!TA 109.
ASPECT RATO=4.0
1.5 2.0 2.5
PLASMA ELONGATION
CONFINEMENT TIME
40
30
-25
2 20
10
5
0
FIGURE 2.26:
VS PLASMA ELONGATION FOR DT
BPTA=J0%
ASPPC? RATIO=4.0
POWE=4000MWt
REACTORS
S 2.0 2.5 3.0
PLASMA ELONGATION
88
- DT
----- DD
- -
3.0
.- PARTICLZ CONPI)U!NT .'T. .. . .. .
- WF-. - !O-ALCATOR COWPi)IYEkEMT TIME
- 0- LIRYOV CONPI)J!IEMNT TIME
. -
....... . 
--. J
- -- ~3
-
FIGURE 2.27:
CONFINEMENT TIME VS PLASMA ELONGATION FOR DD REACTORS
200
150
100
50
0
BETA=10%
ASPECT RATIO-4.
POWER-4000MW t
.- e - PARTICLE COMPI)(EMEWT TIME
- )4? -EO-ALCATOR CONPINEMENT TIME
- - e- MIRNOV COXPIYEMENT TIME
- --
1.5 3.0
PLASMA ELONGATION
FIGURE 2.28: NEUTRON WALL LOADING VS PLASMA ELONGATION
cli
-54l-,
3
z 2
0
BETA= 10%
ASPECT RAT04.0
POWER=4000MLWt
1.5 2.0 2.5
PLASMA ELONGATION
89
3.0
I.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.1
SDT
- -- DD
FIGURE 2.29: THERMAL WALL LOADING VS PLASMA ELONGATION
BETAw 0X
ASPECT RATIO=4.0
POWER-4000MWt
-e- DT
c 1. 5  ----- DD
1.4
1.3
1.2
-1.0
0.9 - ---
0.8
0.7
0.6
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
PLASMA ELONGATION
90
as the shielding material, but this should not bias the results. Over the range of
elongation examined (from 1.5 to 3.0), both major and minor radii exhibit a very
small increase. The plasma is becoming larger in volume and the plasma power
dnsity is decreasing slightly, allowing for a decrease in toroidal field. This decrease
in power density also leads to a slight reduction in plasma density for the same total
power output. Plasma current, being most strongly affected by geometric factors
(I, ai ), is seen to increase with elongation. The larger reactor size results
in slightly improved particle confinement. According to.the Mirnov confinement
law (E ~ a - K - I), improved energy confinement will also result. Neo-Alcator
scaling (rE ~ n -a- R2 ) shows a dimunition in energy confinement time because the
fractional decrease in plasma density over the range of elongation scanned (44 %)
is greater than the fractional increase in the geometric factor (a -R 2 increases by 13
%). As expected, both n utron and thermal wall loadings decrease with elongation
as the available wall are* increases.
2.3 DD Designs
The major reactor arameters for the DD designs considered for this compari-
son are listed in table 2.5. As with the DT designs, the aspect ratio has been set at
4, the elongation is 2.5, the plasma scrape off distance is 10 cm, the shielding mate-
rial is Fe1422, and the thermal power is 4000 MW. With the DD designs, the need
for tritium breeding is eliminated. The blanket employed for three of the designs
for this fuel cycle is HT-9 cooled by helium. The RAF DD design uses a reduced
activation ferritic steel (RAF) first wall and a Fe2Cr1V blanket (see appendix A for
compositions), cooled by helium. It employs a plasma beta of 10 %.
The DD reactors utilize the semi-fatalyzed fuel cycle and are operated near the
maximum of the <a> curve, at a peak ion temperature of ~ 50 keV (ideal ignition
occurs at - 25 keV [2.311). According to both Neo-Alcator and Mirnov scaling,
all machines are ignited with a comfortable ignition margin. Blanket and shield
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Table 2.3: Reactor Parameters For DD Designs
Parameter Low Beta Medium Beta (10 %)
(5%)
Major Radius (m) 13.01
Minor Radius (M) 3.25
Inboard Blanket (cm) 40.0
Outboard Blanket (cm) 125.0
Inboard Shield (cm) 37.0
Outboard Shield (cm) 56.0
Plasma Scaling Constant (3 2B 4 a2 ) (T4 . M2 ) 109.0
Toroidal Field at coil (T) 12.1
Toroidal Field on axis (T) 8.0
B2 a (T2 . m) 209
ToN (keV) 4.7
OH Flux Swing (V - s) 1018
Plasma Current (MA) 53.8
Total Wall Loading (MW/m 2 ) 1.06
Neutron Wall Loading .(MW/m2) 0.64
Surface Heat Flux (MW/m 2 ) 0.42
nD TE (Neo-Alcator) (sec/m 3 ) 3.05x10 22
Neo-Alcator Ignition Margin 23.7
rE (Neo-Alcator) (sec) 188.6
nDTE (Mirnov) (sec/m 3 ) 9.93x10 2 1
Mirnov Ignition Margin 7.7
TE (Mirnov) (sec) 61.3
rp (sec) 11.8
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)
HT-9
9.52
2.38
40.0
125.0
39.0
57.0
149.0
11.3
7.2
122
3.8
538
35.2
1.95'
1.17
0.78
3.05x10 2 2
23.7
118.0
7.59k10 21
5.9
29.4
7.4
RAF
9.44
2.36
35.0
120.0
45.0
65.0
139.8
11.3
7.1
118
3.7
525
34.5
1.84
1.10
0.74
2.84x10 2 2
22.0
112.4
7.21x10 2 1
5.6
28.5
7.6
High Beta
(20%)
7.28
1.82
40.0
125.0
40.0
59.0
194.5
10.4
6.2
70
3.0
311
23.2
3.30
1.98
1.32
3.05x10 22
23.7
78.9
5.74x10 2 1
4.5
14.8
4.9
Low Beta Medium Beta (10 %)
Total Average Density (m- 3 )
Murakami Density Limit (m~ 3 )
Deuteron Density (m-3 )
Triton Density (m 3 )
Helium-3 Density (m 3 )
Protium Density (m- 3 )
Alpha Density (m- 3 )
Fusion Power (MW)
Blanket Multiplication Factor
System Multiplication Factor
Thermal Power (MW)'
Net Electric Power (MW)
Tritium Burned (g/day)
Deuterium Burned (g/day)
Helium-3 Burned (g/day)
Tritium Produced in Plasma (g/day)
Helium-3 Produced in Plasma (g/day)
Protium Produced in Plasma 'g/day)
Alphas Produced in Plasma (,/day)
Tritium Exhausted (g/day)
Deuterium Exhausted (g/day)
Helium-3 Exhausted (g/day)
Protium Exhausted (g/day)
Helium-4 Exhausted (g/day)
Total Gas Load (Pa- m3 /s)
Tritium Fueled (g/day)
Deuterium Fueled (g/day)
(5%) HT-9
1.80x10 20
6.16x10' 9
1.62x10 20
6.48x1017
3.19x10' 8
I.04x10' 9
4.05x10 18
2876
1.65
1.39
4001
1213
221
777
30
228
228
86
334
16
2687
198
86
334
41.3
9.4
3465
2.88x1020
7.52x10' 9
2.59x10 2 0
1.04x10 8
5.09x1018
1.66x10' 9
6.47x10 18
2876
1.65
1.39
4001
1213
221
777
30
228
228
86
334
16
2687
198
86
334
41.3
9.4
3465
RAF
2.81x102 0
7.50x1019
2.53x10 2 0
1.01x1018
4.97x1018
1.62x10' 9
6.32x10 8
2675
1.83
1.50
3999
1213
206
723
28
212
212
80
310
15
2499
184
80
310
38.5
8.7
3222
(20 %)
4.31x10 20
8.51x10' 9
3.87x10 20
1.55x10 18
7.61x10 18
2.48x10 19
9.67x10' 8
2876
1.65
1.39
4001
1213
221
777
30
228
228
86
334
16
2687
198
86
334
41.3
9.4
3465
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Parameter High Beta
Common Parameters
Aspect Ratio 4.0
Scrape off (cm) 10
Plasma Elongation 2.5
Safety Factor at edge 2.5
Peak Electron Temperature (kev) 46.3
Average Electron Temperature (kev) 30.0
Peak Ion Temperature (key) 50.0
Average Ion Temperature (kev) 33.3
Fraction of Energy due to DT Fusion 0.6368
Fraction of Energy due to DD Fusion 0.2728
Fraction of Energy due to DHe Fusion 0.0904
Deuterium Fractional Burn-up 0.224
Tritium Fractional Burn-up 0.932
Helium-3 Fractional Burn-up 0.132
94
r
thicknesses were determin d using ONEDANT and were based on adequate heat
removal and magnet shielding. Since tritium breeding is not an issue, the blanket
thickness was adjusted until 90 - 94 % of the neutron energy was deposited in the
blanket region. The highqr neutron multiplication factor for the RAF DD design
allows for a thinner blankei and lower fusion power to meet the 4000 MWt criterion.
A slightly smaller reactor may result in some economic savings. As with the DT
designs, two-thirds of the putboard blanket and shield were assumed to lie between
the coils and one-third beneath the coils. The shield thickness beneath the coils
on the outboard side is t e same as the inboard shield thickness. The outboard
shield thickness in the ta' le refers to the shielding between the coils and includes
an additional lead shield or gamma ray attenuation.
The DD reactors with 10 % beta are not greatly different from the pulsed
version of WILDCAT. Major reactor parameters for WILDCAT are listed in table
2.6 at the end of this chapter. Many of the small differences can be attributed to
the lower fusion power of WILDCAT.
2.3.1 The Effect Varying of Beta
The variations of reactor parameters with beta for the DD designs are indi-
cated along with those for the DT designs in figures 2.1 through 2.11 and reactor
parameters are given in appendix A. The reactors are consistently larger than their
DT counterparts for the same thermal power output as as consequence of the lower
DD fusion power density. With a constant total fusion power, both the major and
minor radii decrease as plasma beta increases. The decrease is more dramatic for
DD than for DT, where a reduction by 57 % is seen in major radius going from a
beta of 3 % to a beta of 20 % (compared to a 36 % reduction for DT). Increasing
beta increases the fusion power density so that a smaller plasma volume is required
to produce the same total power. The fusion power density is higher for DT, being
8.8 times larger at a beta of 3% and 2.7 times larger at a beta of 20 % (note that
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the DT and DD reactors are not operating at the same temperature). As beta
becomes larger, the fusion power density increases, allowing for a reduction in the
toroidal field. The rate of decrease is nearly the same for DT and DD, although
higher fields are needed for DD. The plasma current decreases as a result of the
decreasing plasma size and toroidal field. The sharper decrease for DD reflects the
more dramatic change in plasma size with beta for this fuel cycle. Increasing beta
results in an increase in the plasma density because of the decreasing size of the
reactor.,, Particle and energy confinement is seen to be degraded at higher betas,
due mainly to the decrease in reactor size. Confinement times are greater for DD,
due to the scaling with reactor size. Wall loading is seen to increase with plasma
beta, as the first wall area becomes smaller. However, values of both the neutron
and thermal wall loadings for DD are still below those for the DT reactors over the
range of betas examined. The DD machines may be able to operate for their entire
life without requiring a blanket changeout, even at high beta. Thus, high beta op-
eration may be more advantageous to the DD fuel cycle than to the DT fuel cycle.
This is also expressed in figure 2.11. The highest power density of the fusion island
for DD is obtained at a neutron wall loading less than 2 MW/nm 2, corresponding to
the design at 20 % beta. Obtaining more energy per unit volume for DD may not
result in an economic penalty from damage due to neutron exposure.
2.3.2 The Effects of Varying Aspect Ratio and Elongation
Figures 2.12 through 2.20 illustrate the effect of varying aspect ratio for the DD
designs as well as the DT designs. The trends and rates of change of the parameters
with aspect ratio are similar for both fuel cycles.
Elongation also has a similar effect on reactor parameters for both fuel cycles,
as shown in figures 2.21 through 2.29. For the most part, the effect is very small.
Plasma current is more strongly affected for DD than for DT, increasing with elon-
gation (I, ~ (1 + ,c2)). The other factors upon which the plasma current depends
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decrease as the elongation increases. Because this decrease is slightly smaller in the
DD case, the effect of the scaling with elongation is more evident for this fuel cycle.
The neo-alcator confinement time is seen to decrease with increasing elongation,
reflecting the slight reduction in major and minor radii (7 - n-a.R2 ). The mirnov
confinement time increases because of its dependence on plasma current (nr - In).
These effects, however are not large.
2.4 A DHe Design
A DHe tokamak d sign has been characterized as part of this work. A single
value of plasma beta of 10 % has been adopted. Due to time constraints, a complete
scan of the major design parameters was not made for this fuel cycle. However, some
insight as to the relative position of this fuel cycle compared to the DT and DD
fuel cycles with regards to safety and economics can be obtained by a comparison
of the 10 % beta designs. Other parameters of the DHe design are listed in table
2.4.
The DHe design was assumed to operate at a peak temperature of ~50 keV
(average ion temperature of - 33 keV) so that the plasma reactivity would be max-
imized (ignition occurs at - 29 keV [2.311). As with the DD designs, the need
for tritium breeding is eliminated. An HT-9/helium cooled blanket is used. The
advantages related to improved energy recovery for the DHe fuel cycle have not
been exploited in this design. It was felt that an extensive evaluation of the energy
recovery system was beyond the scope of this study. Elaborate schemes to take
advantage of the energy released as charged particles (via divertor/direct conver-
sion) and to efficiently utilize the radiative energy release (via rectification using
solid-state circuitry or in-situ MHD conversion [2.33]) have been proposed. These,
in addition to other techniques for energy conversion will likely render the DHe
fuel cycle more attractive than is indicated here [2.34]. A conventional thermal
cycle is also possible for energy conversion, if the first wall temperature can be kept
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Table 2.4:
Reactor Parameters For DT, DD and DHe Designs With 10 % Beta
Parameter DT DD DHe
Major Radius (m) 6.51 9.52 10.02
Minor Radius (m) 1.63 2.38 2.50
Inboard Blanket (cm) 26.0 40.0 30.0
Outboard Blanket (cm) 100.0 125.0 50.0
Inboard Shield (cm) 69.0 39.0 34.0
Outboard Shield (cm) 106.0 57.0 76.0
Peak Electron Temperature (kev) 15.2 46.3 46.5
Average Electron Temperature (kev) 10.1 30.9 31.0
Peak Ion Temperature (kev) 17.0 50.0 50.0
Average Ion Temperature (kev) 11.3 33.3 33.3
Plasma Scaling Constant (/ 2 B 4 a2 ) (T 4 . iM2 ) 5.14 149.0 210.0
Toroidal Field at coil (T) 6.77 11.34 11.67
Toroidal Field on axis (T) 3.73 7.16 7.61
B2a (T 2 .m) 22.7 122.1 144.9
TOH (keV) 1.9 3.8 4.0
OH Flux Swing (V - s) 406 538 619
Plasma Current (MA) 12.5 35.2 39.3
Total Wall Loading (MW/m 2 ) 5.20 1.95 2.31
Neutron Wall Loading (MW/m 2 ) 4.16 1.17 0.18
Surface Heat Flux (MW/m 2 ) 1.04 0.78 2.13
Fusion Power (MW) 3645 2876 3763
Blanket Multiplication Factor 1.122 1.651 1.818
System Multiplication Factor, 1.097 1.391 1.063
Net Electric Power (MW) 1225 1213 1213
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Para6met&. r &T& DDID e
Fraction of Energy due to DT Fusion
Fraction of Energy due to DD Fusion
Fraction of Energy due to DHe Fusion
nDWt (Neo-Alcator) (sec/m 3 )
Neo-Alcator Ignition Margin
TE (Neo-Alcator) (sec)
nD-E (Mirnov) (sec/m 3 )
Mirnov Ignition Margin
7 (Mirnov) (sec)
rp (sec)
Total Average Density (m- 3 )
Murakami Density Limit (m- 3 )
Deuteron Density (m-3 )
Triton Density (m-3)
Helium-3 Density (m-3 )
Proton Density (m- 3 )
Alpha Density (m- 3 )
Tritium Burned (g/day)
Deuterium Burned (g/day)
Helium-3 Burned (g/day)
Tritium Produced in Plasma (g/day)
Helium-3 Produced in Plasma (g/day)
Protium Produced in Plasma (g/day)
Alphas Produced in Plasma (g/day)
Tritium Exhausted (g/day)
Deuterium Exhausted (g/day)
Helium-3 Exhausted (g/day)
99
0.9989
0.0011
~- 0
2.85x10 21
9.5
28.3
7.21x10 20
2.4
7.1
2.3
2.16x10 2 0
5.74x10' 9
1.01x10 2 0
1.01x10 20
3.92x10 16
9.81x1016
1.41x10' 9
559
378
. 0
1.6
1.6
0.5,
742
1598
1067
1.6
0.6368
0.2728
0.0904
3.05x10 22
23.7
118.0
7.59x10 2 '
5.9
29.4
7.4
2.88x10 2 0
7.52x10 1 9
2.59x102 0
1.04x10 18
5.09x10 18
1.66x10 19
6.47x 1018
221
777
30
228
228
86
334
16
2687
198
0.0766
0.0472
0.8762
1.66x10 22
7.3
132.2
4.34x102 1
1.9
34.5
2.3
2.77x10 20
7.60x10'9
1.26x10 20
3.49x1017
1.38x1020
9.0Ox10ls
3.46x10'
42
506
464
63
63
176
672
20
4920
20261
DD DHeDTParameter
Protium Exhausted (g/day) 0:5 86 176
Helium-4 Exhausted (g/day) 742 334 672
Total Gas Load (Pa. m/s) 32.7 41.3 253.5
Tritium Fueled (g/day) 2156 9.4 0
Deuterium Fueled (g/day) 1445 3464 5426
Helium-3 Fueled (g/day) 0 0 20663
Tritium Fractional Burn-up 0.259 0.932 0.674
Deuterium Fractional Burn-up 0.261 0.224 0.093
Helium-3 Fractional Burn-up - 0.132 0.022
Common Parameters
Aspect Ratio 4.0
Scrape off (cm) 10
Plasma Elongation 2.5
Safety Factor at edge 2.5
Thermal Power (MW) 4000
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Parameter DT DD DHe
within bounds 2.24, 2.35.. As with the other fuel cycles, this type of thermal system
has been adopted here. In this way, the comparison amongst the fuel cycles will be
made on an equal basis.
2.4.1 Comparison of the DHe Design to the Other Fuel Cycles
Table 2.4 also list the parameters for the DT and DD designs 'having. a
10 % beta. The DHe reactor is slightly larger than its DD counterpart due to
the lower overall energy multiplication and the criterion for producing the same to-
tal amount of power '(4000 MWt). The shield thickness is least for the DHe design,
since only 7.7 % (i.e. 291 MW) of its fusion power is produced in neutrons. The
shielding required by the DD design is somewhat greater since 60 % (i.e. 1726 MW)
of the power is released in the form of neutrons. Both are significantly less than
the shielding required by the DT machine which releases 80 % (i.e. 2916 MW) of
the power as neutrons. Due to the lower reactivity of the advanced fuels, higher
magnetic fields and larger reactors are required to produce the same total power,
at a fixed value of beta. This will have an impact both in terms of economics, due
to the larger size of the reactors and the magnets, and in terms of safety, due to
the larger stored energy in the magnets. Larger plasma currents are found in the
DD and DHe fuel cycles due to the larger toroidal fields and reactor sizes. The
total wall loading of the DT reactor is greatest due to the large fusion power and
the relatively small size of the reactor. The total wall loading of the DHe reactor
exceeds that of the DD reactor despite its slightly larger size because of the greater
fusion power. Such a high fusion power is required since the fraction of the power
carried by the neutrons is small. Consequently, the total multiplication of power in
the blanket is low compared to the DD case, and a larger fusion power is needed
to achieve the 4000 MWt criterion. The blanket multiplication factor refers to the
amplification of neutron energy per neutron entering the blanket. Although the DT
reactor releases the greatest fraction of energy in the form of neutrons, it has the
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lowest blanket multiplication factor. The DHe reactor releases the fewest neutrons
but it has the largest blanket multiplication factor i.e. more energy is released per
neutron interaction in the blanket. This effect is the result of the difference in neu-
tron energy spectra associated with the fuel cycles. In the DT fuel cycle, the source
neutrons are entirely 14.06 MeV (the temperature is too low for DD or DHe side
reactions to occur to any significant extent). With the semi-catalyzed DD fuel cycle
the neutron energy split is 49 % 14.06 MeV neutrons and 51 % 2.45 MeV neutrons.
The neutron source of the DHe machine is 40 % 14.06 MeV neutrons and 60 % 2.45
MeV neutrons. Since the interaction cross sections of many isotopes vary as , the
lower energy neutrons react more strongly. Because the fraction of lower energy
neutrons in the DHe blanket is largest, a higher energy multiplication per neutron
is seen.
Reactor parameters for a DHe tokamak from a previous study [2.241 are listed
in table 2.5 for comparison. It should be noted that the thermal power, plasma
beta, aspect ratio, elongation and some plasma physics parameters are different
than those assumed for the DHe design presented here.
2.4.2 Ohmic Heating in Advanced Fuel Reactors
The anticipated start-up scheme for the advanced fuel reactors will involve DT
ignition followed by thermal runaway [2.24". Achieving DT ignition will require
some form of auxiliary heating because the intrinsic heating mechanism provided
by collisional friction (i.e. ohmic heating) will fall short of heating to thermonuclear
temperatures. Examining the energy balance containing the ohmic heating term,
the maximum temperature achievable from this heating mechanism is found to be
a function of-B2 a:
k-J2 .7.
TOH = (k )
3-n-ct
= 0.55 (B -a) (2.1)
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Table 2.5: Reactor Parameters For STARFIRE, WILDCAT
he Tokamak
Parameter STARFIRE WILDCAT EPRI D- 3 He
Plasma Beta 0.067 0.11 0.12
Major Radius (m) 7.0 8.58 8.24
Minor Radius (m) 1.94 2.64 2.75
Aspect Ratio 3.6 3.25 3.0
Inboard Blanket (cm) 35.0 20.0 incl. with shield
Outboard Blanket (cm) 53.0 40.0 incl. with shield
Inboard Shield (cm) 60.0 39.0 100
Outboard Shield (cm) 118.0 97.0 -
Scrape off (cm) 20 20 50
Plasma Elongation 1.6 1.6 3.0
Safety Factor at edge 5.0 3.0 3.0
Electron Temperature (kev) 17.3 30.0 -
Ion Temperature (kev) 24.1 32.0 45
Plasma Scaling Constant (T4 . M2 ) 19.119 345.42 261.47
Toroidal Field at coil (T) 11.1 14.0 14.5
Toroidal Field on axis (T) 5.8 8.0 7.0
Plasma Current (MA) 10.1 29.2 53
Total Wall Loading (M1 V/m 2 ) 4.5 1.5 1.1
Neutron Wall Loading (M/m 2 ) 3.6 0.55 0.046
Surface Heat Flux (MW/m 2 ) 0.9 0.83 1.054
Fusion Power (MW) 3510 1285 ~ 1887
Multiplication Factor 1.14 2.024 ~1.06
Thermal Power (MW) 4000 2600 2000
Net Electric Power (MW) 1200 850 800
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where
TOH = temperature achievable by ohmic heating (keV)
k = proportionality constant relating plasma resistivity to plasma temperature
(r = k -T )(M
J = current density (assumed constant) (A)
rE = energy confinement time (S)
1.9 x 10-21 n a R2 (Neo-Alcator scaling)
n = plasma density (n~ 3 )
a = fraction of plasma cross section subject to ohmic heating (assumed to be
two-thirds)
a plasma minor radius (m)
BT = toroidal field on axis (T)
From this expression, the maximum temperature achievable by ohmic heating
for the DT designs considered in this study are 2.4 keV for 5 % beta, 1.9 keV for
10 % beta and 1.5 keV for 20 % beta. The declining temperature as beta increases
is a consequence of the decreasing reactor size (a) and toroidal field (B2 ) (for con-
stant power output of 4000 MWt). In all cases, the temperature. falls short of the
minimum required temperature (ideal) for ignition of , 4 keV. However, it may be
possible to achieve this temperature in the advanced fuel reactors, which must be
larger and require higher magnetic fields for the same power output. If ohmic heat-
ing to DT ignition can in fact occur in the advanced fuel machines, then this could
be followed by thermal runaway until the DD or DHe fuel mixture was ignited. The
temperatures achievable for the designs examined here are indicated in tables 2.4
and 2.5. The 5 % beta DD design can be heated ohmically to 4.7 keV. This surpasses
the ideal ignition temperature for DT, at which time the fusion power released as
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charged particles can heat the plasma sufficiently to balance brernsstrahlung losses.
The other DD designs ohmically heat to a slightly lower temperature because of
the smaller size and the lower magnetic fields of these reactors. They do not quite
heat the plasma to the extent of reaching DT ignition. However, the temperatures
which can be achieved by ohmic heating are roughly twice as high as those in the
DT machines of the same beta.
It has been shown "2.36, 2.37' that confinement is degraded as auxiliary power
input to the plasma increases. Since the scheme employing DT ignition and thermal
runaway requires less auxiliary power to achieve ignition of the advanced fuel (than
would be the case without first igniting a DT plasma), confinement degradation will
not be as severe as it could be. This is important when considering the advanced
fuels because of the longer confinement time needed to maintain the burn.
2.5 Design Summary
Representative design parameters for the various fuel cycles over the range of
values of beta have been summarized in tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. All designs are
pulsed, superconducting tokamaks, employing a 5000 second pulse. Each design
has an aspect ratio of 4, an elongation of 2.5, a safety factor at the edge of 2.5, and
produces 4000 MW -of thermal power. For the DT and DD designs, the reactor size
and on axis toroidal field are seen to decrease with plasma beta. The increasing
fusion power density with increasing beta results in an increase in wall loading. It
is evident that the DT reactors are smaller than their advanced fuel counterparts
at a give beta. This is a consequence of the lower power density of the advanced
fuels, despite the higher operating temperature and magnetic fields associated with
these reactors.
The DT blankets were composed of lithium breeder with HT-9 structure and
helium coolant. The thickness was determined from neutronics calculations with
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a one-dimensional tritium breeding ratio of 1.25 as the design criteron. Tritium
breeding is not a design issue for the advanced fuels. Their blankets were designed
for deposition and removal of energy released in the plasma. They utilize HT-9 as
the blanket material, cooled by helium. The blanket thickness was determined such
that - 94 % of the neutron energy was deposited in this zone. Shield thicknesses
were based on attenuation of the high energy neutron flux to ensure adequate mag-
net protection in all cases. The total blanket/shield thickness is greatest for the DT
designs, reflecting the greater quantity and higher energy of .the fusion neutrons.
The DD designs show the largest total gain in energy from neutron interactions
in the blanket. This is-a consequence of the blanket material, the neutron energy
spectrum and the total number of neutrons entering the blanket. Because of this,
the DD reactors can be designed to produce a lower fusion power, but still result in
the same thermal power output as the other fuel cycles. An even greater blanket
multiplication factor is achieved with the use of the RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket
DD design. This is largely due to the greater iron content of the Fe2Cr1V blanket
compared to the HT-9 blanket.
The designs presented here have been developed on a consistent design basis.
The minimum number of changes to the DT fuel cycle were made to accommodate
the advanced fuels, so that any design changes are a direct consequence of the
change in fuel cycle. These designs can then be compared, in terms of safety and
economics, on an equal basis. The economic and safety analyses are presented in
the forthcoming chapters.
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Chapter 3
Economic Evaluation of Alternate Fuel Cycles
In order to ascertain the overall attractiveness of a given fuel cycle, an economic
analysis must be performed. A costing code to assess the cost of electricity has been
developed. Flexibility for application to costing of fusion plants utilizing the DT,
DD and DHe fuel cycles has been incorporated. Details of the code can be found
in appendix B. The following section outlines the costing methodology employed.
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3.1 Costing Methodology
The competitiveness of fusion as a source of electrical power will be depen-
dent on the cost of the electricity which it provides. The cost of electricity, COE,
is determined from the plant capital cost, the operating and fuel costs, the plant
capacity factor and lifetime, and the financing parameters. The plant capital cost
is dependent on the cost to construct the plant as well as the economic conditions
during construction (inflation/escalation and interest rates). The elements of the
constructed cost are direct cost, indirect cost and contingency. These are discussed
further below. The effects of time related considerations, such as interest and infla-
tion, are also described.
The direct costs are associated with permanent components of the plant and
include equipment, materials, engineering and labor. Equipment and materials
costs include the basic purchase price, expenses associated with shipment to the site,
research and development expenses incurred during the development of a component
for the facility being costed and quality assurance and testing costs. The engineering
component includes first-of-a-kind, nonrecurring engineering costs for any items not
commercially available. Labor costs for construction and acceptance testing of the
permanent plant are also included in the direct costs.
Indirect costs result from support activities required to accomplish the direct
cost activities. The support activities include: (1) construction facilities, equipment
and services (15 % of the direct costs for an eight year construction period); (2) home
office engineering services; (3) field office engineering and construction management
services (a total of 25 % of the direct costs for elements (2) and (3) for an eight
year construction period); (4) project administration costs (10 % of the direct costs
for an eight year construction period), spare parts and inventories. Spare parts and
inventories were estimated as proposed in reference [3.1]. The indirect costs for
construction times other. than eight years can be determined by linear scaling:
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Cindir = 0.15. - 8-Cd+02 -Cir + 0.25 10 - Cir + CSPINV MI$ (3.1)8 8 8
These indirect charge percentages are raised from those recommended in references
[3.21 and [3.3) (10 % for construction facilities, equipment and services, 8 % for engi-
neering and construction management services and 5 % for project administration).
This increase should more accurately reflect present day experience in the power
industry [3.4).
Allowance for uncertainties in project definition, unit pricing and execution is
included in the contingency cost. Such unforeseen and unpredictable expenses are
expected to occur during the facility construction and start-up. As recommended in
reference [3.4], the contingency allowance adopted in this study was 15 % of direct
and indirect costs.
The costing procedure generally follows the methodology developed at the Fu-
sion Engineering Design Center [3.5]. This approach is based mainly on the para-
metric cost estimating method which estimates on a cost-per-unit (weight, volume,
area, power, etc.) and incorporates a generic code of accounts. The accounts are
based on the standard fusion accounts set out in a previous document [3.2] and
on present power industry practice [3.6]. Some modifications have been made to
facilitate comparison of fusion power reactor costs to other sources of electricity.
Specific changes concern the indirect costs elements (four separate elements instead
of three), a completely different set of subaccounts for reactor plant equipment
(accounts 221-229) and the use of account 26 for total plant heat reject system
rather than special materials (which are now included in account 25, with miscel-
laneous plant equipment). The accounts and the algorithms used for costing are
discussed in the appendix.
As suggested in references [3.2], [3.3] and [3.5), and as adopted by major design
studies ([3.7] and [3.8]), the levelized revenue requirement method for calculating
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the COE has been employed in this work. The COE is the unit cost of generating
electricity from the fusion reactor facility and represents the necessary yearly rev-
enues required by the utility to pay operating costs, taxes, return on undepreciated
capital investment and capital investment depreciation. The COE can be calculated
in two ways. In the current dollar approach, inflation is explicitly included and the
purchasing capability of the dollar changes with time. The COE is quoted in dol-
lars of a future year (dollars of year of completion of construction or first year of
plant operation), the capital costs are levelized to account for inflation/escalation
during the plant lifetime, the operating and maintenance costs are also levelized
to account for inflation and escalation during the plant lifetime and are quoted in
dollars of the first year of operation. The constant dollar approach allows for easy
comparison with present day costs. In this approach, no inflationary effects are
incorporated, but the time value of money is considered (i.e. interest on borrow-
ing capital for plant construction). Operating costs are calculated in current-day
dollars (as opposed to dollars of the first year of operation).
For the Current Dollar COE:
cc FCR + (COM + CF) -LNCOEcurrent = C (C60 + F) mills/kWh (3.2)
Pe 8760.- Fcap .
For the Constant Dollar COE:
Cc-FCR+ Com+CF.COEconstant = mills/kWh (3.3)Pe - 8760 - Fcap
where
COEcurrent= levelized revenue requirement or cost of electricity (mills/kWh, dollars
of first year of operation)
constant levelized revenue requirement or cost of electricity (mills/kWh, dollars
of present day)
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Cc= total capital cost of plant (M$)
FCR= levelized annual fixed charge rate (see below)
CoN= annual operating and maintenance costs-(M$/yr)
CF= annual fuel costs (M$/yr)
LN= thirty year levelizing factor (see below)
Pe= plant net electrical output (MW)
Fcap plant capacity fa-tor
The total construction cost of the plant is determined from the direct, indirect
and contingency costs. The total capital cost is obtained from the total construction
cost of the plant by including time related costs incurred during plant construction.
The plant cost factors used to account for these time related effects were taken from
reference [3.5] and are listed in table 3.1. The current dollar calculation uses the
factors which include inflation/escalation as well as interest during construction.
It is assumed that power plant escalation in excess of general inflation is 0 % (i.e.
escalation and inflation rates are equal). For the constant dollar calculation, only
interest during construction is included.
The levelized annual fixed charge rate converts the capital cost of the plant to
an equivalent annual expenditure over the 30 year plant lifetime. In the current
dollar calculation, both inflation and interest are included. Only interest is con-
sidered in the constant dollar mode. Also, return on capital, local property taxes,
income taxes, book depreciation, investment tax credit and tax writeoff are reflected
through the fixed charge rate. The financial parameters on which the fixed charge
rates used in this study are based are listed in table 3.1.
The annual operating and maintenance costs include expenditures associated
with plant operating personnel (salaries, benefits, administration, overtime, travel,
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Table 3.1: Costing Factors for Determination of COE [3.5]
Parameter Inflation Rate
0% 6% 10%
Effective Cost of Money 4.2 9.0 12.2
(%/yr)
Fixed Charge Rate 8.3 14.4 19.1
(%/yr) (FCR)
Thirty Year Levelizing 1.000 1.950 2.822
Factor (LN)
Four Year Construction 1.070 1.324 1.517
Plant Cost Factort
Six Year Construction 1.109 1.523 1.866
Plant Cost Factort
Eight Year Construction 1.148 1.751 2.296
Plant Cost Factort
Ten Year Construction 1.188 2.014 2.824
Plant Cost Factort
t factor applied to the total constructed cost of the plant to account for inter-
est/inflation
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retraining, cost of contract personnel, workman's compensation insurance); sup-
plies, equipment and interim replacement parts; coolant makeup; process materials;
licensing; liability insurance; miscellaneous costs such as equipment rental; and a
decommissioning allowance..
The cost of fuel cycle materials that must be replaced during operation are
included in the annual fuel costs. This includes the blanket/first wall replacement
cost and the costs of other replaceable components that are part of the energy gain
system such as the limiter, auxiliary heating equipment and the fuel components.
Eighty percent of the miscellaneous scheduled replaceable items cost is included
with the fuel costs, the remainder being evaluated as part of the miscellaneous plant
equipment costs.. Replacement of these components results from neutron damage
and erosion. The fluence limit of the first wall and components of the auxiliary
heating system which are bombarded by neutrons is set by the average neutron
wall loading. The first wall also receives heat as electromagnetic radiation from the
plasma. The remaining thermal power is handled by the targets and limiters. Their
fluence limit is set by erosion damage from plasma bombardment. Erosion can be
minimized by maintaining a cold plasma edge temperature. When erosion cannot
be avoided, it must be localized to easily replaceable components such as targets
and limiters. The lifetime of these components is set by the average thermal power
(particles and radiation) on the surface.
The cost of waste disposal has also been assessed as part of the annual fuel
costs, and has been evaluated as in reference [3.9]. To estimate these costs, it
was assumed that 5 % of plant personnel work in waste handling and that the
materials, labor and overhead costs for these activities are 5 % of those for operation
and maintenance. Volumes of low activity, tritiated and first wall/blanket wastes
were determined by scaling the estimates given by Cannon [3.10] with net electric
power and tritium inventory. The cost for transport of these wastes to the disposal
site was taken to be $ 635 per shipment (see reference [3.9] for details). Disposal
costs were 241 $/m 3 for low level wastes qualified for shallow land burial and
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473,400 $/m 3 for high level wastes requiring geologic disposal (from reference [3.9],
updated to current dollars).
In this study, it was desirable to know the total costs associated with a given fuel
cycle. The total fuel cycle cost would include the initial blanket, first wall, limiter
and auxiliary heating system, in addition to the elements mentioned above in the
discussion on the cost of fuel cycle materials.. A separate calculation was performed
to evaluate these costs together. For simplicity, no inflation was included so that the
levelized annual repayment is simply the average yearly cost, in constant dollars.
This recategorization facilitates the comparison of fuel cycle costs between alternate
fusion fuels, and between fusion and fission.
The thirty year levelizing factor levelizes the annual costs which may be subject
to inflation during the plant lifetime. An equivalent annual cost is obtained so
that the present value of the time-varying cost is equal to the present value of the
resulting levelized cost. The factors used to account for this are listed in table
3.1, and assume that costs change at the same rate as inflation (i.e. no additional
escalation of costs). Note that this factor is equal to one for the constant dollar
calculation (i.e. no inflation).
The cost of electricity has been evaluated for the DT, DD and DHe fuel cycles.
A construction lead time of 6 years and inflation rate of 6 % have been employed.
Reference [3.6] has recommended a plant capacity factor of 65 %. This value was
adopted for the DT designs. Some improvement in the capacity factor is anticipated
for the advanced fuel cycles resulting from the absence of the breeder, lower induced
activity and reduced tritium inventory. The capacity factor has been evaluated as
69 % for the DD fuel cycle and 72 % for the DHe fuel cycle. These values were
assessed based on estimates of scheduled and unscheduled maintenance times re-
quired for the same number of activities (see appendix C). Results of the economic
analysis are given in tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 and are discussed.below.
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3.2 Economics of DT Designs
3.2.1 TheEffect of Varying Beta
For the DT designs, the COE has been determined for reactors having values
of plasma beta of 5 %, 10 % and 20 %. The designs costed have an aspect ratio of
4, elongation of 2.5, plasma scrape of of 10 cm, employ an Fe1422 shield and have
a thermal power of 4000 M\W. Reactor parameters are listed in table 2.2 and the
corresponding economic information is found in table 3.2.
The trend observed is that as beta is increased, the COE decreases. In go-
ing from beta of 5 % to 10 %, there is a 7 % drop in the cost of electricity, from
61.6 mills/kWh to 57.2 mills/kWh. Further increasing beta to 20 % from 10 %
results in no additional improvement in the COE. This trend can be explained
by examining the changes to the reactor parameters and how these changes af-
fect the cost accounts contributing to the COE. As beta is increased, the reactor
dimensions are reduced for a fixed power output. Hence, any costs scaling with
the volume of material used will decrease as beta is increased. These costs in-
clude: structures and site facilities ( fusion island volume), first wall/blanket
(~ first wall/blanket volume) shield (~ shield volume), structure and support
(~ toroidal field coil volume + plasma volume), particle removal and control
(~ major radius + minor radius), magnet systems (- toroidal field coil volume),
and vacuum system (~ fusion island volume). These costs comprise the bulk of
the direct costs. The cost of electricity for DT reactors appears to level off as beta
is increased beyond 10 %. This occurs as a result of the increasing importance of
other factors in the cost scaling as beta is increased. Poloidal field coil costs scale
with plasma shaping, which is increased in order to achieve higher beta. Plasma
shaping also strongly affects power conditioning costs (for conversion/regulation of
ac line power, distribution of power to magnets, protection of magnets and sup-
ply of power) for the EF and CF coils. Some of the replaceable items costs scale
with wall loading, which increases with beta, as the reactor size and hence first
121
Table 3.2: Economics for DT Designs
Parameter Low Beta Medium Beta High Beta
(5 %) (10%) (20 %)
Direct Costs (1986 M$) 2385 2165 2159
Land & Land Rights 5.0 5.0 5.0
Structures & Site Facilities 407 346 307
Reactor Plant Equipment 1346 1182 1210
'Blanket & First Wall 31 24 19
Shielding 216 168 135
Structure & Support 79 48 31
Particle Removal/Control 3.5 3.0 2.6
Magnet Systems 247 169 162
Power Injection System 153 131 110
Vacuum System 11.2 8.6 7.0
Power Conditioning Systems 191 221 336
Heat Transport System 179 174 172
Fuel Handling & Storage 143 143 143
Instrumentation & Control 30 30 30
Maintenance Equipment 63 63 63
Turbine Plant Equipment 399 399 399
Electric Plant Equipment 110 110 110
Misc. Plant Equipment 64 69 73
Heat Rejection System 54 54 54
Indirect Costs (1986 M$) 996 910 909
Contingency (1986 M$) 507 461 460
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A
Parameter Low Beta
(5 %)
Medium Beta
(10%)
High Beta
(20%)
Total Constructed Cost (1986 MS)
Total Capital Cost
(constant 1986 M$)
Total Capital Cost
(current 1992 M$)
Annual Operation & Maintenance
(1986 M$/yr)
Fuel Cycle (1986 M$/yr)
COE (mills (1992)/kWh)
COE (mills (1986)/kWh)
Relevant Design Information:
Plasma Volume (m3 )
First Wall/Blanket Volume (m3 )
Shield Volume (m 3 )
TF Coil Volume (m3 )
Fusion Island Volume (m 3 )
Major Radius (m)
Minor Radius (M)
Toroidal Field (T)
Plasma Current (MA)
Triangularity
Plasma Density (m- 3 )
Neutron Wall Loading (MW/m 2 )
Thermal Wall Loading (MW/m 2 )
3889
4313
5923
57.9
20.2
142
61.6
1375
754
1800
250
4699
7.64
1.91
4.68
18.4
0
1.70x10 2O
3.04
0.76
3536
3922
5386
57.7
21.5
132
57.2
854
574
1399
111
3225
6.51
1.63
3.73
12.5
0.3
2.16x10 20
4.16
1.04
3528
3912
5373
57.5
21.9
132
57.2
565
458
1129
51
2378
5.68
1.42
2.92
8.6
1.2
2.65x10 2 0
5.41
1.35
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wall area, decrease. These considerations play an increasing role at higher values of
beta, driving the COE up and countering the reduced capital costs from the smaller
sized reactor. Hence, for the DT fuel cycle, there is not a large economic incentive
for achieving a more than moderately high value of plasma beta (i.e. - 10 %).
It must be stressed, however, that this conclusion assumes that first stability
scaling laws can be extrapolated to high values of beta (i.e. an estimate of the
degree of triangularity required to obtain a given value of beta, knowing the aspect
ratio, elongation and safety factor, was obtained using first stability scaling laws
regardless of the value of beta). Theoretical studies of beta-saturation mechanisms
associated with resistive ballooning modes and internal kink modes have lead to ex-
ploration of possible approaches to the second stability region for high beta tokamak
configurations [3.11]. One possible route to this regime assumes high values of the
on axis safety factor coincident with lower plasma current and indentation. Studies
are currently underway to examine the feasibility of this scheme [3.12]. Relaxation
of plasma indentation and a reduction in plasma current will lead to reduced capital
costs because of a smaller central solenoid and fewer plasma shaping magnets. This
consideration may improve the economic position of the high beta design. However,
because it is not clear that the second stability regime can be achieved, this ap-
proach was not examined here. The high beta designs were based on extrapolation
of first stability physics.
As part of the economic analysis, the total costs associated with the fuel cycle
were evaluated. These costs include those components which are part of the energy
gain system such as initial and replacement costs for the first wall/blanket, the
limiter and 25 % of the auxiliary heating components (vacuum windows, launching
structures, klystrons, gyrotrons, etc., which suffer neutron damage), as well as 80 %
of miscellaneous scheduled replaceable items, fuel costs and waste handling costs.
For the three reactors assessed, the fuel cycle costs were least for beta of 5 %
(20.2 M$/yr), and greatest for beta of 20 % (21.9 M$/yr). The slight increase in
fuel cycle costs at higher beta can be explained if the factors which contribute to the
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total fuel cycle costs are examined. Initial first wall/blanket, limiter and auxiliary
heating components costs scale withreactor size,ia ence decrease with increasing
beta (see table 3.5). However, replacement frequency and therefore replacement
costs for these components also depend on wall loading, which increases with beta.
At high beta, total replacement costs represent a larger fraction of the total fuel
cycle costs than the initial costs (49 % at 20 % beta and 37 % at 5 % beta) due to
the more frequent replacement of components (see table 3.5). Other miscellaneous
replaceable items costs also scale with wall loading, thus tending to increase the
fuel cycle costs at higher beta. Another difference is in the area of waste handling.
Despite the smaller volume of the reactor, the waste handling costs are greater at
higher beta. This is a result of the greater number of blanket/first wall changeouts
which take place during the lifetime of the higher beta reactor. However, for the
DT designs, the overall impact of-this consideration is not large and the total fuel
cycle cost is nearly the same for all values of betas.
The cost model was used to examine the dependence of the COE on several
parameters. The designs described in chapter 2, for beta ranging from 3 % to
20 %, with HT-9 as the shielding material, have been costed. Economic information
pertaining to these designs can be found in appendix B. It was found that the use
of HT-9 as the shield material increased the COE compared to that when Fe1422 is
used. An adjustment to the COE can be made (see section 3.2.3) to account for this
difference, and give the expected COE for the design using Fe1422 shielding. The
Fe1422 adjusted COE's have been used in the parametric plots. The same trends
should be exhibited regardless of the shielding material used.
In figure 3.1, the COE is seen to decrease with beta, illustrating the impor-
tance, in terms of cost, of obtaining a value of beta higher than what is currently
achievable (- 5 %). Beyond a beta of 10 %, however, the cost decrease is min-
imal, coming at the expense of increased wall loading (see figure 3.2). This will
lead to more frequent replacement of components. However, the volume of ma-
terial required per changeout decreases as beta increases, due to the decreasing
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reactor size. These competing effects contribute to the appearance of a slight min-
imum in the COE at a beta of 16 %,:but the improvement of the COE at this
minimum over that at 10 % beta is not large. The main advantage of high beta
operation is that lower toroidal fields may be used for the same size device, thereby
lowering the COE. This effect is illustrated in figure 3.3. The highest on axis
magnetic field indicated (5.5 T) corresponds to a beta of 3 % and results in the
highest COE. At a beta of 20 %, the toroidal field on axis can be reduced to
3.2 T, leading to a lower COE. The toroidal field costs are somewhat reduced but
stronger plasma shaping is required to achieve higher beta. This increases the
poloidal field and power conditioning costs. These considerations also contribute to
the slight occurrence of the minimum at 16 %. The effect of reactor size on the cost
of electricity is indicated in figure 3.4. The COE is plotted against minor radius for
the series of reactors having values of beta ranging from 3 % to 20 %. It is evident
that larger sized reactors produce more expensive electricity.
Fission costs are expected to rise from the current level of ~ 40 mills/kWh to
~ 50 mills/kWh or higher in the future [3.6, 3.13]. Figure 3.5 indicates that the
fusion island mass must be in the area of 10,000 tonne for a 4000 MWt plant in
order to be competitive with fission. From this figure which plots the COE versus
the fusion island mass for the series of reactors discussed above, it can be seen that
the fusion island is responsible for a small fraction of the COE. The rest of the COE
is comprised of the cost of auxiliary systems, power supplies, turbine plant, electric
plant, operation and maintenance costs, indirect costs and contingency costs.
Although it is the neutron and thermal fluences which determine the total
number of first wall and blanket components, limiters and other targets cycled
through the plant during its lifetime, the mass and volume of these components
and hence, their cost, would be greater for a more massive fusion island. Since
many of the cost components scale with volume, it is not unexpected that a larger
fusion island volume would correspond to a higher COE, as is exhibited in figure
3.6. In order for the COE to fall in the competitive range, the fusion island volume
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must be on the order of 3000 i 3 .
The power density of the fusion island (PT/VFI) can be used to characterize
fusion reactors. The COE is plotted against this parameter in figure 3.7 and is
seen to decrease as the fusion island power density (i.e. beta) increases. The power
densities corresponding to the DT reactors of this study are comparable to those for
several gas-cooled fission reactors (0.8 MW/r 3 - 1.2 MW/r 3 inside the pressure
vessel [3.14]). The values given for the power density inside the primary pressure
vessel are somewhat higher for BWRs (- 4MW/m 3 ) and PWRs (~ 10MW/M 3 ).
As is indicated in the figure, there is little cost advantage in going to power densities
larger than about 1.2 MW/m 3 . This is in agreement with Sheffield's findings [3.4].
Figure 3.8 shows the variation of COE with net electric power per unit mass of
the fusion island (Pe/MFI). Little economic benefit is gained beyond 0.1 MWe/tonne
(100 kWe/tonne). This also agrees with the conclusions of Sheffield [3.4]. For the
10 % beta design, the fusion island power density is 1.22 MW/m 3 and the net
electric power per unit mass is 0.114 MWe/tonne. This suggests that pursuing a
beta greater than 10 % for DT designs is not worthwhile.
3.2.2 The Effects of Varying Aspect Ratio and Elongation
The COE was determined for designs having a fixed beta of 10 %, an elongation
of 2.5 and an aspect ratio ranging from 3 to 7. In figure 3.9, the COE is seen to
be a decreasing function of aspect ratio. Beyond an aspect ratio of 4 or 5, little
further improvement is seen. Thus, the apriori choice of an aspect ratio of 4 for
those designs having this parameter held fixed (i.e. beta and elongation variations)
has not resulted in an economic disadvantage. Sheffield [3.4] found that over a range
of values of beta, the minimum cost lies in the range of R between 4 and 8. From
the family of curves that he presents, the minimum cost occurs at an aspect ratio
which increases as beta increases. This suggests that a larger aspect ratio is more
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desirable at higher beta (which is in agreement with physics needs) and a lower
aspect ratio is more desirable at low beta.
In figure 3.10, the direct plant cost for the series of designs having aspect ratios
ranging from 3 to 7 is plotted against the mass per unit thermal power (MFI/PT),
or mass utilization factor. A linear relationship is observed, given by:
CDo = 1100 + 400-P A$ (3.4)
PT
This trend was also seen in an earlier study [3.15], where several reference fusion
reactors were compared. Miley [3.16] gives a similar scaling of the direct costs
with the mass utilization factor. The work here, however, indicates a stronger
dependence on the mass utilization factor than the other two studies. It is evident
that designers should strive to obtain improved mass utilization.
The effect of varying plasma elongation on the COE over the range of interest
is shown in figure 3.11. A minimum in cost is observed for an elongation of 2.0.
Decreasing the ellipticity below 2.0 requires greater triangularity to give the desired
beta (see table 2.1) resulting in increased poloidal field coil and power conditioning
costs. Also, wall loading is higher at low elongation due to the smaller reactor size
(see table A.4), leading to more frequent replacement and greater costs. At higher
elongation, the reactor size increases and costs scaling with volume increase. The
wall loading and replacement frequency are lower, but this is offset by the larger
volume of material to be replaced per changeout. An optimum is achieved for the
DT design (with 10 % beta and an aspect ratio.of 4) with an elongation of 2.0,
where the combined impact of these two effects is minimized. The apriori choice
of 2.5 results in a COE less than 2 mills/kWh higher than this optimum. As will
be seen, this does not strongly affect the economic position of the DT fuel cycle
relative to the advanced fuels.
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3.2.3 Other Effects
The manner in which certain assumptions regarding input to the economics
code affect the COE are displayed in figures 3.12 through 3.16. The analyses were
carried out for the DT reactor with 10 % beta and an Fe1422 shield. The plant
capacity factor has an important influence in determining the COE. A 20 % change
in capacity factor from 60 to 80 % leads to a drop of ~ 14 mills/kWh in the COE.
The value assumed for the DT fuel cycle was 65 %. This value does place the
fusion reactors in the competitive range. For high power densities, the capacity
factor may be reduced. Because of the higher wall loadings, blanket changeouts
may no longer be performed during scheduled outages and additional downtime
may be required. Furthermore, the reliability of plant components may decrease
at higher power densities, leading to more unscheduled outages. This possibility
was not taken into account and the capacity factor for all DT designs was fixed at
65%.
Construction lead time also affects the COE, as indicated in figure 3.13. Longer
plant construction times result in greater interest charges and also lead to a greater
expense for supporting construction personnel. A one year reduction in construction
time can lead to a 5 % improvement in the COE. A six year construction time was
used for all designs.
The effect of varying the neutron fluence limit on the COE is shown in figure
3.14. There is a relatively rapid decrease in the COE up to a value of Fn of about
15 MW - yr/m 2 . At values of F,, lower than this, the blanket/first wall lifetime
would become quite short. This would eventually impact the plant capacity factor
and lead to an even higher COE (65 % capacity factor was assumed here). The
effect of the neutron fluence limit is not large as the COE decreases by less than
4 mills/kWh (~ 6 %) as the fluence limit varies from 10 to 30 MW.yrs/m. Roughly
half of this decrease in cost can be achieved if the fluence limit is increased from
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10 to 15 MW - yrs/m 2 . Materials fluence limits much beyond this do not appear
to have a major influence in in lowering the cost of electricity. This does not agree
with Sheffield's work which indicates the need to achieve a neutron fluence limit
above 20 MW - yrs/m 2 .
Figure 3.15 plots the COE against blanket lifetime. Neutron wall loading was
varied for a fixed lifetime neutron fluence of 25 MW - yr/m 2 . This was the neu-
tron fluence limit adopted in the Generomak study [3.17]. As the blanket lifetime
lengthens (i.e. wall loading decreases), fewer changeouts are needed. Consequently,
there is a reduction in the COE. A similar trend would be observed for the COE
versus blanket lifetime plot if the wall loading was held constant and the allowable
lifetime fluence was varied. A greater lifetime fluence would lead to longer blanket
life and fewer replacements, resulting in an improved capacity factor, lower replace-
ment component costs, and a lower COE. Blanket elements are best replaced during
the scheduled maintenance period for the turbines, which occurs every two years,
as discussed in the STARFIRE report [3.7]. If the blanket lifetime was six years,
one-third of it could be replaced every two years during the scheduled outage. In
this way, no additional downtime would be needed for replacement. Also, since only
one-third of the blanket would be nearing the end of its lifetime every two years,
there may be a reduction in blanket failures if this scheme is adopted (as opposed
to replacing the e:' ire blanket every six years).
Figure 3.16 indicates the effect of wall loading on the COE for two values of
lifetime neutron fluence. For a lifetime fluence of 5 MW-yr/m 2 , the rise of COE with
wall loading is quite steep. This reflects the shorter blanket lifetime and increased
replacement costs. With a lifetime fluence of 20 MWX-yr/m 2 , the impact of increased
wall loading is not as strongly felt. Increasing the wall loading from 2 MW/m 2 to
10 MV/m2 results in a 12 % increase in the COE. This compares to a 37 % increase
with a lifetime fluence of 5 MW - yr/m 2 . Operating at a wall loading of 5 MW/M 2
with a lifetime fluence of 20 MW- yr/m 2 appears to place fusion in the competitive
range for the COE. Furthermore, this neutron loading is within the range of power
137
11.I
,1
I,
ii 10 15 20BLANKET/FIRST WALL LIFETIME (YEARS)
FIGURE 3.16:
COST OF ELECTRICITY VS NEUTRON WALL LOADING
FOR THE DT FUEL CYCLE
85,
80 1
C-)
C-)
Ca.
0
C,,
0
C.)
70
65
60
50
BETA-0.10
ASPECT RAT10=4.0
POWERu4000MWt
---- NEUTRON FLUENCE LIMIT=5 MW*yr/m2
-- - NEUTRON FLUENCE LIMIT-ZO MW. yr/mZ
Al
- - -
-i
- - - - -. I I
0 2 4 6 8 10
NEUTRON WALL LOADING (MW/m2)
138
0
COST OF
FIGURE 3.15:
ELECTRICITY VS BLANKET/FIRST WALL LIFETIME
FOR THE DT FUEL CYCLE
Pwnu 2.0-10.0
Pinn25.0
BETA=0.10
ASPECT RAT10=4.0
POW ERm4000MWt
61
60
5 9
58
57
56
55
0
- -I
U
density that can be inherently safe [3.18, 3.19].
The sensitivity of the COE to the unit costs of particular items may be of
importance. In this study, two shielding materials have been considered. The
standard shielding material, Fe1422, is -relatively inexpensive but may not perform
as well as an HT-9 shield from a safety point of view (- order of magnitude decrease
in decay heat with HT-9 [3.20]). The shielding capabilities of these materials are
nearly identical (compare shielding thicknesses in tables 2.2 and A.2). The cost for
HT-9 shielding is 50 $/kg, compared to 20 S/kg for Fe1422. Figure 3.17 indicates
that a linear relationship exists between the COE and the shielding cost, given by:
COE = 0.166 -UCSHLD + 53.8 (mills/kWh) (3.5)
where
UCSHLD =.unit cost of shielding material ($/kg)
This relationship was obtained for a DT design with a beta of 10 %, an elongation
of 2.5, an aspect ratio of 4 and an Fe1422 shield. The cost of the Fe1422 was varied
from 10 $/kg to 100 $/kg. At 50 $/kg, the COE found using the Fe1422 design
was within 0.5 % of the COE obtained for the HT-9 design. There is an almost
negligible difference in the COE for these designs assuming the same unit cost for
the shielding (although the volume of shielding material is not identical and design
parameters are slightly different). A difference of 5 mills/kWh is seen when the
Fe1422 shielding cost changes from 20 $/kg to 50 $/kg. Since the relationship of
the COE to shielding cost is linear, approximate costs for designs with Fe1422 shields
can be obtained from those for HT-9 shields by simply subtracting 5 mills/kWh.
The difference in the COE for these two shielding materials is significant. This
indicates the importance of selecting low cost materials for reactor components
where ever possible.
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The effect of fuel costs on the COE for DT reactors is shown in figure 3.18.
Since tritium is produced on site in the breeding blanket, its cost is actually reflected
in the cost of the breeder. Hence, deuterium is the only fueling component which
must be purchased for the DT reactors. Evidently, the effect of its cost on the COE
is almost negligible (note magnification of scale). Although the COE is seen to
rise with the cost of deuterium, this increase is only 0.15 mills/kWh as the price of
deuterium rises from 1 k$/kg to 10 k$/kg.
3.3 Economics of DD Designs
3.3.1 The Effect of Varying Beta
For the DD reactors, a range of values for beta was also scanned. Economic
information is given in table 3.3. A decrease in the cost of electricity was observed
as beta was increased. An improvement of 25 % was seen with the HT-9 designs
in going from beta of 5 % to 10 %, from 126 mills/kWh to 94 mills/kWh. Further
increasing beta to 20 % resulted in an -additional reduction of 10 % in the cost of
electricity (to 85 mills/kWh). Clearly, higher values of beta are more advantageous
for DD reactors than for DT reactors. (As noted in section 3.2.1, the attainment
of the second stability region using high q and lower current may lead to a further
improvement in the economics of the high beta design.) The major factor causing
this is the great reduction in fusion island volume for DD reactors (-- 76 %) when
beta is increased from 5 % to 20 %. The reduction in fusion island volume is not as
large (- 49 %) for the DT designs. This consideration is felt more strongly than the
increase in wall loading at higher betas for two reasons. Firstly, the cost elements
which scale with volume are major contributors to the total cost. Secondly, since
volume scales with the cube of the linear dimensions of the reactor and wall load-
ing scales with the square of the linear dimensions, a reduction in reactor size will
more strongly impact costs proportional to volume (resulting in a decrease) than
costs associated with wall loading (resulting in a increase). Furthermore, the wall
141
Table 3.3: Economics for DD Designs
Parameter Low Beta Medium Beta (10 %) High Beta
(5%) HT-9 RAF (20%)
Direct Costs (1986 MS) 5752 3982 3654 3501
Land & Land Rights 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Structures & Site Facilities 849 557 552 406
Reactor Plant Equipment 4275 2793 2470 2459
Blanket & First Wall 759 461 172 296
Shielding 319 189 207 123
Structure & Support 454 183 178 83
Particle Removal/Control 5.9 4.3 4.3 3.3
Magnet Systems 1678 919 890 670
Power Injection System 69 56 54 49
Vacuum System 54 31 31 20
Power Conditioning Systems 543 603 591 889
Heat Transport System 255 208 206 187
Fuel Handling & Storage 46 46 46 46
Instrumentation & Control 30 30 30 30
Maintenance Equipment 63 63 63 63
Turbine Plant Equipment 404 404 403 404
Electric Plant Equipment 110 110 110 110
Misc. Plant Equipment 55 59 59 64
Heat Rejection System 54 54 54 54
Indirect Costs (1986 M$) 2317 1624 1495 1437
Contingency (1986 M$) 1210 841 772 741
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Low Beta Mediun Beta (10 %)
(5%)
Total Constructed Cost (1986 M$)
Total Capital Cost
(constant 1986 MS)
Total Capital Cost
(current 1992 NIS)
Annual Operation &z Maintenance
(1986 MS/yr)
Fuel Cycle (1986 M$/yr)
COE (mills (1992)/kWh)
COE (mills (1986)/kWh)
Relevant Design Information:
Plasma Volume (m 3 )
First Wall/Blanket Volume (m 3 )
Shield Volume (m3 )
TF Coil Volume (m3 )
Fusion Island Volume (m3 )
Major Radius (m)
Minor Radius (m)
Toroidal Field (T)
Plasma Current (MA)
Triangularity
Plasma Density (m~3 )
Neutron Wall Loading (MW/m 2 )
Thermal Wall Loading (MW/m 2 )
9279
10291
14132
52.5
70.9
296
126
6781
2440
2692
3001
19157
13.01
3.25
8.0
53.8
0
1.80x10 20
0.63
0.42
HT-9
6447
7150
9819
52.4
82.7
218
94
2661
1481
1588
1322
8920
9.52
2.38
7.2
35.2
0.3
2.88x10 2o
1.17
0.78
RAF
5920
6566
9018
52.2
45.3
199
85
2595
1365
1745
1271
8779
9.44
2.36
7.1
34.5
0.3
2.88x10 2 0
1.11
0.74
High Beta
(20%)
5679
6298
8649
52.1
80.4
197
85
1190
951
1031
614
4671
7.28
1.82
6.2
23.2
1.2
4.31x10 20
1.98
1.32
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Parameter
loadings associated with the DD fuel cycle are lower, resulting in longer lifetimes.
This implies that the decrease in wall area- (i.e. reactor size) would have to be larger
before component lifetimes and the COE were affected.
Total fuel cycle costs for the HT-9 DD designs are seen to increase as beta is
increased from 5 to 10 %, and then to decrease again as beta is increased to 20 %.
For a beta of 5 %, fuel cycle costs are 70.9 MS/yr. This increases to 82.7 M$/yr
(17 % increase) at beta of 10 %, and then decreases again to 80.4 M$/yr at beta
of 20 %. It appears that total initial fuel cycle costs dominate for the DD reactors
(see table 3.5), especially at lower beta. The more frequent blanket changeouts at
higher beta result in somewhat larger replacement component and waste handling
costs. However, the larger volume of material involved in reactor components drives
materials and waste handling costs up for the 10 % beta case, although only one
blanket changeout is required during its lifetime (compared to two changeouts for
the 20 % beta case). Decommissioning costs are assumed to-scale with material
volume and wall loading. The combination of these factors leads to a slight decrease
in the decommissioning estimate as beta increases (see table 3.6). Comparing to
the DT designs, fuel cycle costs for the HT-9 DD designs are significantly larger,
being 71 M$/yr at best, for a 10 % beta, compared to 21 M$/yr for the DT cycle.
The larger volume of material required for components is responsible for the greater
cost associated with the DD fuel cycle.
The cost of electricity for the DD fuel cycle is greater than the DT fuel cycle.
The lowest COE achieved was 57.2 mills/kWh for DT and 85.0 mills/kWh for DD.
The DD fuel cycle produces electricity which is 48 % more expensive despite the
improved plant availability (69 % for DD, 65 % for DT - see appendix C). However,
there are other attributes of the DD cycle, namely safety related, which must be
examined before a conclusion on the overall attractiveness of this cycle can be
reached.
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The effect of varying beta on the cost of electricity is illustrated in figures 3.19
to 3.26. Figure 3.19 shows that high beta results in a lower COE. The effect is much
more dramatic for the DD fuel cycle than for the DT fuel cycle. It is also apparent
that going beyond a beta of 10 % for the DD fuel cycle there is not a great improve-
ment in the COE. This reflects the increasing role of greater plasma shaping and
higher wall loadings in determining the COE at high beta. Power conditioning costs,
replacement component costs and waste handling costs are all seen to increase with
plasma beta. Baxter et al. [3.21] found that beyond a beta of 15 %, the cost decrease
per unit increase in beta for a DD tokamak becomes very small. They also state
that the COE from a DD tokamak approaches that of a DT tokamak if high plasma
beta can be achieved. This study shows that although the cost difference between
DD and DT decreases as beta increases, the COE for the DD fuel cycle is still sig-
nificantly above that for DT even at 20 % beta (DD is 2.05 times more expensive at
5 % beta compared to 1.49 times more expensive at 20 % beta).
In figure 3.20, the COE is plotted against the neutron wall loadings correspond-
ing to the various values of beta. The neutron wall loading is seen to have a greater
impact on the COE for the DD reactors. An initial sharp decrease is seen as the
wall loading increases. This corresponds to a reduction in the volume of the fusion
island and an increase in beta. Beyond a wall loading of 1 MW/m 2 and a beta of
10 %, the COE is not largely affected because plasma shaping and replacement
components costs become more important. Although the wall loadings for the DD
designs are less than for the DT designs, the lifetime neutron fluence limit was
assumed to be lower (14.6 MW - yr/m 2 for DD vs 25.0 MW - yr/M2 for DT, see
appendix A for an explanation and section 3.3.3 for a discussion of the impact of
varying this parameter on the COE). Despite this, less frequent component replace-
ment is required at a given beta for DD than for DT. The role of component size in
determining costs is much more strongly felt by the DD reactors. It is apparent from
figure 3.20 that the contribution to the COE of costs for more frequent replacement
of the smaller high beta DD reactor components is less than the contribution of the
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larger and less frequently replaced components of the low beta DD reactor.
High beta allows for the use of lower toroidal field magnetic fields, as shown
in figure 3.21. Because of the reduced magnet size due to the smaller reactor and
reduced fields required to produce the 4000 MW of thermal power, the magnet costs
are significantly reduced at higher beta. This leads to a lower COE. However, the
lower power density of the DD reactors compared to the DT reactors necessitates
higher fields for this fuel cycle. A reduction in magnetic field and magnet costs at
high beta is therefore felt more strongly by the DD designs. This contributes to the
larger reduction in the COE seen with beta for the DD fuel cycle.
In figure 3.22, it is clear that a smaller reactor size reduces the cost of electricity,
reflecting the scaling of costs with volume. There is a large reduction in reactor
dimensions for the DD machines when beta is increased from 3 % to 10 %. At
this point, the DD reactor size becomes comparable to the low beta DT reactor
size. However, the DD reactors are still more costly because of the higher required
magnetic field and greater plasma shaping needed to obtain the higher value of
beta.
The variation of the cost of electricity and fusion island costs with the mass
of the fusion island for the DD fuel cycle are shown in figure 3.23. As expected, a
lower mass for the fusion island corresponds to lower costs. Fusion island costs are
seen to decrease smoothly as the mass of the fusion island decreases. The minimum
mass for the fusion island found in this work for the DD fuel cycle is approximately
20,000 tonnes. This is still quite large, for it was found that the DT fuel cycle would
be economically competitive as a source of electricity if the fusion island mass was
in the vicinity of 10,000 tonnes.
The volume of the fusion island for the DD fuel cycle can be compared to the
DT fuel cycle in figure 3.24. As expected, the fusion island volume and COE for
the DD reactors is greater than for the DT reactors.
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Less effective utilization of fusion island volume for the DD fuel cycle is evident
in figure 3.25, as less power is produced per unit volume of the fusion island, at a
more expensive rate. A further example of less effective material utilization for the
DD fuel cycle is illustrated in figure 3.26, where the net electric power produced is
plotted against the mass of the fusion island. DD reactors have a lower mass power
density and produce more costly electricity.
3.3.2 The Effects of Varying Aspect Ratio and Elongation
The effect of varying aspect ratio is illustrated in figure 3.27 for both the DD
and DT fuel cycles. The trend observed is similar for both fuel cycles. There
appears to be a fairly large decrease in the COE in going from an aspect ratio of 3
to an aspect ratio of 4. Beyond a value of 4, further increasing the aspect ratio has
only a small effect on the COE.
In figure 3.28, the direct capital cost is plotted against the mass per unit thermal
power (mass utilization) for designs with aspect ratios varying from 3 to 7. The
DD reactors appear less attractive than the DT reactors for two reasons. Firstly,
the direct capital cost is greater for DD in all cases. Secondly, the mass per unit
thermal power is higher for DD, indicating less effective utilization of fusion island
mass for power production.
In figure 3.29, plasma elongation is varied. The DD fuel cycle appears to exhibit
a very broad minimum between an elongation of 2.0 and 2.5. The DT fuel cycle
exhibited a minimum at an elongation of 2.0. As the elongation is reduced below
2.0, the fusion island volume decreases, but the magnet and power supply systems
become more costly. This is due to the fact that lower plasma elongation requires
more elaborate plasma shaping, and hence, more costly magnet systems, to achieve
the same value of beta (10 %). The wall loading is also seen to increase as the
elongation is decreased, leading to more frequent blanket changeouts and increased
151
0FIGURE 3.27: COST OF ELECTRICITY VS ASPECT RATIO
140
cn 120
>. 100
80
O 60
40
40
BETA=0. 10
PLO)(CATON.2.3
, POWER4000Wt
-9-- DT
--- s-- DD
3 4 6 7
ASPECT RATIO
FIGURE 3.28:
DIRECT CAPITAL COST VS MASS PER UNIT THERMAL
6000
5000
C 4000
3000
U
c 2000
1000
8 ETA0. 10
ELOXGATIOX-2.5
POWERa.4D00MWt
-e-- DT
-- -- DD
--
T UPCTNATC-
E
A SIC? ATIO-.
z 
ASPICT 
NATIO-3
I I I I
POWER
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
MASS PER UNIT THERMAL POWER (MFI/PL) (TONNES/,%fW)
152-
*
U
9
- ..--------
*
.
r-
-I
FIGURE 3.29: COST OF ELECTRICITY
110
1
F-.
F-*
00
90
80
70'
60
1.5
PLASMA ELONGATION
FIGURE 3.30-
COST OF ELECTRICITY VS BLANKET/FIRST WALL LIFETIME
Pwn 1.0-10.0
FWIN=25.0
BETA=0.10
ASPECT RAT10=4.0
POWER-4000MWt
5 10 15 20 25
BLANKET/FIRST WALL LIFETIME (YEARS)
153
VS PLASMA ELONGATION
BETA0. 10
ASPECT RATIO-4.0
POWER=4000W9t
e DT
*---- DD
-- -. . - --
3.0
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
N
Cr,
C-)
F-
0
Ca.
0
U,
0
0
*--e- D?
-- &- DO
- .
- -
- -*
0
I
replacement component costs. At an elongation of 3.0, an increase in cost is seen
because of the larger volume of the fusion island. The choice of an elongation of 2.5
in the designs where elongation is fixed (beta and aspect ratio variations) has not
adversely affected the economics of the DD designs, as very little variation in the
COE is seen over the range of values of elongation examined.
3.3.3 Other Effects
It is interesting to see the effect of varying the blanket lifetime on the COE for
the DD reactors. Blanket lifetimes were determined for both the DT and DD fuel
cycles for a fixed lifetime neutron fluence of 25 MW.yr/m 2 , for neutron wall loadings
ranging from 1 to 10 MW/m 2 . The COE is plotted against blanket lifetime in figure
3.30. Increasing blanket lifetime has more impact on reducing the COE for DD than
for DT. This occurs because blanket changeouts are more costly for the DD reactors
due to the larger volume of material involved. It should be noted that these results
apply to the designs with 10 % beta. A different conclusion may be reached due to
the different wall loadings at different values of beta. The effect of varying neutron
fluence limit on the COE for the DD fuel cycle is shown in figure 3.31. An initial
V
sharp decrease in the cost of electricity is seen as the fluence limit is increased up
to a value of - 5 MW". Beyond this point, the impact of the fluence limit on the
COE is small. The fluence limit for HT-9 used for the economic analyses for the
DD fuel cycle (14.6 ) was obtained from that for the DT fuel cycle by scaling
with the average neutron energy. An alternate approach assumes the fluence limit
to be independent of neutron energy (see appendix A), and is therefore constant for
all fuel cycles (25 MW ) The correct approach for determining the appropriate
fluence limit for a different neutron energy spectrum from that for DT probably
lies between these two methods. However, as indicated in figure 3.31, the impact
of choosing either approach will not affect the results given here since both fluence
f
limits lie in the range where there is little effect of this parameter on the COE.
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The effect of increasing the cost of deuterium on the COE for the DD fuel cycle
Js shown in figure 3.32. A cost for deuterium of 2.88 kS/kg (from reference [3.8],
updated to current dollars) was assumed. A very small increase in the cost for this
fuel cycle is observed (less than 0.3 mills/kWh) as the cost of deuterium is increased
from 1 kS/kg to 10 kS/kg. In the case of the DD fuel cycle, the cost of fuel is not
a significant contributor to the total costs.
The impact of using an alternate material on the economics of the DD fuel
cycle is indicated in table 3.3. The RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket DD design has
a higher blanket multiplication factor relative to the HT-9 design. This allows the
reactor to produce less fusion power and still meet the 4000 MWt power output
requirement. Consequently, a smaller, less costly reactor is needed. The COE for
this alternate 10 % beta design is improved by nearly 10 %, from 94 mills/kWh for
the HT-9 design, to 85 mills/kWh. In addition to the reduction in size, part of the
cost savings is achieved through the use of a less expensive blanket material (cost of
Fe2Cr1V is 20 S/kg, compared to 50 $/kg for HT-9). The reduction in blanket costs
account for roughly 25 % of the savings in the COE. Initial and replacement blanket
costs, which are major contributors to the fuel cycle costs, are greatly reduced for
the alternate DD design. The balance of the reduction in the cost of electricity is a
consequence of the smaller reactor size, for the costs of many other components scale
with reactor dimensions. It should also be noted that the RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V
blanket design produces electricity at the same cost as the high beta HT-9 DD
design, but at a lower wall load. This may result in a safety advantage with the use
of this alternate material, with no accompanying economic penalty (relative to the
high~keta DD design).
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3.4 Economics of the DHe Design
The COE was also evaluated for the DHe fuel cycle at a single intermediate
value of beta (10 %). This is compared to the costs for the DT and DD fuel
cycles with a 10 % beta in table 3.4. Despite the fact that the DHe reactor i
slightly larger than its DD counterpart, it produces electricity at a somewhat lowei
cost (78.8 mills/kWh compared to 93.8 mills/kWh). Several factors contribute tc
lowering the COE. A large fraction of the power is produced as radiation, which car
be absorbed in a much thinner blanket compared to neutrons [3.22]. The reduce(
neutron ffux allows for a reduced total blanket/shield thickness. Savings in sit<
facilities costs, support structures costs, maintenance equipment costs and othe
miscellaneous plant equipment costs result from lower activation and the use o
non-nuclear grade components at certain locations. The reduced activation allow:
for the use of contact maintenance in certain areas for certain tasks, as oppose<
to time consuming and inefficient remote maintenance. Consequently, the plan
capacity factor increases (a value of 72 % was found - see appendix C). Becaus
of the reduction in dose rates throughout the plant, there is less concern abou
exceeding worker exposure limits. Fewer workers are needed at the plant sinc
replacement manpower would not be a concern. Plant staffing requirements wer
estimated at 406 persons, compared to 426 persons for DD and 457 persons fc
DT (see appendix C). In comparison with the DT cycle, the electricity generate
from DHe fusion is - 38 % more expensive for reactors of the same beta, assumin
a helium-3 cost of 40 k$/kg (the impact of the cost of helium-3 on the COE
discussed towards the end of this section). The 10 % beta DD design gives a valu
of COE ~ 64 % greater than for the DT design.
Examining the costs directly associated with the fuel cycle, there is not a lar
difference between DT and DHe, both being significantly lower than DD. Annu;
costs attributable to the fuel cycle are 21.5 M$/yr for DT, 82.7 M$/yr for DD ar
22.6 MS/yr for DHe. The greater cost for the DD fuel cycle is mainly due to tl
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Table 3.4:
Economics for DT, DD & DHe Designs with 10 % Beta
Parameter DT DD DHe
Direct Costs (1986 MS) 2165 3982 3667
Land & Land Rights 5.0 5.0 5.0
Structures & Site Facilities 346 557 3 3 1 f
Reactor Plant Equipment 1182 2793 2684
Blanket & First Wall 24 461 140
Shielding 168 189 212
Structure & Support 48 183 16 6 t
Particle Removal/Control 3.0 4.3 4.6
Magnet Systems 169 919 1019
Power Injection System 131 56 62
Vacuum System 8.6 31 59
Power Conditioning Systems 221 603 672
Heat Transport System 174 208 207
Fuel Handling & Storage 143 46 73
Instrumentation & Control 30 30 30
Maintenance Equipment 63 63 38t
Turbine Plant Equipment 399 404 428
Electric Plant Equipment 110 110 110
Misc. Plant Equipment 69 59 55t
Heat Rejection System 54 54 54
Indirect Costs (1986 M$) 910 1624 1504
Contingency (1986 M$) 461 841 776
Total Constructed Cost (1986 M$) 3536 6447 5946
Total Capital Cost 3922 7150 6594
(constant 1986 M$)
158
Total Capital Cost 5386 9819 9056
(current 1992 M$)
Annual Operation & Maintenance 57.7 52.4 47.0
(1986 MS/yr)
Fuel Cycle (1986 MS/yr) 21.5 82.7 22.6/107.1*
COE (mills (1992)/kWh) 132 .1218 185/206*
COE (mills (1986)/kWh) 57.2 93.8 78.8/89.8*
Relevant Design Information:
Plasma Volume (m3 ) 854 2661 3090
First Wall/Blanket Volume (m3 ) 574 1481 451
Shield Volume (m3 ) 1399 1587 1825
TF Coil Volume (m 3 ) 111 1322 1316
Fusion Island Volume (In 3 ) 3225 8920 8605
Major Radius (m) 6.51 9.52 10.02
Minor Radius (m) 1.63 2.38 2.50
Toroidal Field (T) 3.73 7.16 7.61
Plasma Current (MA) 12.5 35.2 39.3
Triangularity 0.3 0.3 0.3
Plasma Density (m- 3) 2.16x10 2 0 2.88x10 20  2.77x10 20
Neutron Wall Loading (MW/m 2 ) 4.16 1.17 0.18
Thermal Wall Loading (MW/m 2 ) 1.04 0.78 2.13
some reduction due to low activation, inherent safety, and non-nuclear grade
components
* helium-3 fuel costs are 40 k$/kg and 700 kS/kg
159
DT DD DHeParameter
larger volume of materials used for initial components compared to DT, and the
greater replacement frequency compared to DHe. One area in which the DHe fuel
cycle is the most expensive is in fuel costs. Annual fuel costs for this fuel cycle are
5.52 M$/yr, compared to 0.59 MS/yr for DD and 0.27 MS/yr for DT (this assumes
a helium-3 cost of 40 kS/kg). Waste handling costs are least for DHe. The reduction
for DHe is due to the expected reduced materials, labor and overhead costs for waste
handling activities resulting from dealing with less volume and lower activity waste,
in addition to the reduced waste disposal costs. The waste handling cost, however,
does not include the waste handling expenses incurred during decommissioning.
The decommissioning costs were assumed to scale with neutron wall loading and
material volume. .The combination of these factors would result in these costs
being least for DHe. The decommissioning allowance for the DHe fuel cycle has
been estimated at 0.49 MS/yr, compared to 3.3 M$/yr for DD and 4.4 M$/yr for
DT. Although the volume of the fusion island is lowest for the DT fuel cycle, the
neutron wall loading is greatest and the activity of the waste at decommissioning,
and therefore decommissioning costs, would be higher.
Fuel costs for the DD fuel cycle are double that for the DT fuel cycle. Deuterium
is the only fuel to be purchased in both cases, since for the DT reactors, tritium is
produced on site and is considered to be a non-cost item. The DHe fuel costs are
nearly ten times larger than DD and twenty times larger than DT due to the high
cost of helium-3. The cost of helium-3 fuel assumed for this analysis was 40 k$/kg
[3.231. Figure 3.33 illustrates how the cost of electricity is affected by the cost of
helium-3 fuel. A linear relationship was found to exist, given by:
COE = 0.0176. UCHe + 77.6 mills/kWh (3.6)
where
UCHe =unit cost of helium-3 fuel (S/g)
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As the cost of helium-3 increases from 40 kS/kg to 100 kS/kg, the COE increases by
1 mill/kWh. A further increase in the fuel cost to 500 kS/kg would lead to an
additional increase of 7 mills/kWh in the cost of electricity. Thus, a high cost for
helium-3 can have significant impact on the COE. It is important to note that the
cost of helium-3 is highly uncertain at this time. In fact, adequate supply of this
fuel component cannot be guaranteed.
Although the electricity produced by the DHe fuel cycle is more expensive than
that produced by the DT fuel cycle, the significant reduction in neutron flux and
the resulting safety merits associated with this fuel cycle may justify the increased
cost. Figure 3.34 illustrates the relative economic positions of all three fuel cycles.
3.5 General Discussion of Fuel Cycle Economics
The economic impact of the change in fuel cycle can be determined by ex-
amining specific direct cost accounts of the three. fuel cycles. Firstly, the effect of
changing the blanket material from one needed for tritium breeding (Li coinpbund
for DT reactors) to one dedicated to heat removal (ferritic steel for DD and DHe
reactors) will be discussed. For the advanced fuels, the first wall/blanket costs in-
crease significantly over the DT blanket costs (by approximately a factor of 20 for
DD and a factor of 6 for DHe). This is due to the larger machine size and greater
volume of material used as well as to the slightly more costly material used in the
advanced fuel blankets. In the case of the DD fuel cycle, the improved neutron
energy multiplication obtained with the use of HT-9 compared to lithium allows for
a smaller fusion power to give the same total thermal power. This is improved even
further with the Fe2Cr1V blanket. Despite having a large neutron energy multipli-
cation factor (i.e. energy gain per neutron or total blanket power divided by fusion
neutron power), there is not a large total gain in energy in the blanket for the DHe
reactor because very few neutrons enter the blanket (only - 7%). A better overall
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Table 3.5: Fuel Cycle Costs
DT DT DT DD DD (10 %)
(5 %) (10 %) (20 %) (5 %)
DD DHe
HT-9 RAF (20 %) (10 %)
Initial First Wall/
Blanket (MS/yr)
Replacement First Wall/
Blanket (MS/yr)
Total First Wall/
Blanket (MS/yr)
2.67 2.03 1.62 64.3 39.0 14.6 25.0 11.9
2.31 2.64 2.80 0 16.9 6.3 21.7 0
4.97 4.67 4.42 64.3 55.9 20.9 46.8 11.9
3.04 4.16 5.41 0.63 1.17 1.11 1.98 0.18Neutron Flux
(MW/NM 2 )
Number of Blanket
Changeouts
Initial Limiter
(Ms/yr)
Replacement Limiter
(M$/yr)
Total Limiter
(M$/yr)
2 3 4 0 1 1 2 0
0.29 0.25 0.22 0.50 0.37 0.36 0.28 0.39
0.14 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.40 0.36
0.43 0.49 0.43 0.74 0.54 0.53 0.68 0.75
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I
DT DT DT DD DD (10 %)
(5 %) (10 %) (20 %) (5 %) HT-9 RAF (20 %) (10 %)
Initial Auxiliary
Heating (M$/yr)
Replacement Auxiliary
Heating (M$/yr)
Total Auxiliary
Heating (MS/yr)
Misc. Sched. Replaceable
Items (MS/yr)
Fuel
4.31 3.69 3.10 1.94 1.58 1.51 1.38
3.74 4.79 5.37 0 0.68 0.65 1.20
8.05 8.48 8.47 1.94 2.26 2.16 2.58
1.23 1.84 2.46 0 0.61 0.61 1.23
0.27 0.27 0.27 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.59 5.52/90.03
(M$/yr)
Waste Handling
(M$/yr)
Total Initial Components
Costs (M$/yr)
Total Replacement
Components Costs (MS/yr)
Total Fuel Cycle
(M$/yr)
5.28 5.80 5.86 3.33 22.8 20.6 28.6
7.27 5.97 4.94 66.7 40.9 16.4 26.7
7.42 9.51 10.84 0.24 18.4 7.7 24.5
20.2 21.5 21.8 70.9 82.7 45.3 80.4 . 22.5/107.0-
* helium-3 fuel costs are 40 k$/kg and 700 kS/kg
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1.74
0
1.74
0
2.65
14.0
0.36
Parameter DD DHe
indicator of this effect is given by the system multiplication factor which is the total
thermal power divided by the total fusion power. The DT and DHe values are very
close, but that for DD is somewhat larger (for both materials). Because of this, the
DD reactor can produce less fusion power and still result in the same total thermal
power. It appears, however, that despite the elimination of tritium breeding and'
the potential for enhanced neutron energy multiplication, the advanced fuels have
more costly blankets and produce electricity more expensively.
For the DT fuel cycle, lithium handling costs must be considered. These have
been included in the fuel handling and storage account which also covers blanket
and coolant tritium removal, fuel preparation and injection, fuel purification, stor-
age and atmospheric tritium recovery systems. The advanced fuels do not need to
be concerned with lithium handling and blanket or .coolant tritium recovery. Ad-
ditionally, the fuel purification, storage and atmospheric tritium recovery systems
are scaled down for the advanced fuels because of the reduced tritium inventory.
These costs are, however, only a factor of three less for DD than for DT so that the
savings seen here do not compensate for the greater expense associated with their
blankets. Fuel handling costs are only reduced by a factor of two for DHe. This is
a consequence of the additional equipment required for purification and handling of
large quantities of helium isotopes.
Tritiated waste will be considerably reduced for the advanced fuels. Although
there is a reduction in the number of blanket changeouts, the total volume of acti-
vated waste to be disposed of is greater. However, in the case of the DHe fuel cycle,
the activity of the structure will be considerably below that for DD and DT. It
may, in fact, qualify for shallow land burial as opposed to deep geological disposal.
Waste handling cost information is listed in table 3.6. Calculations were based on
the method used in reference [3.9].
Magnet costs are considerably affected by the fuel cycle. The DT machine
requires a lower toroidal field (6.8 T at coil, 3.7 T on axis) and has a lower plasma
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Table 3.6: Waste Handling Information
DT
(5 %) (10%)
DD
(20 %) (5 %) HT-9 (10 %) RAF (10 %) (20-%)
Number of Complete
Blanket Changeouts
Number of Complete
Limiter Changeouts
Low Activity Waste
Volume (m 3/yr)
Tritiated Waste
Volume (m 3 /yr)
Storage Pool
Volume (m3 /yr)
Lithium Waste
Volume (m3 /yr)
Lithium Waste Volume
at EOL (m3 )
Structural Waste
Volume (m 3/yr)
2 3 4 0
1 2 2 1
550 551 551 539
31 31 31 0.3
102 102 102 1
36 41 43 0
535 408 325 0
3 4 4 0
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Fuel Cycle
Beta
DH(
(10
1
1
1
1
546
0.3
1
2 0
2 2
549 546
0.3 0.3
1 1
0 0
0 0
25 0
546
0.3
1
0
0
36
0
0
39
DT
(5 %) (10%)
DD
(20 %) (5 %) HT-9 (10 %) RAF (10 %)
Structural Waste Volume
at EOL (m3 )
Fraction of Blanket
Lifetime Consumed at EOL
Materials, Labor and
Overhead Costs for Waste
Handling Activities (MS/yr)
Cost for Transportation
of Waste (M$/yr)
Cost for Disposal of
Wastet (M$/yr)
Decommissioning
Estimate (MS/yr)
Total Cost for Waste
Handlingt (M$/yr)
48 36 29 1952
0.37 0.25 0.22 0.89
3.3 3.4 3.4 2.7
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12
1.9 2.3 2.3 0.55
4.6 4.4 4.2 3.8
5.3 5.8 5.9 3.3
1185
0.66
3.6
0.13
19.1
3.3
22.8
1092
0.57
3.0
0.13
17.4
3.1
20.6
t does not include disposal of waste from decommissioning
167
Fuel Cycle
Beta (20 ) (1'
761 3
0.64 0
3.3 2
0.13 0.
12.4 0.
3.0 0.
15.7 2
I . ............... ll.
current. Thus, both TF and PF coils are smaller, and hence, less costly. The larger
field, current and reactor size for the DD and DHe reactors lead to more expensive
magnet systems.
Table 3.7 lists several key parameters which are good indicators of the relative
economic merit of the various designs. Four relate to power density: plasma power
density (MW/rn 3 ), blanket specific power density (MWe/tonne of blanket material),
neutron Wall loading (MW/m 2 ) and thermal wall loading (MW/m 2 ). The DT
fuel cycle is superior in terms of material and volume utilization per unit power
generated. With a 5 % beta, the plasma power density of the DT machine is 6.3
times greater than the DD machine (see table 3.8). At 10 % beta, the DT power
density is 4.0 times greater than that for DD, and 3.5 times greater than that for
DHe. At a beta of 20 %, the DT plasma has a power density 2.7 times larger than
the DD plasma. It is evident that at higher values of plasma beta, the performance
gap between the DT fuel cycle and the advanced fuels is narrowing. This is also
indicated by the specific blanket power density. However, the gap is much wider for
this parameter because of the greater density and volume of blanket material used
for the advanced fuels. There is not a large difference seen in the values of these
economic scaling factors for the two materials examined for the DD fuel cycle.
In terms of neutron wall loading, the advanced fuels show a distinct advantage.
It is desirable to have as low a wall loading as possible to minimize damage and
the need for component replacement. At a given beta, the neutron wall loading
is lower for the DD fuel cycle compared to the DT fuel cycle (see table 3.7). The
DHe fuel cycle appears even more desirable from this perspective. However, the
neutron wall loading for the DD machines with a 10 % beta still requires that the
initial first wall/ blanket be replaced during the plant lifetime. In this respect, the
DHe cycle presents an advantage because it can retain the blanket for the life of
the plant. Relative to the DT cycle, which requires 3 blanket changeouts during
the plant lifetime for a beta of 10 %, the improvement of the advanced fuel cycles
is clear.
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Table 3.7: Economic Scaling Factors
DT DT DT DD DD (10 %) DD DHe
(5 7) (10 %) (20 %) (5 %) HT-9 RAF (20 %) (10 %)
2.65 4.27 6.45 0.42 1.08 1.03 2.42 1.22Power Density
(MW/m 3 )
Blanket Specific Power
Density (MWe/tonne blkt mat'l)
Neutron Wall Loading
(MW/nM 2)
Thermal Wall Loading
(MW/M 2 )
Blanket Changeouts
During Lifetime
Limiter Changeouts
During Lifetime
Magnet Stored Energy
(MJ/MWe)
Fraction of Direct Cost
due to Fusion Island
Plant Capacity Factor
1.90 2.50 3.14 0.079 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.35
3.04 4.16 5.41 0.63 1.17 1.11 1.98 0.18
0.76 1.04 1.35 0.42 0.78 0.74 1.32 2.13
2 3 4 0 1 1 2 0
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
242 94 38 3565 1121 1051 368 1473
0.240 0.189 0.161 0.558 0.440 0.396 0.335 0.419
0.65 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.72
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Table 3.8: Relative Ranking of Economic Scaling Factors
of Advanced Fuels Compared to the DT Fuel Cycle
Parameter DT/DD DT/DD
(5 %) HT-9 (10 %)
DT/DD DT/DD DT/DHe
RAF (10 %) (20%) (10%)
Power Density
Blanket Specific Power
Density
Neutron Vall Loading
Thermal Wall Loading
Magnet Stored Energy
Fraction of Direct Cost
due to Fusion Island
6.3
24.1
4.8
1.8
0.068
0.43
4.0
19.2
3.6
1.3
0.084
0.43
4.1
22.7
3.7
1.4
0.089
0.48
2.7
15.0
2.7
1.0
0.103
0.48
3.5
7.1
23.1
0.5
0.064
0.45
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As mentioned previously, the blankets of the DD and DHe reactors have the
a reduced need for replacement as a consequence of the lower neutron wall loading
and the elimination of tritium breeding. Hence, there is less need for shutdown.
Furthermore, unscheduled replacement of failed blanket modules may be reduced,
especially for the DHe reactor, because of the reduced neutron damage and possibly
more reliable performance. If replacement is required, this can be done easily and
rapidly since limited direct access to the plasma chamber of the DHe reactor is
possible £.22]. Such direct access capability could be very important for handling
unexpected problems. These effects lead to the possibility of enhancing the reactor
capacity factor for advanced fuel reactors and improving the COE. An attempt to
account for these effects resulted in a plant capacity factor of 69 % for DD and
72 % for DHe (see appendix C), compared to the assumed 65 % capacity factor for
the DT fuel cycle.
The thermal wall loading (radiation and charged particles) exhibits a different
trend. The DT reactors have a slightly larger wall loading than the DD reactors for
all values of beta. However, at a beta of 20 %, the thermal wall loading is nearly
identical for both machines. On the other hand, the thermal wall loading of the
DHe reactor is almost twice that of the DT reactor and nearly three times that
of the DD reactor for a beta of 10 %. A higher thermal and particle flux to the
wall leads to more frequent limiter changeouts during the plant lifetime, and hence,
greater replacement costs for these components. However, these costs are not a
large contributor to the COE so that this consideration is not strongly felt.
An additional parameter related to the cost of the magnet system is the mag-
netic stored energy (MJ/MWe). Its magnitude is indicative of the cost of the magnet
system. As can be seen in table 3.7, this parameter is higher for the advanced fuels,
and is observed to decrease as beta increases for a given fuel cycle. It is apparent
that more costly magnet systems are required for the advanced fuels. This is also
true for low beta designs, which require higher magnetic fields (and larger volumes
in which the magnetic energy is stored) in order to achieve a higher power density.
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The fraction of the direct costs attributable to the fusion island reflects- the
capital cost intensity of the power producing components of the plant. This is
lowest for the DT fuel cycle, and is seen to decrease as beta is increased, due to the
decreasing fusion island volume. The DD fractional fusion island costs are slightly
greater than for DT, but exhibit the same trend. The DHe fusion island fractional
cost is nearly the same as for DD at 10 % beta. The higher fusion island capital
cost for the advanced fuels is a reflection of the lower power densities associated
with these fuel cycles.
The values of the COE obtained for the DT fuel cycle in this work appear
somewhat high when compared to other studies. The Environmental, Safety and
Economics Committee (ESECOM) [3.241 examined a range of fusion reactor designs
and determined the COE's for tokamaks varying from 35.4 mills/kWh (V/Li/Li
with an advanced MHD conversion system) to 55.7 mills/kWh (SiC/He/Li2O).
The COE determined for a tokamak employing HT-9 structure, helium coolant and
Li 2 O breeder was 49.7 mills/kWh. Their assessment assumed a beta of 10 % for
the tokamak designs. The COE for the 10 % beta DT design in this work was
57.2 mills/kWh. In addition to small effects due to differences in financial pa-
rameters, the bulk of this discrepancy can be attributed to the pulsed burn cycle
employed here versus the steady state burn cycle employed in the ESECOM study.
A major cost contributor for the pulsed design is the thermal energy storage system
which is needed to ensure a continuous flow of steam to the turbine for constant
electrical output. This adds approximately 165 MS to the capital cost of the reactor
plant equipment. The pulsed nature of the reactor also results in greater poloidal
field magnet costs because of the larger ohmic heating coils required, greater poloidal
field power supply equipment costs and slightly greater structures and site facilities
costs (since more electrical equipment must be operated, maintained and housed).
It is estimated that these considerations add 8 to 10 mills/kWh to the COE.
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3.6 Summary of Economic Analysis
From the results presented in the previous sections, it is evident that the ad-
vanced fuels are at a clear economic disadvantage with respect to the DT fuel cycle.
At best. the DD fuel cycle employing an HT-9 blanket (20 % beta), produces elec-
tricity at a cost 48 % greater than for DD. The cost of electricity produced by the
DHe fuel cycle is 38 % greater than for DT, if the cost of helium-3 is as low as 40
kS/kg. The COE may increase substantially, if the cost of helium-3 fuel is much
greater than this. A cost improvement for the DD fuel cycle was seen with the use
of an RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket. This resulted from the smaller sized reactor
due to enhanced neutron multiplication in the blanket, in addition to the lower
cost blanket material. the DD reactors is greater than for the DT reactors.the DD
reactors is greater than for the DT reactors. Although a comparison amongst the
fuel cycles cannot be made with this alternate material, it would be expected that
a cost reduction would also be seen for the DT and DHe fuel cycles. The savings
would likely not be as significant as for the DD fuel cycle. due to the smaller volume
of structure in the DT and DHe blankets.
It is apparent from the parametric analyses performed for DT that there is no
economic incentive for pursuing values of plasma beta above 10 %. This vvvvopti-
mum is a consequence of the competition between decreasing costs due to a smaller
reactor and increasing costs due to more frequent component replacement as beta
is increased. It was found that for 10 % beta, a high aspect ratio and an elongation
of 2.0 are desirable.
From the other parametric variations carried out for the DT fuel cycle, several
interesting observations can be made:
9 The fusion island mass of a 4000 MWt plant must be in the area of 10,000
tonne for DT fusion to be competitive with fission.
* A fusion island volume on the order of 3,000 m3 will result in a competitive
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COE.
" Desirable values for the power density of the fusion island (PT ) and the
net electric power per unit mass of the fusion island (k,) are 1.2 and
0.1 2 . These values are obtained with the 10 % beta design and place
DT fusion within the economically competitive range.
" The COE depends fairly strongly on the mass utilization factor (').
" The neutron fluence limit has a large impact on the COE up to values of
13 M Above this value, the decrease in the COE per unit increase
in fluence limit is not large.
" The COE for DT was found to be linearly dependent on the cost of shield-
ing. and almost unaffected by the cost of deuterium fuel.
With the DD designs, the impact of varying beta is more strongly felt. Higher
beta appears to be more important in reducing the COE for this fuel cycle, although
the unit reduction in cost per unit increase in beta becomes small beyond a beta of
10 - 15 %. This is again a consequence of the competing effects of decreasing
costs due to smaller component sizes and increasing costs due to more frequent
replacement at high beta. A high aspect ratio and elongation of 2.0 to 2.5 should
be sought to minimize the COE for DD reactors. A longer blanket lifetime is more
important for this fuel cycle because the larger reactor components result in more
costly blanket changeouts. For the DD fuel cycle the neutron fluence limit has a
significant impact on the COE up to approximately 5 " Beyond this value, the
reduction in COE as the fluence limit is increased is small. Some cost savings results
with the RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket DD design compared to the HT-9 DD
design at 10 % beta. This is a consequence of the improved energy multiplication in
the blanket (due to increased iron content), and the lower unit cost of the blanket
material. The mass and volume of the least costly DD designs (20 % beta HT-9
and 10 % beta RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket) are far too large to result in a
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competitive COE. The fusion island power density and mass power density of the
DD designs are too low to result ini econbmical energy production.
The cost of electricity determined for the DHe fuel cycle is somewhat reduced
from the DD fuel cycle, although still significantly above that from the DT fuel
cycle. An important factor in determining the COE for this fuel cycle is the cost of
fuel. An increase of 7 mills/kWh in the COE was seen as the cost of helium-3 was
increased from 10 kS/kg to 500 kS/kg. A major concern is the availability of fuel
to supply an economy dependent on this fuel cycle.
Costs directly associated with the fuel cycle were seen to be similar for DT and
DHe. both being much below the costs for DD. The greater cost for DD is mainly a
consequence of the larger volume of materials use for components compared to DT,
and the greater replacement frequency compared to DHe.
The contribution of fuel costs to the fuel cycle costs are greatest for DHe; the
contribution of waste handling costs are least for this fuel cycle. This reflects the
reduced volume and activity of the wastes to be handled.
Despite the elimination of tritium breeding and the potential for enhanced
neutron energy multiplication, the advanced fuels have more costly blankets and
produce energy more expensively. The absence of a lithium compound and breeder
tritium extraction equipment do not lead to a great cost reduction for the DD and
DHe fuel cycles. Tritium handling and hydrogen isotope separation equipment is
still required, although at a smaller scale than for DT, to provide for plasma exhaust
purification. Some cost savings is seen, but not enough to offset the large expense
associated with the advanced fuel blankets. This suggests the use of a less costly
blanket material for these fuel cycles.
As indicated by the economic scaling factors, the DT fuel cycle is superior in
terms of material and volume utilization per unit power produced. It also requires
much less magnetic energy for power production. The advantage of the DT fuel cycle
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diminishes however, at higher values of beta. The DT fusion island is less capital
intensive, but has a greater need for component replacement as reflected through
the wall loading. The reduced,need for component replacement, the absence of
a lithium breeder, the lower tritium inventory and the reduction in activation of
structural materials (especially in the case of the DHe fuel cycle) all lead to the
possibility of improved plant availability for the advanced fuels. This partially
offsets the increased costs for the advanced fuel cycles seen in other areas.
The DD and l5He fuel cycles are at a distinct economic disadvantage with
respect to the DT fuel cycle. However, there appears to be some safety benefits.
to be obtained by adopting an advanced fuel cycle. In the next several chapters,
safety advantages will be identified and quantified where possible. It will then be
the necessary to determine if these safety advantages can justify the increased cost
for electricity.
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Chapter 4
Fuel Cycle Systems
The fuel cycle systems consist of all the subsystems of the fusion reactor which
are needed to process and handle the fuel components. These include: the plasma
exhaust/vacuum system, the exhaust impurity removal system, the isotopic sep-
aration systems, fuel storage, the fuel injection system, the atmospheric tritium
recovery system, the tritiated waste processing system, and the blanket tritium
recovery system (DT).
Burnt gases are removed from the plasma chamber by the exhaust/vacuum
system. This system must be capable of reaching and maintaining very low pres-
sures (iO-5 - 1Q4 kPa) and must offer a very large pumping capacity. Compound
cryopumps are well suited to this operation. Gases being evacuated from the torus
will include hydrogen (H 2 , HD, HT, D2 , DT and T2 ), helium (3He and 4 He), along
with gaseous impurities coming from the walls. It is also possible to find oxygen,
nitrogen, water vapor, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, ammonia, methane and
other hydrocarbons.
Before isotopic separation can be performed, impurities must be extracted from
the exhaust stream. Helium is initially separated from the other gases at the com-
pound cryopumps. If it is desired to recover helium-3, the stream containing the
helium isotopes is directed to the helium isotope separation system. The mixture of
hydrogen isotopes and impurities is passed through several chemical process beds
so that the impurities can be removed and either stored in the beds or passed out
of the facility after a final processing in the tritium waste treatment system. Once
the impurities are removed, a relatively pure mixture of hydrogen isotopes can be
delivered to the hydrogen isotope separation system.
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Separation and enrichment of the isotopes will be performed according to de-
vice specific requirements. Cryogenic distillation seems to be well suited for this
task, for both hydrogen and helium isotopes. The hydrogen isotopes can be iso-
topically distilled at1- 20 K. In addition to the stream from the plasma exhaust,
there will be an input stream from the blanket tritium recovery system, for the DT
reactors, consisting primarily of tritium, with a small amount of protium. Also,
there may be an input stream from the low level tritiated water processing and
air processing subsystems, containing largely protium with smaller amounts of tri-
tium and deuterium. Cryogenic distillation of helium isotopes (at ~ 4 K) appears
straightforward, and separation factors higher than for hydrogen isotopes have been
reported [4.1].
Once separated, the fuel constituents can be stored until they are needed. Stor-
age is required for both the short term to smooth out supply and demand transients
and for the long term to provide fuel for reactor operation in the event that the
upstream fuel system is non-operational. When needed, the fuel components can
be combined to form the proper fueling mixture and injected into the torus.
A tritium recovery system may be needed to process tritium contaminated
atmospheres. The contaminated gas is processed by being continuously pumped
through a catalytic bed where tritium gas is converted to tritiated water. The
cooled gas is directed to a molecular sieve or cold trap where the tritiated water is
captured, reducing tritium in these streams to acceptable levels for discharge.
The blanket tritium recovery system is needed for the DT reactors to recover
the tritium bred in the blanket. For the liquid lithium breeder used in the designs
considered in this work, a molten salt extraction process is most attractive for
removing the tritium.
In the following sections, each of the fuel cycle subsystems will be described in
more detail. An attempt to characterize particular aspects (i.e. equipment size and
system capacities) of some of the components of the fuel handling systems for the
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designs considered in this work has been made. The design differences amongst the
DT, DD and DHe fuel cycles will be discussed. Schematics of the fuel processing
systems for each of the fuel cycles are shown in figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. There is
very little difference in the fuel handling systems for the different values of beta for
a given fuel cycle.
4.1 Vacuum System
The primary requirement of the vacuum system is to remove non-fusing plasma
ash particles, such as protons, alpha particles and impurities formed from interac-
tions with wall materials, from the torus. It is desirable for this system to achieve
good reliability and maintainability, and to have minimum tritium inventory, min-
imal neutron streaming and minimum number of vacuum ducts within the system.
Tradeoffs between these design objectives are necessary since they tend to conflict
with one another. Maximizing helium pumping would maximize plasma purity, but
it would require more and/or larger vacuum ducts leading to excessive neutron and
gamma streaming. It would also remove large amounts of unburnt tritium leading
to large tritium inventories in the vacuum pumps and the fuel recycle systems. In
the STARFIRE report [4.2], a number of analyses were performed to determine how
to best satisfy these conflicting design objectives. The recommendations provided
there were followed in designing the vacuum systems here to ensure a minimum
amount of neutron streaming and adequate ash removal.
A pumped limiter has been used for the vacuum system consisting of a toroidal
"belt" located at the outboard midplane. The components of this system include
the limiter slots, the limiter duct, the plenum, the vacuum ducts and the cryop-
umps (see figure 4.4). There are two limiter slots located between the back of the
limiter and the first wall, above and below the reactor midplane. The orifice extend-
ing from the limiter slots through the blanket to the plenum region is the limiter
duct. The plenum is the open region behind the blanket and serves to provide a high
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conductance I pathway to the vacuum ducts while hindering neutron streaming.
The limiter slots, the limiter ducts and the plenum region extend around the torus
circumference and are symmetric about the reactor midplane. The circular vacuum
ducts connect the vacuum pumps to the plenum region. The pumps are located
below the reactor.
As in STARFIRE [4.21, evacuation is achieved using compound cryopumps.
They provide high pumping speeds, cleanliness, reliability/maintainability, tritium
compatibility and have no moving parts. However, the cryopumps are batch pump-
ing devices, and undesirable holdup of tritium within the pumps is unavoidable.
The pumps remove hydrogen isotopes and any impurities by cryocondensation on
a 4 K panel; helium is removed by cryosorption on a separate refrigerated panel.
Tritiated water vapor and ammonia can be separated from the stream within the
pump if a liquid nitrogen baffle is incorporated. These impurities can then be easily
routed to the most advantageous process beds. Helium is separated from the bulk
of the plasma exhaust within the cryopumps. The cryocondensing panel yields the
hydrogen isotopes plus some hydrocarbons and argon; pure helium is found on the
cryosorbing panel. Most cryosorbers capable of pumping pure helium are quickly
inactivated by hydrogens, which condense and freeze on their surfaces. If the con-
densing chevrons are located in front of the cryosorbers, the fouling species can be
intercepted before reaching the cryosorbers, circumventing the problem. This type
of pump is one of three candidates being employed at the Tritium Systems Test
Assembly (TSTA) for long term tritium pumping experiments [4.3].
The vacuum pumps must be regenerated on a regular basis. Frequent regen-
eration will minimize the tritium inventory. However, this may have a deleterious
effect on the valve lifetime. A two hour regeneration period for the DT reactor was
t Conductance refers to the ease with which the gas flows through a given com-
ponent of the vacuum system; it depends on whether molecular-wall interactions
(molecular flow) or molecule-molecule interactions (viscous flow) are dominant.
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thought to be suitable, giving a valve life of two years [4.2, 4.4]. The regeneration
time can be extended for the advanced fuels because of the greatly reduced quanti-
ties of tritium in the plasma exhaust. A regeneration time of 32 hours was selected,
as in the WILDCAT study [4.5]. With this scenario, the valves would last for the
entire plant lifetime. For regeneration of the cryopumps, a series of hermetic, tri-
tium compatible mechanical pumps can be employed. Such a series, consisting of a
magnetic-bearing turbopump, a moving spiral pump and a two-stage metal bellows
pump, has performed satisfactorily and was not degraded by a tritium environment
[4.6].
The vacuum systems for the fusion reactors examined in this work have been
designed. The conductance analysis followed the procedure outlined in the DEMO
report [4.4] and is summarized in appendix D. Vacuum system parameters for the
three fuel cycles are listed in tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. There is not a great variation
amongst the designs having different values of beta since the vacuum system pa-
rameters depend largely on the exhaust rates from the vacuum chamber, which are
constant for a given fuel cycle.
The DT reactors utilize 28 cryopumps, 1.2 m in diameter, on 14 vacuum ducts.
Two pumps are provided on each duct so that regeneration of one of them can be
accomplished during plasma operation. The 14 operating pumps provide sufficient
pumping capacity to remove the helium ash at its production rate, and the tritium
inventory in each is kept to below 10 g. Because of the need for higher plasma
purity to maintain the burn, the advanced fuel reactors have greater pumping re-
quirements. The DD reactors employ 32 cyropumps on 16 vacuum ducts and the
DHe reactor uses 48 pumps on 24 ducts. The fact that the helium production rate
in the DHe plasma is greater than in the DD plasma combined with the need for-
a high purity plasma requires this system to have the greatest pumping capacity.
Because of the high exhaust rate, large quantities of all species will be recirculated.
To accommodate the greater gas load, a larger plenum and larger vacuum ducts as
well as more pumps must be incorporated into the vacuum system. The alpha pro-
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Table 4.1: Vacuum System Parameters for DT Reactors
Parameter Low Beta Medium Beta High Beta
(5 %) (10%) (20%)
Number of pumps 14 14 14
Regeneration time (h) 2 2 2
Helium pressure in limiter slot (Pa) 0.042 0.053 0.065
Hydrogen pressure in limiter slot (Pa) 0.598 0.762 0.936
Total limiter gas load (Pa - m 3 /sec) 32.76 32.76 32.76
Helium limiter gas load (Pa - m 3/sec) 4.89 4.89 4.89
Hydrogen limiter gas load (Pa -m 3/sec) 27.87 27.87 27.87
Limiter slot helium conductance (m 3 /sec) 1511 1290 1127
Limiter duct helium conductance (m 3/sec) 2776 2381 2080
Plenum helium conductance (m 3 /sec) 5326 4617 4097
XVacuum duct helium conductance (m 3 /sec) 81 81 81
Pump conductance for helium (m3 /sec) 70 70 70
Effective conductance for helium (m3 /sec) 320 311 303
Required helium pumping speed (m 3 /sec) 236 186 152
Limiter slot hydrogen conductance (m 3 /sec) 1906 1627 1422
Limiter duct hydrogen conductance (m 3 /sec) 3502 3003 2624
Plenum hydrogen conductance (m 3 /sec) 6718 5823 5168
\Tacuum duct hydrogen conductance (m 3 /sec) 102 102 102
Pump conductance for hydrogen (m 3/sec) 127 127 127
Effective conductance for hydrogen (m 3 /sec) 448 434 421
Required hydrogen pumping speed (m 3 /sec) 69 54 47
Tritium Exhausted (g/day) 1598 1598 1598
Deuterium Exhausted (g/day) 1067 1067 1067
Protitim Exhausted (g/day) 0.5 0.5 0.6
Helium-3 Exhausted (g/day) 1.6 1.6 1.6
Helium-4 Exhausted (g/day) 742 742 742
Tritium inventory per pump (g) 9.5 9.5 9.5
Total Tritium in pumps (g) i33 133 133
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Table 4.2: Vacuum System Parameters for DD Reactors
Parameter Low Beta Medium Beta High Beta
(O %) (10 %) (20 %)
Number of pumps 16 16 16
Regeneration time (h) 32 32 32
Helium pressure (Pa) 0.027 0.044 0.065
Hydrogen pressure (Pa) 0.652 1.043 1.559
Total gas load (Pa - m 3/sec) 41.37 41.37 41.38
Helium gas load (Pa - m 3 /sec) 3.92 3.92 3.92
Hydrogen gas load (Pa - m 3/sec) 37.45 37.45 37.46
Limiter slot helium conductance (m3 /sec) 2712 1989 1525
Limiter duct helium conductance (m 3 /sec) 4474 3281 2516
Plenum helium conductance (m 3 /sec) 9316 7009 5528
Vacuum duct helium conductance (m 3 /sec) 86 85 86
Pump conductance for helium (m 3 /sec) 75 75 75
Effective conductance for helium (m3 /sec) 407 388 369
Required helium pumping speed (m 3 /sec) 287 180 -120
Limiter slot hydrogen conductance (m 3 /sec) 3661 2686 2059
Limiter duct hydrogen conductance (m 3/sec) 6040 4430 3397
Plenum hydrogen conductance (m 3 /sec) 12578 9463 7464
Vacuum duct hydrogen conductance (m 3/sec) 116 116 116
Pump conductance for hydrogen (m 3 /sec) 144 144 144
Effective conductance for hydrogen (m 3 /sec) 612 581 550
Required hydrogen pumping speed (m 3 /sec) 86 54 36
Tritium Exhausted (g/day) 16 16 16
Deuterium Exhausted (g/day) 2687 2687 2687
Protium Exhausted (g/day) 86 86 86
Helium-3 Exhausted (g/day) 198 198 198
Helium-4 Exhausted (g/day) 334 334 334
Tritium inventory per pump (g) 1.3 1.3 1.3
Total Tritium in pumps (g) 21 21 21
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Table 4.3: Vacuum System Parameters for DT, DD and DHe Reactors
Parameter DT DD DHe
Number of pumps 14 16 24
Regeneration time (h) 2 32 32
Helium pressure (Pa) 0.053 0.044 0.533
Hydrogen pressure (Pa) 0.762 1.043 0.510
Total gas load (Pa - m3 /sec) 32.76 41.37 253.48
Helium gas load (Pa - m 3 /sec) 4.89 3.92 184.50
Hydrogen gas load (Pa -m 3 /sec) 27.87 37.45 68.98
Limiter slot helium conductance (m 3 /sec) 1290 1989 2266
Limiter duct helium conductance (m3 /sec) 2381 3281 5069
Plenum helium conductance (m 3/sec) 4617 7009 . 8978
Vacuum duct helium conduct ance (m 3 /sec) 81 86 145
Pump conductance for helium (m 3 /sec) 70 75 126
Effective conductance for helium (m 3 /sec) 311 388 872
Required helium pumping speed (m 3 /sec) 186 180 684
Limiter slot hydrogen conductance (m 3/sec) 1627 2686 2830
Limiter duct hydrogen conductance (m 3 /sec) 3003 4430 6330
Plenum hydrogen conductance (m3 /sec) 5823 9463 11211
Vacuum duct hydrogen conductance (m 3 /sec) 102 116 181
Pump conductance for hydrogen (m 3 /sec) 127 144 225
Effective conductance for hydrogen (m 3 /sec) 434 581 1192
Required hydrogen pumping speed (m 3 /sec) 54 54 201
Tritium Exhausted (g/day) 1598 16 20
Deuterium Exhausted (g/day) 1067 2687 4920
Protium Exhausted (g/day) 0.5 86 176
Helium-3 Exhausted (g/day) 1.6 198 20663
Helium-4 Exhausted (g/day) 742 334 672
Tritium inventory per pump (g) 9.5 1.3 1.1
Total Tritium in pumps (g) 133 21 26
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duction rate is lower in the DD plasma due to fewer DHe reactions. Consequently,
the pumping capacity need not be as large for the DD reactors as for the DHe
reactor. However, the total gas load for DD is greater than for DT. The tolerable
level of impurities is lower for DD so that a somewhat greater removal rate of-plasma
exhaust is required to offset the production rate of impurities and maintain a lower
steady state density of ash.
The tritium inventory in the DT pumps is 9.5 g. This is substantially larger
than either of the advanced fuels despite the shorter regeneration period because
of the much higher tritium content of the plasma exhaust. Although the total
tritium held up in the cryopumps of the DHe system exceeds that of the DD system,
the tritium inventory per pump is almost the same as for the DD system. This
is a consequence of the greater number of pumps, needed to handle the higher
recirculation rate of species in the DHe system.
4.2 Impurity Removal System
The primary function of this system is to remove impurities in the form of
argon, tritiated methane, water, and ammonia from the reactor exhaust stream and
to recover the tritium for reuse from the tritiated impurities. This step is crucial
since if the other molecular species were present in the feed to the hydrogen isotope
separation system, they would freeze and plug the low temperature distillation
columns. Helium is separated from the impure reactor exhaust gases by operation
of the compound cryopump at the reactor (helium is collected on one adsorbent
surface and all other species are collected on another surface). This separation
is easily maintained during regeneration of the cryopumps [4.7]. An analysis to
determine the impurities other than alpha and protium ash was not performed as
part of this work. This should not have an effect on the outcome of this study.
Consequently, the required impurity removal capacity for the present designs was
not evaluated at this time. Nevertheless, a brief account of candidate impurity
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removal schemes will be given here.
Hot metal catalyst beds can be used to achieve separation of the impurities
4.3. 4.81. The impurity stream can first be passed over a uranium bed at 1170
K to remove any free oxygen, nitrogen and carbon, forming oxides, nitrides and
carbides (see figure 4.5). Cryogenic adsorption on a molecular sieve bed at 77 K will
remove all other impurities (DTO. N 20, NO 2 . CO2 , CO, Ar, methane), leaving a
stream of hydrogen isotopes suitable as feed for the isotope separation system. Upon
regeneration of the molecular sieve beds, the stream is directed to a titanium getter
bed at 500 K, where hydrides are formed and argon is eliminated from the system.
Subsequently, the hydrogens are regenerated from the titanium bed by heating to
1170 K and rerouted to the isotope separation system. Upon further heating of the
molecular sieve bed, other adsorbed species are evolved. At this time, the stream
is directed to a CuO/MnO 2 catalyst recombiner where hydrocarbons are oxidized
to DTO and CO2 at 800 K. The water is condensed in a cold trap at 77 K while
the impurities (CO, C0 2, N2 0, NO 2 , Ar) are exhausted. Vaporized water from the
cold trap is reacted with uranium at 750 K to liberate hydrogen isotopes and form
uranium oxides. The use of a ceramic electrolysis cell may be used as an alternative
to decompose tritiated water [4.9]. This stream is then passed over a catalyst bed at
450 K where any free oxygen can be removed. The stream then meets the outflow
of the initial feed from the uranium bed at 1170 K (which removes 0, C, and N
from the feed coming from the cryopumps) and both enter the molecular sieve bed
at 77 K as described above.
Another approach to exhaust impurity removal utilizes a Pd-Ag permeation
membrane assembly to extract pure hydrogen isotopes from the plasma exhaust
stream, leaving a mixture of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, tritiated methane,
water vapor, ammonia and residual hydrogen for subsequent processing [4.9, 4.10].
Elements of the Pd-Ag diffuser would be operated at 300 *C to minimize perme-
ation through the surrounding structure. Hydrogen isotopes are drawn through the
membrane by a backing pressure of less than 100 Pa to minimize the carryover of
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DT with the impurities. The stream which does not pass through the perrneator
membrane would be passed over hot metal beds to react the impurities forming car-
bides, nitrides and oxides, liberating hydrogen isotopes. The later could be passed
through another Pd-Ag diffuser or be adsorbed on a low temperature uranium bed.
Although the palladium diffuser can produce a hydrogen isotope stream free of im-
purities, it cannot produce an impurity stream free of hydrogen isotopes. Other
disadvantages include the need for elevated pressures, potential for brittle failure
during temperature recycling, and poisoning by methane and ammonia.
4.3 Isotope Separation Systems
The plasma exhaust contains a mixture of hydrogen isotopes, helium isotopes
and various impurities. Helium isotopes are separated from the mixture in the
cryopumps; the outflow from the impurity removal system provides a pure stream of
hydrogen isotopes. The hydrogen isotopes must be separated so that the appropriate
constituents for fueling are available. High purity deuterium is needed for all of
the fuel cycles. A stream of relatively high tritium concentration is required for
the DT system. A mixed D/T stream is required for achieving ignition of the
plasma for the advanced fuels. This fueling mixture would be altered once the
operating temperature for the advanced fuel cycles was achieved. Separation of
helium isotopes is required for the DHe fuel cycle. This is also likely for the DD
system since the plasma exhaust contains significant quantities of 3He. The very
low quantity of 3 He in the DT exhaust does not warrant separation.
The systems required to achieve the separation of the hydrogen and helium
isotopes are described below. Cryogenic distillation is the preferred approach in
both cases.
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4.3.1 Hydrogen Isotope Separation
Many possible methods exist for the separation of mixtures of H2 , HD, HT,
D2 , DT and T 2 which exit the fusion reactor chamber. These include cryogenic
distillation, thermal diffusion, palladium diffusion, gas chromatography, differential
hydriding and laser activated separation processes [4.11]. Cryogenic distillation is
probably the best understood and has been successfully employed on a large scale in
industry for H-D-T separation. For fusion reactor applications, the system must be
capable of providing deuterium and tritium streams for fueling and a waste stream
of H2 with trace amounts of HD suitable for discharge to the environment.
Cryogenic distillation provides relatively large separation factors, high through-
put, short start-up times and a large degree of design flexibility. Steady state
operation allows for good control. The operating pressure is approximately one
atmosphere and there are no large pressure gradients within the system. Although
there are large temperature gradients there is no thermal cycling during operation,
resulting in fewer mechanical strains to the system. There are some drawbacks.to
this process, however. A relatively large inventory of tritium is held up as surface
film on the column packing and walls or as bulk liquid in the reboiler. Refrigeration
power requirements for maintaining the low temperature (~ 25 K) are large.
Some basic principles must be considered in the design of an isotope separation
system based on distillation. The most volatile of the hydrogenic molecules is H2 ,
followed by the others in order of increasing molecular weight (HD, HT, D 2 , DT and
T 2 ). The columns are generally designed to provide a specified separation between
any two species, called the light and heavy keys, which are usually adjacent on the
volatility scale. The lighter and more volatile key is recovered in the distillate or
top product, while the heavier and less volatile key is recovered in the reboiler as
the bottoms product. At least one column is required for each pure product.
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Because it is undesirable to inject protium back into the torus, and because
it is unacceptable to release tritium to the environment, the HT form of molecular
hydrogen must somehow be eliminated. Half of the protium in the system will be
in this form [4.11]. Removal of this undesirable species can be accomplished by
promoting the equilibrium:
HT+D 2 = HD + DT (4.1)
This liberates HD which can be removed as an innocuous distillate product and
be discharged directly from the plant in a stream free of tritium. The DT can be
recovered for recycling into the fuel stream. This operation can be carried out in
room temperature catalytic equilibrators fed with a stream of pure D2 , strategically
located between distillation columns.
The radioactive nature of tritium cannot be ignored. Its decay heat of 0.326
W/g manifests itself as a heat leak to the column or reboiler. To prevent liquid
streams in the stripping sections of the columns from decreasing to dryness as a
result of the decay heat, cooling matched to remove this heat must be provided
stage by stage.
Because cryogenic distillation involves tritium in a condensed state, a disad-
vantage of the process is its relatively large tritium inventory within the system.
This results from liquid holdup on the column packing or on the column walls and
from the bulk liquid contained in the reboiler. However, if no high purity tritium
stream is needed, thias inventory could be reduced. This is the case for advanced
fuel reactors, and also for DT reactors if high purity tritium is not needed for neu-
tral beam injections. If another mode of fueling is employed (i.e. gas puffing), the
required fueling mixtures can be prepared by varying the flows of a pure D2 stream
and a mixed DT/D 2 stream.
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The feed stream to the isotope separation system comes directly from the im-
purity removal system. It will consist of the various hydrogenic molecules in their
equilibrium concentrations and containing on the order of 1 ppm of total noncon-
densible impurities [4.12].
Since six species are being separated in the hydrogen isotope separation sys-
tem, calculations to evaluate flow rates and compositions are quite involved. Large
computer codes are available to perform these calculations [4.13, 4.14]. However,
it was felt that such an elaborate model would not enhance the understanding the
systems required for this study. Furthermore, as indicated in section 4.8, the fuel
cycle systems contribute at most 7 % (for the DT fuel cycle) to the total direct
cost of the plant. Thus, economic uncertainties due to lack of design detail will not
have a significant impact. A general description of the expected requirements for
hydrogen isotope separation for each of the fuel cycles is given below. A summary
of the isotope separations system parameters is given in table 4.4.
For the DT reactors considered in this study, the feed to the hydrogen isotope
separation system consists of an equimolar mixture of deuterium and tritium, with a
small amount of protium. A three column cascade is needed to produce the desired
product streams: pure D 2 , mixed DT/T 2 and a waste stream of HD and H2 - In
column 1 (see figure 4.6), the principal separation between recycled fuel and waste
is made. The distillate will contain some HT along with HD and H2 . By passing
this stream through a chemical equilibrator fed with a large amount of D2 , the
formation of HD will be strongly favored. Any unreacted D 2 and the DT formed
in the equilibrator will be passed out of the bottom of column 2 and fed back into
column 1 at the appropriate location. The distillate from column 2 can be directly
eluted to the environment since it is essentially free of tritium. The bottoms from
column 1 are fed into column 3. The distillate of column 3 consists of nearly pure
deuterium; the reboiler product is a mixture of DT and T 2 . From these two streams,
it is possible to prepare a wide range of torus fueling mixtures by varying the flow
rates. If pure tritium is required, another column would be needed to separate it
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Table 4.4: Isotope Separation System Parameters
Parameter ' DT DD DHe
Flow Rate to Hydrogen Isotope
Separation System (mole/d)
Composition of Feed to Hydrogen Isotope
Separation System* (mole %):
T
D
H
Number of Columns required for Hydrogen
Isotope Separation System
Flow Rate to Helium Isotope
Separation System (mole/d)
Composition of Feed to Helium Isotope
Separation System (mole %):
3 He
4 He
Number of Columns required for Helium
Isotope Separation System
o The feed would actually consist of an equilibrium
DT and T2 , but the atomic fractions would be as
1060 1425 2424
49.95 0.37 0.27
49.95 93.64 95.53
0.1 5.99 7.20
3 2 (3*) 2 (3*)
149 7019
56 97
44 3
1 10
mixture of H2 , HD, HT, D2 ,
listed here.
* The third column is needed only during the initial phase of the burn, when large
quantities of tritium are supplied to the reactor in order to achieve ignition.
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from the DT. This, however, would significantly increase the tritium inventory in
the isotope separation system [4.11].
The hydrogen isotope separation systems for the DD and DHe fuel cycles are
essentially the same (see figures 4.7 and 4.8). The first column separates the three
lighter hydrogens from the three heavier hydrogens. To initiate the plasma burn,
each of the advanced fuel reactors will require some tritium fueling in order to
reach ignition. Consequently, the feed to the isotope separation system shortly
after initiating the pulse will contain more tritium than throughout the rest of the
burn. Thus, the distillate from column 1 will contain more HT at this time. This
must be removed before discharge to the environment. The chemical equilibrator
fed with D2 and column 2 will remove this species from the effluent. Throughout
the rest of the burn cycle, the tritium exhausted from the torus (and hence, the HT
content of the exhaust) will be substantially lower. As a result, the distillate from
column 1 may be safe for immediate discharge without further processing, if the
total annual tritium emissions from this system do not exceed 20 Ci [4.12]. Column
2 can then be put on standby. The reboiler product from. column 1 is fed to column
3 where the D2 for fueling is separated. The bottoms from this column (DT/T 2 )
is sent to storage until it is needed at the start of the next pulse. In the case of
steady state systems, this column would not be needed since the primary function
of the isotope separation system would be to remove the protium waste from the
spent fuel. Start-up tritium could be supplied from a separate source since it would
not be needed on a regular basis.
4.3.2 Helium Isotope Separation
The purification of stable rare gas isotopes has generally been performed by
thermal diffusion. The separation factor is proportional to the square root of the
mass ratio for the species being separated. For helium isotopes, this is 1.15. In
order to accomplish separation, the diffusion columns may be many meters tall,
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and several of these may be needed in a cascade to obtain the desired product
quality. This, in addition to the large electrical power requirements, render this
method of separation inefficient.
Cryogenic distillation has also been used effectively to separate helium isotopes.
The main advantage of this means of separation over thermal diffusion is the much
larger separation factor. For distillation, the separation factor is proportional to
the ratio of the vapor pressure of the two species being separated. The minimum
value of this for helium isotope separation is 3 at the critical temperature of 3 He,
3.2 K. It rises rapidly as the temperature decreases. Other advantages of cryogenic
distillation include high throughput, short start-up times and a high degree of design
flexibility. Although radioactivity is not a concern for the separation of helium
isotopes as it is with hydrogen isotopes, refrigeration requirements are more severe
since the separation is performed at a temperature below 4.2 K.
Because only two isotopes of helium must be separated in helium isotope sep-
aration system, standard analytical techniques for assessing the separation of a
binary mixture by distillation can be applied. A McCabe - Thiele analysis [4.15]
was employed here to assess the needs of the helium isotope separation systems for
the various fuel cycles. A summary of the isotope separation system parameters is
given in table 4.4.
Continuous-production of 99.95 % 3 He has been achieved using cryogenic dis-
tillation with a packed column employing a closed cycle 3 He refrigerator [4.16, 4.17].
The bottoms product concentration obtained was 99.92 % 4 He. A McCabe - Thiele
analysis of this separation, assuming a saturated vapor feed, indicated that the
column provided 15 theoretical stages of separation. With the column height of
30 cm, the height equivalent of a theoretical plate (HETP) was determined as 2
cm. In other work, HETP's ranging from 1 to 8 cm have been reported [4.18]. The
fact that only a few centimeters of column length are required for each stage is a
reflection of the large separation factor occurring in helium isotope separation.
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Helium isotope separation is not included as part of the fuel cycle for the DT
fusion reactors. The quantities of He being handled are not large enough to warrant
recovery. It was assumed that the helium recovered from the cryopumps was directly
passed to the waste processing facility with no attempt made to separate the species.
In the case of the DD fuel cycle, however, recovery of 3 He appears worthwhile.
The quantity of 3He being exhausted from the plasma is ~ 66 mole/d, compared to
0.5 mole/d for DT. A single packed column, 2.1 cm in diameter should accomplish
the separation (see figure 4.9). A McCabe - Thiele analysis [4.15] indicated that 13
theoretical stages should accomplish the separation. This gives a column height of
26 cm, assuming an HETP of 2 cm. Further details of the design calculations are
given in appendix D.
The much greater flow rates for the DHe reactor demand several distillation
columns operated in parallel to perform the helium isotope separation. The higher
flow rates in the columns necessitate larger diameters to prevent flooding. For
columns 9.5 cm in diameter, 5 columns would adequately perform the separation.
If 10 columns are operated in parallel, their diameter could be reduced to 6.7 cm for
the same product quality. Since the bulk of the flow passes through the enriching
or upper part of the column, the column sizing calculations were based on the flow
rates here. The lower flow rates of the stripping section would allow for a smaller
diameter. The columns could be designed with the larger diameter in the upper
section, and be tapered to the smaller diameter below the feed inlet. A McCabe -
Thiele analysis estimates 14 theoretical stages are needed for the separation. This
corresponds to a column height of 28 cm, assuming an HETP of 2 cm. The flows
anticipated for a single column (assuming 10 parallel columns will be used to handle
the total feed to the helium isotope separaton system) are shown in figure 4.10.
The number of stages required for helium isotope separation (as determined by
the McCabe - Thiele approach) for both the DD and DHe fuel cycles
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Figure 4.9: DD Helium Isotope Separation Systems
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Figure 4.10: DHe Helium Isotope Separation System
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agree well with results obtained from an analytical expression (the Fenske equation
- see appendix D). It must be pointed out, however, that both -McCabe - Thiele
analysis and use of the Fenske equation assume that the latent heats of the com-
ponents are nearly equal, that the boiling temperatures are close together, that the
relative volatility is roughly constant and that the feed quality is known. Since
9 these conditions are not met in the current problem, the number of stages obtained
here is just a rough estimate.
9 4.4 Fuel Storage and Delivery System
The fuel storage and delivery system must be capable of supplying the fusion
reactor with a fuel mixture of very high purity, at the required flowrate and in
the correct isotopic proportion of fuel components. Storage of fuel constituents is
required for both the short term to smooth out supply and demand transients and
for the long term to provide fuel for reactor operation in the event that the upstream
fuel system is non-operational. The fuel must be stored in a safe and stable form;
the potential for a tritium release to the environment in the event of an accidental
system failure must be minimized. The system must also maintain the particulate
9
and molecular impurities in the fuel stream to values below the tolerable limits for
efficient operation of the torus. Finally, the injection system must deliver accurate
quantities of the fuel mixture into the torus in the given time sequence.
Storage of hydrogen isotopes as a metal matrix has received attention as being
an attractive option for this purpose. Uranium forms a stable hydride (U(H, D, T)3 )
which can accommodate tritium, deuterium or protium in large quantities in a very
small space. As much as 10 4 Ci of tritium (1.04 g or 0.34 mole) can be stored on as
little as 26.4 g of uranium, although approximately five times this is used in practice.
The uranium getter bed is in the form of a metal sponge and is placed in a stainless
steel vessel. Although operating conditions should never exceed pressures of 30 psig
or temperatures of 550 *C, vessels are designed to withstand the pressure of the
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entire tritium inventory in gaseous form [4.191. The equilibrium partial pressure of
hydrogen over the uranium hydride at room temperature is about 0.3 mPa. Even
at 400 0 C, the dissociation pressure of the hydride is only 40 Pa. Because of this,
uranium is an excellent material on which to store the hydrogens, particularly in the
case of tritium where immobilization is an important safety concern. The hydrogen
isotopes will rapidly desorb when heated to about 700 K, where the equilibrium
partial pressure is around 100 kPa. Except in the case of tritium with its 3 He
decay product, the hydrogen evolved from the getter bed is very pure. Most of the
3He from tritium decay can be pumped off using an auxiliary vacuum system, but
there will still be some residual 3 He which is released from the UT 3 lattice as the
bed is heated to drive off the tritium. Any other impurities which may be evolved
during heating can be separated from the hydrogen isotope by passage over a Pd/Ag
diffusor and particulates can be removed by passage through a filter.
Due to the hazardous nature of tritium, it is proposed to immobilize this fuel
component at the fusion plant as uranium tritide, as described above [4.2, 4.19].
Although it would also be possible to store the deuterium needed for fuel as uranium
deuteride, this is not actually necessary since this species is not hazardous and
immobilization is not essential. However, some streams coming from the isotopic
separation system may contain a mixture of deuterium and tritium (D2 and DT).
For the DD and DHe fuel cycles, storage of this mixture is necessary so that a
supply of fuel for start-up of the advanced fuel cycles (by DT ignition followed by
thermal runaway) is on hand. Storage of the D2 /DT mixture on uranium beds
would be required. High purity D2 and 3 He can be stored in standard pressurized
containers according to the same criteria as the industrial storage of hydrogen and
helium [4.20].
The fuel is prepared for injection in the fuel blending units or mixing tanks.
These vessels are of stainless steel construction, insulated and thermostated for
precise control of the content's temperature. The hydrogens may first pass through a
Pd/Ag membrane for final purification before entering the tank. Mass spectrometry
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can be used to determine the exact composition of the gas in the mixing tank. This
can then be adjusted by adding -the appropriate component until the desired ratio
is achieved. The mixture can subseqt.ently be transferred to the torus injection
system., As for STARFIRE [4.2], two blending units are assumed to be adequate
for fueling the DT reactors. For the advanced fuels, two units would be used during
the burn phase of the pulse and one additional unit would be required for preparing
the initial fueling mixture needed for igniting the plasma.
Fuel delivery to the plasma can be performed by either gas puffing or pellet
injection. Gas puffing is the simplest fueling technique and has been used effectively
to maintain and increase the plasma density over several particle confinement times
[4.21]. It consists of injecting cold gas at the plasma boundary. The mechanism by
which the center of the tokamak plasma is fueled, however, is not well understood.
Repetitive injection of frozen pellets at high speed is also a promising means of
carrying fresh fuel across confining magnetic fields to the central plasma core [4.22].
With this method of fueling come the advantages of lower particle losses compared
to cold gas inlet at the plasma edge and greater flexibility in tailoring plasma param-
eter profiles. Both centrifugal and pneumatic injectors are being developed [4.10,
4.23], the latter being preferred for higher injection velocities. Very high injection
velocities are required in order to fuel the center of the plasma without large pel-
lets, which can cause excessive plasma density perturbations. Individual D2 andT 2
pellets 4 mm in diameter, injected once per second at a velocity of 5000 m/s may
result in density perturbations of less than 10 % [4.10].
Fuel is injected by through several injector sets spaced at equal intervals around
the torus. For pellet fueling, each of these is secondarily contained in a cryogenic
injector volume which is filled with the appropriate fuel mixture. The liquiA fuel
is admitted to the pellet former for injection at at rate determined by the plant
needs. Fast acting flow regulating valves can be programmed to admit the gas to
the torus at the appropriate rate. The FED will inject 4 mm pellets at a velocity
of 2000 m/s at a rate of 20 per second during operation [4.23]. STARFIRE [4.2]
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proposes the use of gas puffing for its fueling system. This choice was based on the
fairly low refueling rate and the simplicity of the engineering.
Both systems of fueling may be utilized to meet fueling requirements during
start-up, burn and shutdown phases of the operating cycle. Gas puffing may be used
to backfill the torus prior to start-up and to fuel the torus until a 1 keV plasma is
established [4.231. Frozen deuterium and/or tritium pellets can then be injected to
control the plasma density. For fueling of 'He, gas puffing [4.24] or the injection of
a He neutral beam [4.25] may be envisioned. In the designs considered here, only
the gas puffing mode was assumed for fueling the torus. Four puffers were thought
to be adequate for the DT and DD reactors; 14 puffers were assumed to be adequate
to handle the greater fueling needs of the DHe reactor.
4.5 Atmospheric Tritium Recovery Systems
The atmospheric tritium recovery system is required to treat under normal
and/or accident conditions, the atmospheres and exhausts from the reactor building
and the rooms housing all the tritium related systems. The atmospheric processing
system must be capable of removing airborne tritium, either in the molecular or ox-
ide form, from the reactor building, the fuel processing building and all secondary
enclosures internal to these buildings. During normal operation, small amounts
of tritium may be routinely released to the reactor building from various compo-
nents. Expected sources of tritium release include leakage and permeation from the
plasma chamber and associated components, leakage from the coolant/heat trans-
fer system and leakage and permeation from fuel handling components. Because
of the much greater tritium inventory associated with the DT fuel cycle, the ca-
pacity of this system will be greater. The DD and DHe fuel cycles will not require
continuous atmospheric processing (see chapter 5). However, some provision for
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atmospheric tritium removal in the event of an accident must be available.
A widely used method for tritium removal from air streams is oxidation of
tritium in a recombiner containing Pt/Pd catalyst, followed by adsorption of the
tritiated water vapor together with water vapor in the air, on molecular sieve driers.
Operation of the Pt/Pd catalyst at temperatures around 180 'C avoids the problem
'of catalyst deactivation by condensed water vapor and increases the tritium conver-
sion rate. The cooled gas is passed to the molecular sieve driers where adsorption
occurs. The tritiated water can be recovered from the beds by regeneration, or
the molecular sieves can be removed for disposal. Critical features of the system
for ensuring effective tritium removal include the efficiency of the recombiner, the
efficiency of the driers and the leak tightness of the reactor hall. Drier efficiency
can be enhanced by partially pre-loading the molecular sieve with clean water to
promote isotopic exchange with tritiated water molecules.
The availability of an atmospheric cleanup system does not alleviate the need
for effective tritium containment. Large atmospheric cleanup systems can be ex-
pensive to operate, and efforts should be made to minimize both the capital and
operating costs. To minimize releases of airborne tritium, different levels of con-
tainment can be used in tritium-related systems. Primary containment within the
fuel handling and processing systems consists of the equipment itself. More effective
containment is achieved through the use of all metal components. Secondary con-
tainment is accomplished through the u.se of gloveboxes, vacuum jackets, jacketed
tubing and nested containers. Routine leakage and permeation of tritium into the
environment can be minimized by applying secondary containment. Major mainte-
nance activities, such as replacement of blanket segments, vacuum pumps, impurity
control devices and fueling equipment may result in some tritium release due to
component offgassing. An atmospheric tritium recovery system may be needed
during these times to maintain the tritium concentration at an acceptable level.
Operation of these areas at a reduced atmospheric pressure will minimize tritium
outleakage from the reactor building.
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Personnel access for maintenance is the dominant factor in sizing the required
atmosphere detritiation system'Forunprotected workers, the tritium concentration
must be below 5piCi/m 3 . Bubble suits with an independent air supply are required
if a worker spends extended periods at levels above 5pCi/m 3 . These suits provide a
safety factor of at least 100 against tritium so that suited workers are permitted in
areas with tritium levels up to 500pCi/m 3 . The degree of protection affects worker
productivity, and the tritium concentration level to be maintained also significantly
affects the capital and operating costs associated with the air detritiation system.
The productivity of a worker in a bubble suit is reduced by a factor of two [4.26,
4.27] (see table 4.5). It has been suggested [4.26, 4.27] that the best strategy for a
DT reactor with tritium leakage rates between 15 and 30 Ci/d is a combination of
a detritiation system and a bubble suit, where the tritium concentration could be
maintained between 5 and 500PCi/m 3 . A study performed to determine the impact
of maintenance strategy (i.e. remote vs suited contact vs unsuited contact) [4.27]
concluded that maintenance of levels below 50PCi/m 3 does not appear justified.
Also, they concluded that the use of bubble suits at 50pCi/m 3 does not adversely
affect reactor availability. The MARS report [4.20] affirmed that maintaining a
building atmosphere of 5kpCi/m 3 would be extremely expensive. They selected an
airborne concentration of 50pCi/m 3 for the MARS reactor hall since this level can
be maintained at a reasonable cost, provides a reasonable level for maintenance
workers using bubble suits and allows only a minimal release to the environment.-
If tritium releases to the reactor hall and inactive auxiliaries during normal
operation are below 10 Ci/day, direct emission to the environment without treat-
ment may be possible if the room concentration is kept below 5pLCi/m 3 . [4.10, 4.26].
This is the case for the advanced fuel reactors (see chapter 5), where tritium leak-
age rates are well below 10 Ci/d and the tritium level in the-reactor room is less
than 5pCi/m 3 . A ventilation system may be used with direct release of reactor room
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air to the environment. This is not the case for the DT fuel cycle. Sizing of the
atmospheric tritium removal system for this ftel cycle is performed in chapter 5.
Emergency tritium cleanup capabilities must be available for all fuel cycles in
the event of an accidental release of tritium into the reactor hall. Even in acci-
dent situations, the tritium concentration must be maintained below 5O0pCi/m 3 or
personnel access is not possible. In the MARS design, a two day clean up time sub-
sequent to an accident was thought to be acceptable after consideration of the costs
involved for quicker clean up capability [4.20]. The emergency detritiation systems
for the reactors considered in this work were sized based on a 48 hour clean up period
after an accidental release of the maximum vulnerable tritium inventory. Smaller
tritium releases will take less time for the 500p4 Ci/m 3 level to be reached. Shielding
of components from decay gamma rays was designed to achieve a 2.5 mrem/h dose
equivalent in the reactor hall one day after shutdown. The use of robotic units
during the cool down time is proposed to improve device availability. Once the
2.5 mrem/h level has been reached, hands on operation is permitted to maintain
external reacter components if the tritium level is below 500pCi/m 3 (this level may
be reached within 24 hours for smaller tritium releases). Sorption of tritium and
subsequent release from the surfaces of equipment within the containment volume
can delay the arrival of tritium to the detritiation system. Appropriate choices of
materials to minimize surface adsorption of tritium will mitigate this concern [4.28,
4.29].
An air detritiation system is comprised of the following major components: a
blower, an air pre-heater, a catalytic reactor, an aftercooler and a drier (molecular
sieve). A schematic is shown in figure 4.11. The air entering the system first passes
through a filter to remove particulates. It is then preheated to 180 'C before en-
tering the catalyst oxidizer. After exiting the catalyst bed, the molecular hydrogen
content would essentially be reduced to zero. The gas is then cooled to near its dew
point and routed to the molecular sieve drier. Clean water can be added to promote
adsorption. The air leaving the driers can be either sent to the stack or recirculated
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to the room. To regenerate the beds, the cycle would be operated as a closed to
supply the energy necessary to remove the water from the molecular sieve [4.301.
The steam leaving the dryer is cooled to near its dew point and then routed to a
refrigerated condenser, where most of the water would be condensed and collected
in tritiated water storage tanks. This water may later be processed so that the
tritium can be recovered and returned to the fuel cycle.
In order to evaluate the capacity of the routine and emergency atmospheric
processing equipment, vulnerable tritium inventories and chronic tritium releases
to the reactor building must be known. Tritium inventories and release rates are
estimated in the following chapter and an attempt to determine the equipment
needs is made at that point.
4.6 Tritiated Waste Treatment System
Effluents from various systems may retain quantities of tritium which are un-
economical to recover, but are too high to release directly to the environment. A
system is needed to provide routine processing of these gases generated within the
plant to reduce tritium to acceptable levels before discharge to the environment.
Tritium is removed from all waste gases exhausted from the fuel handling loop, the
glovebox atmosphere purge systems or the vacuum systems before release to the
environment. Such a system is operated at the TSTA [4.31] and involves catalytic
conversion of all hydrogen isotopes in the input stream to water, and organic materi-
als to water and carbon dioxide. Oxygen is maintained at a level to ensure catalytic
conversion of all hydrogen isotopes to water. The water formed from this process
is adsorbed on a molecular sieve; the remaini .g gaseous effluent can be discharged
to the atmosphere after determining that the tritium level is low as practicable. A
process flow diagram is given in figure 4.12. Required system capacities for this
system were not evaluated.
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4.7 Blanket Tritium Recovery System
The blanket tritium recovery system is needed to recover the tritium bred in the
blanket. This system is, of course, only required for the DT fuel cycle. The breeding
material chosen for this study was liquid lithium metal. An effective way to remove
tritium from liquid lithium is by extraction with a molten salt. This requires the
use of a centrifugal contactor, an electrolysis unit and a tritium purification system
to remove gamma and other impurities :4.32]. The tritium produced in the breeder
can be recovered by slow circulation of the lithium to the tritium recovery system
where the tritium is extracted by the molten salt. Technology exists to reduce the
tritium content of the breeder to the 1.0 wppm level (see figure 4.13). In the BCSS
[4.33, 4.34], the tritium inventory in the breeder was kept to an acceptable level by
circulating the lithium at a rate of 0.092 m3 /s. The associated MHD pressure drop
was 1.01 MPa. Circulation of the lithium at a faster rate increases the pressure drop
but the tritium inventory does not drop appreciably. This is due to the minimum
achievable tritium concentration after the extraction process of 1.0 wppm. Once
the tritium is removed from the breeder, the lithium must be chemically purified.
It may then be stored in dump tanks or recirculated to the blanket module. A
tank heating system and tritium control measures must be provided for the lithium
storage. Detailed design calculations of thissystem were not undertaken. It is
expected that the system size would be very near to that described in the BCSS
[4.33] for the Li/HT-9/He blanket since both are part of a 4000 MWt fusion plant.
By maintaining a sufficiently low tritium partial pressure in the lithium tubes,
tritium entering the helium coolant via the first wall will permeate into the lithium
and be recovered with the bred tritium. If necessary, additional tritium in the
primary coolant can be recovered by passing a slip stream over an oxidizing catalyst
followed by cryocondensation of the water produced.
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Figure 4.13: Schematic of Molten Salt Tritium Extraction Method
for Fusion Reactors with Liquid Lithium Blankets [4.31]
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4.8 Economic Evaluation of Fuel Cycle Systems
An assessment of the economics of the fuel handling systems for each fuel cycle
has been made. Estimates of the costs of the various components were made using
information given in references [4.2], [4.51 and [4.32], and are listed in table 4.6.
Little cost variation is seen for the different values of beta for a given fuel cycle.
These costs are small relative to other capital costs associated with the fusion plant
(-- 6 % for DT,-~ 2 % for DD and DHe) so that the overall impact of the fuel
handling systems costs on the cost of electricity is not large. The effect is smallest
for the advanced fuels, where equipment needs are less and the costs associated with
the fusion island (blanket, shield, coils, structure) are much higher.
The fuel handling systems are most costly for the DT fuel cycle, followed by the
DHe fuel cycle and then by the DD fuel cycle. Major contributors to the cost for the
DT reactors include the blanket tritium removal and purification systems, and the
helium coolant tritium removal equipment, which are not needed for the other fuel
cycles, and the atmospheric tritium recovery system, which has a larger capacity
than for DD or DHe. The operating cost for the atmospheric tritium recovery system
indicated in the table is for the continual processing of the air in the DT reactor
hall. The estimate was obtained from information given in reference [4.26]. A single
detritiation unit was found to be capable of maintaining the tritium concentration
in the DT reactor building at an acceptable level. Storage costs are also higher for
the DT fuel cycle because of the need to store large quantities of tritium. Major
contributors to the cost for the DHe fuel cycle are the fuel preparation and injection
systems and the vacuum system, which must be capable of handling the greater
gas load, and the plasma exhaust purification systems which must be capable of
separating large quantities of both hydrogen and helium isotopes.
Annual operating and maintenance costs were estimated based on expected
staffing levels for the fuel handling systems. From projected staff requirements for
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Lthe tritium plant at JET [4.35], it was anticipated that six workers will be needed for
the operation and maintenance of the fuel handling systems for the DD and DHe fuel
cycles, and eight workers will be needed to perform these activities for the DT fuel
cycle (two additional workers will be employed for operation and maintenance of the
breeder systems). Annual operation and maintenance costs, consisting of salaries,
outside personnel support services and miscellaneous costs were scaled from the
total estimate for the plant using the fraction of the total plant staff involved in
fuel handling systems activities (see appendix B for algorithms). Annual operation
and maintenance costs, consisting of process materials and miscellaneous supplies
and equipment, were obtained in a similar way, except that the costs were scaled
using the fraction of the plant operation and maintenance staff (as opposed to the
total plant staff) involved in fuel handling systems activities. The estimated annual
operation and maintenance costs are given in table 4.6.
An independent cost estimate was made for the fuel handling systems using
information from TSTA [4.36]. The goal of the Tritium Systems Test Assembly
was to develop and demonstrate the processes for handling the fuel and exhaust
from a magnetic fusion reactor. Cost data for the TSTA subsystems required to
separate, purify and circulate the gas recovered from the vacuum vessel have been
used to make a second estimate of the costs for the reactors of concern here. No
blanket or coolant tritium removal and purification systems exist at TSTA. Hence,
cost data for these systems were not available from this source. However, it is
possible to compare cost estimates for the other systems. Values extracted from
table 4.6, based largely on estimates made at Argonne National Laboratory [4.2,
4.5], are compared with the TSTA based estimates in table 4.7. The agreement is
fairly good, lending some confidence to these estimates.
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Table 4.6: Economics of Fuel Cycle Systems
DT DD
5 % 10 % 20 % 5 % 10 % 20 % 10 %
Vacuum System (MS)
Cryopumps (M$)
Valves (M$)
Regeneration System (MS)
Fuel Preparation & Injection (M$)
Blending Units & Piping (M$)
Gas Puffers & Piping (M$)
Fuel & Coolant Processing & Purification (MN$)
Blanket Tritium Removal & Purification (M$)
Centrifugal Contactor (M$)
Electrolysis Unit (M$)
Blanket Tritium Purification System(M$)
Lithium Chemical Purification (MS)
Lithium Dump Tank & Heating System(M$)
Plasma Exhaust Purification (M)
H Isotope Separation System (MS)
He Isotope Separation System (M$)
Fuel Cleanup Units (M$)
Pumps & Piping (M$)
Coolant Tritium Removal & Purification (M$)
Helium Coolant Tritium Removal (M$)
Helium Coolant Chemical Purification (M$)
Storage (M$)
Tritium Storage (M$)
Deuterium Storage (M$)
Helium-3 Storage (MS)
Storage System Pumps & Piping (MS)
Atmospheric Tritium Recovery System (M$)
Total (M$)
Fraction of Total Direct Cost (%)
Spare Parts Allowance (2 %) (M$)
Annual 0 & M Costs (M$/yr)
3.5
2.0
1.4
0.1
2.2
0.4
1.8
103.1
50.6
11.9
11.9
10.7
10.7
5.4
9.5
4.7
2.6
2.6
41.0
30.3
10.7
2.6
2.1
0.1
0.4
36.8
3.5
2.0
1.4
0.1
2.2
0.4
1.8
103.1
50.7
11.9
11.9
10.7
10.7
5.4
9.5
4.7
2.6
2.6
41.1
30.3
10.7
3.5
2.0
1.4
0.1
2.2
0.4
1.8
103.2
50.7
11.9
11.9
10.7
10.7
5.4
9.5
4.7
2.6
2.6
41.1
30.4
10.7
4.0
2.3
1.6
0.1
2.4
0.6
1.8
26.4
13.3
6.1
2.0
1.7
3.4
10.7
10.7
4.0
2.3
1.6
0.1.
2.4
0.6
1.8
26.4
13.3
6.1
2.0
1.7
3.4
10.7
4.0
2.3
1.6
0.1
2.4
0.6
1.8
26.4
13.3
6.1
2.0
1.7
3.4
10.7
10.7 10.7
6.0
3.5
2.4
0.2
6.9
0.6
6.4
48.6
35.4
6.1
20.4
1.7
7.2
10.7
10.7
2.6 2.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.8
2.1 2.1 - - - -
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
- - - - - 1.0
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
36.8 36.8 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.4
148.2 148.2 148.3 52.1 52.1 52.1 81.7
6.1
2.9
1.83
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6.7
2.9
1.83
6.8
2.9
1.83
0.9
1.0
0.87
1.2
1.0
0.87
1.4
1.0
0.87
2.2
1.6
0.88
Component DHe
Table 4.7: Comparison of Fuel Handling Systems Cost Estimates
Fuel Cycle
DT DD DHe
TSTA Cost
Data [4.36]
Argonne Studiest
[4.2, 4.5)
Difference (%)
44.1 39.9 66.1
56.4 41.4 71.0
21 4 7
not including blanket and coolant tritium removal systems costs
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Source of
Estimate
4.9 Summary of Fuel Cycle Systems
The major difference between the fuel handling systems of the advanced fuels
and that for DT fuel is the need for a blanket tritium recovery system and tritium
removal from the coolant for the DT fuel cycle. Although tritium is not bred in the
advanced fuel blankets, all other components of the fuel handling systems needed
for DT are also required for these fuel cycles. Most of these components, how-
ever, are scaled down in size from the DT components because of the lower tritium
throughput. This is not the case for the vacuum systems which are larger for the
advanced fuels because of the more severe plasma purity requirements. The hydro-
gen isotope separation systems are not largely different, although a third column
for the advanced fuels is only needed during and shortly after pulse initiation. The
additional capacity is needed at this time because the plasma exhaust will contain
a higher tritium concentration (since tritium is being fueled to ignite the plasma)
which must be reduced before discharge to the environment. Helium isotope sepa-
ration capabilities are greatest for the DHe fuel cycle. No helium isotope separation
equipment is used for the DT plants because the 3 He is the plasma exhaust is not
worth recovering. Other components of the fuel cycle systems are not expected to
be largely different amongst the fuel cycles. No difference in equipment needs is
seen for the different values of beta for a given fuel cycle.
The economic evaluation of the fuel cycle systems indicated that the largest
costs will occur for the DT fuel cycle. This is mainly a consequence of blanket and
coolant tritium removal and purification needs. For the DT and DD fuel cycles,
little cost variation is seen for the different values of beta. The total economic
impact of the fuel cycle systems is small. The effect is least for the advanced fuels,
where the fuel cycle equipment needs are less and where the costs are overshadowed
by the much greater costs associated with the fusion island.
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Chapter 5
Radiological Hazards of Fusion Fuel Cycles
During operation of fusion power plants, the potential for exposure of workers
to radioactive hazards will exist. Ionizing radiation is anticipated to be the most
prevalent hazard within a reactor station because it is associated with all parts of
the on-site fuel cycle. Sources of ionizing radiation include tritium, neutrons and
beta-gamma radiation resulting from the decay of neutron activation products. The
degree of hazard associated with each of these sources depends'on which of the fuel
cycles is being considered.
Tritium is associated with many of the reactor station operations: fueling, fuel
processing and breeding. Some of the plant wastes, especially in the case of the DT
fuel cycle, will contain tritium. It can be found in the coolant, streams and on the
surfaces of components. The degree of concern over exposure to the tritium hazard
is greatest for the DT fuel cycle.
Neutrons are of potential concern only during operation of the reactor because
they are produced in the DT reaction and the neutron branch of the DD reaction,
which take place only while there is a burning plasma. Because of radioactivity
levels resulting from neutron activation of structural materials and potential neutron
leakage through penetrations of the reactor structure, personnel entry to the reactor
hall during operation is precluded. Some neutrons may escape from the reactor
building via penetrations through the reactor room but the reactor building walls
will capture nearly all neutrons that escape the reactor structure. Exposure of
workers to neutrons is not expected for any of the fuel cycles.
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All parts of the reactor structure and impurities in the primary coolant will
become radioactive during neutron bombardment. Activation products in the reac-
tor structure are not expected to be a significant radioactive hazard during reactor
operation. During maintenance outages, a 24 h cool down period will allow gamma
dose rates to be reduced to 2.5 mrem/h so that personnel access is possible. Ra-
dioactivity levels may still be high (especially for the DT fuel cycle) so that proper
procedures and protective measures may be needed. Subsequent storage, decon-
tamination, disassembly and disposal of activated components may also involve
potential exposure of personnel to radioactive material so that appropriated safety
measures may be needed. The primary coolant loop will circulate an inventory of
activation products from the reactor to other components of the power cycle, such
as the steam generator, pumps, valves and piping. This is not foreseen to be a major
hazard with helium cooled systems [5.1, 5.2]. Appropriate procedures to minimize
personnel exposure in areas of high radioactivity will be needed. These concerns
are greatest for the DT fuel cycle, and least for the DHe fuel cycle.
In this chapter, the radiological hazards associated with the different fuel cycles
are identified. Most of the effort has been focused on occupational hazards. An
attempt to quantify activity levels and rates of release at various locations in the
plant has been made. Some attention was given to release rates to the environment
and hazards posed to the public.
5.1 Tritium Hazards
The reactors considerhd in this work burn various fuels. Since it does not ex-
ist in useful concentrationL in nature, tritium for fueling the DT reactors must be
generated by neutron tran'smutation of lithium contained in a blanket surrounding
the reactor plasma. For ihe DD and DHe fuel cycles, tritium is generated as a
reaction product from the proton branch of the DD reaction. Some of this tritium
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will be burned in the plasma. However, not all of the fuel will be burned during a
single pass through the reactor. Thus, some tritium will be present in the plasma
exhaust for all fuel cycles. For the DT and semi-catalyzed DD fuel cycles, the tri-
tium is recycled and reinjected into the torus. For the DHe fuel, cycle, the tritium
produced in the plasma which does not burn during its residence in the torus is sep-
arated from the reusable fuel components of the plasma exhaust. The circulation
of tritium throughout the fusion plant will lead to an accumulation of this species
at various locations and will also lead to routine releases. Accurate determination
of tritium inventories and release rates requires precise knowledge of tritium im-
plantation, diffusion and permeation rates. This, in turn, requires that first wall
surface conditions, and temperatures and pressures throughout the plant be well
known. Information to this level of detail has not been determined for the designs
presented in chapter 2. However, estimates of tritiim inventories and release rates
can be made via scaling and extension of previous studies. An attempt to quantify
tritium activity levels and release rates for the three fuel cycles using this approach
has been made here.
5.1.1 Tritium Inventory
The flow of tritium throughout the fusion plant will result in an inventory of
this species being established at various locations. Knowledge of the magnitude of
the tritium retained at a given location is needed so that appropriate tritium con-
tainment measures can be instituted. Components which will establish a tritium
inventory include the fuel preparation and injection system, the plasma chamber,
the vacuum pumps, the fuel purification and processing systems, the blanket struc-
ture, the coolant system and the storage units. For the DT fuel cycle, a-steady state
inventory of tritium in the breeding blanket and associated processing systems will
also exist. The tritium inventory in the plant is classified as either vulnerable or
non-vulnerable depending on the extent of mobilization of tritium during poten-
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tial transients. This is useful for initial evaluation of accident hazard. It refers to
the likelihood for release from the primary containment and does not always mean
that the material will reach the environment. The quantities of tritium found and
their classification as to vulnerability are discussed below. Estimates were gen-
erally scaled from previous detailed reactor design studies [5.3, 5.4] using tritium
throughput.
5.1.1.1 Tritium Inventory in Fuel Handling Systems
The fuel handling systems include the fuel preparation and injection systems,
the plasma chamber, the vacuum system, the impurity removal system, the hy-
drogen isotope separation system, and the storage equipment. In short, the path
of tritium in the fuel loop can be summarized as follows (see figures 4.1, 4.2 and
4.3). The plasma exhaust consisting of unburned fuel, helium-4 ash and impurities
is routed from the torus to the compound cryopumps. The helium is separated
at this point and the remaining mixture enters an impurity removal unit. Triti-
ated methane, water and ammonia are decomposed; gaseous C0 2 , 02 and N2 are
discharged to the environment and the hydrogens are directed to the isotope sepa-
ration system. The required streams for fueling leave the isotope separation system
and enter the fuel preparation system or are passed into storage. Additional fuel
requirements to yield the appropriate mixture for fueling can be drawn from the
onsite supply in storage. From the fuel preparation system, the mixture is injected
into the torus. These systems have been discussed in more detail in the preceeding
chapter. Here, an estimate of the tritium inventory found in these components will
be made.
Fuel may be provided to the plasma chamber by gas puffing, pellet injection
or a combination of these. The STARFIRE and WILDCAT designs use gas puffing
to fuel the torus [5.3, 5.4]. This method of fueling has also been assumed for the
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designs considered in this work. The fuel injection system will contain a tritium
inventory. In the STARFIRE report [5.3], it was assumed that the gas puffers
would hold one hour's supply of tritium. This assumption was adopted here and
the resulting tritium inventory in the fuelers is given in table 5.1. Two tritium
fuelers will be used for the DT reactors, each containing 45 g of tritium; only one
fueler, holding 0.4 g of tritium, will be needed for each of the DD reactors. This
inventory is considered vulnerable since the. fuelers are closely coupled to the torus
and therefore subject to accidents or component failures in the torus.
The quantity of tritium found in the plasma chamber during operation of the
reactor is simply the product of the triton density and the plasma volume. These
values are indicated in table 5.1 for each of the fuel cycles. The amount of tritium
contained in the torus at a given time is not large, even for the DT reactors. This is
classified as vulnerable since breach of containment would allow for the immediate
release of the tritium inventory.
Compound cryopumps were selected to accomplish torus evacuation and pump-
ing of the plasma exhaust. The helium can be separated from the impure ex-
haust gases and hydrogen isotopes by careful temperature and pressure control
during regeneration of the pumps. The tritium inventory in the cryopumps de-
pends on the tritium exhaust rate from the torus and the regeneration period.
The cycle time for pump regeneration should be short so that the tritium inven-
tory is kept to a minimum; on the other hand, it should be long enough so not
to have a deleterious effect on the pump valve lifetime. For the DT reactor a 2
hour regeneration time is used; a 32 hour regeneration time is used for the ad-
vanced fuels. The maximum tritium inventory in the cryopumps will exist just
before regeneration. The quantity of tritium found in each pump at this time will
be 9.5 g for DT, 1.3 g for DD and 1.1 g for DHe (same inventory for all values
of beta for a given fuel cycle). The total inventory held up in all of the cry-
opumps will be 133 g for DT (in 14 pumps), 20.8 g for DD (in 16 pumps) and
26.4 g for DHe (in 24 pumps). The relatively large tritium inventory held up in the
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cryopumps of the DHe system is a consequence of the high plasma exhaust rate.
The vulnerability of tritium in the vacuum pumps has not been established with
any degree of certainty [5.41. However, because of their proximity to the torus, they
could be affected by accidents and failures of other components. The ingress of air
into the torus, and hence into the vacuum system, or loss of liquid-helium cooling
to the pumps, would cause tritium to be released from the pumping surfaces. If
this occurred, tritium could be released to the reactor hall if the integrity of the
vacuum seals was not maintained. Because of this possibility, the tritium inventory
in the cryopumps is designated as vulnerable.
The mixture of hydrogen isotopes and gaseous impurities separated from the
helium at the cryopumps is routed to the impurity removal system. Here, (H, D, T) 2
is separated from reactor off-gas contaminants and hydrogen isotopes chemically
combined with oxygen, nitrogen and carbon are recovered. It is proposed that hot
uranium beds be used to accomplish the removal of impurities from the hydrogen
isotopes. Calculations to determine the tritium inventory in the impurity removal
system were not performed. This inventory would be classified as non-vulnerable
since multiple containment would be used. For the purposes of evaluating the
tritium inventory, the tritium which would be retained in the impurity removal
system was assumed to be passed into the hydrogen isotope separation system and
is included in the inventory estimate for this system.
The stream of pure hydrogen isotopes flows from the impurity removal system
to the isotope separation system where cryogenic distillation will be used to separate
the tritium, deuterium and protium. This system requires little maintenance and is
relatively self contained. The hydrogen isotope separation system was described in
the previous chapter. As discussed there, a large computer code would be required
to assess the tritium inventory and flow rates in this system because of the complex-
ity introduced when many components are to be separated. It was felt that this
elaborate approach would not increase the. understanding required for this work.
Hence, the tritium hold up in the distillation columns was assessed by scaling from
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STARFIRE and WILDCAT, using the tritium throughput. The total quantity of
tritium retained in this system during steady state was found to be 322 g, 21.1 g and
26.4 g for the DT, DD and DHe fuel cycles respectively. Since the tritium exhaust
rates are the same for all values of beta for a given fuel cycle, the amount of tri-
tium in the columns is independent of this variable. The tritium inventory in the
isotope separation system is in the unoxidized form. Because the units have a high
reliability, the tritium located here is considered to be non-vulnerable [5.3].
Some supply of fuel must be kept on hand to smooth out fluctuations in op-
eration, disruptions in fuel shipments and possible non-operational periods in fuel
recycle or blanket process operations. It was assumed that two days fuel supply
would be kept onsite. For the DT fuel cycle, this requires that 4.3 kg of tritium
must be stored (2.15 kg of tritium fueled per day, see table 2.2) For the semi- cat-
alyzed DD fuel cycle, some tritium is fueled to the torus on a regular basis. Two
days supply implies that 19 g of tritium must be stored (9.5 g of tritium fueled per
day, see table 2.3). Also, the advanced fuels require additional tritium to be fueled
in order to reach ignition at the beginning of each pulse. A further 10 g of tritium
was assumed to be kept on hand for this purpose. During normal operation, tri-
tium for ignition for each pulse can be supplied from the isotope separation system.
The supply in storage may be needed in the event of operational interruption of
the upstream processing system. The tritium stored on site will be in the form a
uranium tritide (UT,), placed within storage vessels, located inside a barricaded
vault with an inert cover gas for fire protection. This inventory is considered to
be non-vulnerable to accidents. In addition to tritium, a supply of the other fuel
components must be available. Assuming two days fuel supply of these species will
also be kept onsite, the DT reactors will require 2.89 kg of deuterium, the DD reac-
tors will require 6.93 kg of deuterium, and the DHe reactor will require 10.9 kg of
deuterium and 41.1 kg of helium-3. The storage of these fuel constituents presents
no radioactive hazard.
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5.1.1.2 Tritium Inventory in the Blanket and Breeder
Processing Systems
The greatest contribution to the vulnerable tritium inventory for the DT fuel
cycle will be found in the blanket and the blanket processing systems. The elimi-
nation of the need to breed tritium for the advanced fuels removes this source from
consideration and is a major advantage in terms of reducing the tritium hazard.
The tritium inventory in the breeding blanket is established from neutron in-
teractions with lithium. The liquid lithium containing the tritium flows from the
blanket module to the processing systems. It was assumed that the same ratio of
tritium in the processing system to tritium in the blanket would exist as in reference
[5.5]. Molten salt extraction was the breeder tritium removal technique assumed
to be employed. The tritium inventory in the breeding blanket for the DT designs
was estimated from the information given in the Blanket Comparison and Selection
Study [5.6, 5.7, 5.8] for the Li/He/HT-9 tokamak design. The tritium inventory
in the blanket was scaled from that given in the BCSS using the blanket tritium
production rate. The inventories determined are summarized in table 5.1. The
inventory in the blanket and blanket processing systems is considered as vulnerable
since the possibility for the liquid metal to drain from the reactor and release its
tritium inventory after some accident scenarios exists.
5.1.1.3 Tritium Inventory in Blanket Structure and Coolant System
A steady state inventory of tritium will be found in the blanket structure
and coolant. The blankets, of the advanced fuel reactors are composed entirely of
structure (HT-9). Their purpose is to provide a pathway for heat removal, either
by neutron interaction/conduction or radiation/conduction. Some tritium will be
present in the blanket structure of all reactors because of tritium implantation and
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permeation. Tritium implantation is dependent upon the tritium flux impinging
on the first wall and the first wall conditions. Tritium permeation is a function
of the permeability and thickness of the metal involved. It occurs more rapidly
through high temperature surfaces and for higher tritium pressures in the torus or
blanket. Actual permeation rates are strongly dependent on the surface conditions'
of the material. Rates may be lower than calculated values because of surface
barriers, such as oxide films, that could impede surface dissolution of tritium [5.9,
5.1O]. Permeation rates may also be higher than anticipated. High concentrations
of tritium in the near surface depths of the first wall can result from implantation
of energetic charge-exchange neutrals. The depth of penetration can impede the
recombination rate of the implanted atoms into molecules at the surface. These
effects translate into a higher effective tritium pressure in the metal near the surface.
The resultant concentration gradient through the wall causes the tritium to diffuse
into the bulk and into the coolant at a considerably higher rate [5.5, 5.10, 5.11].
This consideration is especially important for the limiter. Estimates of the tritium
inventories in the first wall and blanket structure were based on information given
in the BCSS [5.6, 5.7, 5.8]. First wall inventories were scaled from the value given
in the BCSS by the triton flux and the first wall area. For the inventory in the
blanket structure of the DT designs, the BCSS value was scaled with triton flux
and structure volume. The advanced fuel inventories were found in a similar way,
but an additional factor was applied to account for the elimination of the breeding
blanket as a source of tritium for permeation into the structure (i.e. source is only
due to implantation so that the first wall area is a factor, and that fraction of the
structural tritium inventory due to tritium permeation from the breeder is removed
from the base scaling value). Because of the fairly high diffusion rates of tritium in
metals, possible thermal transients could "bake-out" the tritium in a short period
of time. Thus, tritium contained in the structure is designated as vulnerable.
A tritium inventory in the blanket coolant will also be established due to per-
meation from the plasma. Helium cooled designs have been considered in this work.
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Tritium losses from the helium circuit through the steam generator to the steam
loop may result from permeation and leakage. Tritium management in this regard
is of greatest concern for the DT designs. The source of the tritium in the coolant is
the plasma, and not the breeding material [5.10]. Thus, tritium enters the coolant
stream by the same pathway (i.e. via the first wall) for all fuel cycles, regardless
of the presence of a tritium breeding material in the blanket. For the DT design,
tritium which has entered the coolant can be recovered by maintaining a sufficiently
low tritium partial pressure in the lithium tubes so that the tritium will permeate
from the helium into the lithium and be recovered with the tritium from the breeder.
The source of tritium (i.e. tritium implanted in the first wall from the plasma) will
be significantly lower for the advanced fuels. The tritium entering the coolant can
be recovered through oxidation of tritium followed by adsorption on molecular sieves
[5.6]. Coolant inventories were simply found by scaling the value given in the BCSS
with tritium flux to the first wall and first wall area. No account for tritium entering
the coolant from the breeder was taken. Inventories of tritium in the coolant are
indicated in table 5.1. This is classified as vulnerable.
5.1.2 Tritium Releases
Fuel cycle activities and handling of tritium contaminated materials could re-
sult in release of tritium to the environment. The potential for this occurring is di-
rectly related to the tritium inventory and tritium flow rates throughout the plant.
Components of the fuel cycle systems from which tritium may be released include
the fuel preparation and injection equipment, the vacuum ducts and pumps, the fuel
purification and processing systems, the blanket and blanket processing equipment,
the coolant system, and the tritium storage units. Mechanisms for tritium release
from these systems have been identified as steady state leaks from imperfect fluid
system connections, valves and pumps, permeation through pipes and vessel walls,
and occasional leaks during routine maintenance and accidents. These pathways
240
Reactor Room 7-
Fuel Gas
)- Cir cu
Sys
Bellows
Blanket
Fuel Feed
Unit
BreedinHn Tritium
Sy.
Plasma Vacuum
Chamber
L
Blanket
i ecovery
(stem
Primary Cooling
System
Permeation ED
Figure 5.1: Schematic Pathways of Tritium Release During Normal Operation
241
iation
tem
TTi PA 
i--4
I
Leakage ID
for tritium release are summarized in figure 5.1. Only the routine releases will be
examined here.
In table 5.2, the major design parameters affecting the tritium release rates
for the three fuel cycles (with 10 % beta) being evaluated are listed. An impor-
tant difference from the standpoint of tritium containment is the absence of the
tritium breeding material in the advanced fuel designs. Also of interest is the tri-
tium fractional burnup. For the DT fuel cycle, only 26 % of the tritium injected
into the plasma is consumed in fusion reactions. For the DD fuel cycle, 93 % of
the tritium in the plasma is burned. For the plasma conditions associated with this
fuel cycle, tritium producing reactions become important (proton branch of the DD
reaction). Because of the high temperature of the plasma and the relatively long
residence time of particles in the torus, most of the tritium produced, and most
of the tritium injected into the torus is consumed, giving the high tritium burnup.
For the DHe fuel cycle, no tritium is fueled, but a significant amount is produced
due to DD side reactions in the plasma. Almost 67 % of this tritium is burned
before being exhausted from the torus. One reason for the fractiona! burnup of
the DHe fuel cycle being lower than the DD fuel cycle, despite operating at the
same temperature, is the shorter particle confinement time for the DHe system.
Determination of this confinement time was based on tolerable alpha ash levels in
the plasma. Alpha particles are produced from reactions of deuterons with tritons
and with helium-3 nuclei. Compared to the DD fuel cycle, the production rate of
alphas in the DHe fuel cycle is much greater. Consequently, the exhaust rate from
the DHe reactor must be much greater than from the DD reactor to maintain the
same degree of plasma purity. Thus, any tritium produced in the DHe plasma has a
much shorter time to react, resulting in a lower fractional burnup than for the DD
reactor. The tritium inventories throughout the plants are significantly lower for
the advanced fuels than for the DT case, as would be expected. Despite the lower
steady state triton density in the DIe plasma (3.49 x 1017 for DHe, 1.04 x 1018 for
DD and 1.01 x 1020 for DT at 10 % beta), tritium inventories throughout the plant
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Table 5.2: Design Parameters That Affect Tritium Releases
Parameter
DT
Fuel Cycle (10 % beta)
DD DHe
Breeding Material
Breeding Temperature (*C)
Coolant
Coolant Temperature (*C)
Structural Material
Fusion Power (MW)
Net Electric Power (MW)
Plant Availability
Burntime (s)
Particle Confinement Time (s)
Tritium Fractional Burn-up
Tritium Burned (g/d)
Tritium Exhausted (g/d)
Tritium Fueled (g/d)
Tritium Bred (g/d)
Tritium Inventory (g)
Vacuum Pumps
Fuelers
Fuel Purification
Storage
Blanket
Blanket Processing
Structure
Coolant
Total
Li
500 - 560
He
275 - 510
HT-9
3650
1225
0.65
5000
2.3
0.259
559
1600
2160
633
133
90
322
4300
242
68.5
13.3
4.3 x 10-7
5170
He
275 - 510
HT-9
2875
1213
0.69
5000
7.4
0.932
221
16
9.4
20.8
0.4
21.1
30
0.13
4.3 x 10-9
72.5
He
275 - 510
HT-9
3765
1213
0.72
5000
2.3
0.674
42-
20
0
26.4
0
26.4
10
0.17
5.4 x 10-9
63.0
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are comparable to the DD plant. This is a consequence of the higher processing
rate.
The tritium release rates for each tritium containing subsystem have been esti-
mated, based on the methodology given in reference [5.5]. These are listed in table
5.3. The most significant releases occur from the fuel handling and blanket process-
ing systems of the DT reactors. There is not a large variation in these release rates
with plasma beta for a given fuel cycle. This is due to the fact that the amount
of tritium circulating in the system depends on the fusion power, which is constant
for each fuel cycle. Although the tritium release rates during operation of the DT
fuel processing systems may be significant, secondary enclosure and continuously
operating the routine atmosphere cleanup system is expected to remove over 99 %
of the tritium. This will significantly reduce the potential for tritium release from
these sources to the environment.
It is important to note that the quantities of tritium released during routine
maintenance depend upon the design of components (to permit outgassing before
maintenance), the maintenance procedures and rapid resealing of components af-
ter maintenance. Some attention to these considerations would result in releases
to the environment lower than those indicated in table 5.3. Temporary secondary
containment during maintenance work could also reduce the releases. However, uti-
lizing continuous secondary containment around components adjacent to the reactor
would be difficult and possibly expensive due to geometrical complexities. Remote
maintenance and removal of these components would be hindered by secondary en-
closures and may encumber maintenance or replacement of other large pieces of
equipment. In any case, the atmospheric cleanup system would process the tritium
released to the reactor building during maintenance if tritium levels approached the
maximum permissible concentration.
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5.1.2.1 Tritium Releases From the Fuel Handling Systems
Fuel handling system components from which tritium may be released include
fueling devices, the vacuum system, the impurity removal system, the hydrogen
isotope separation system and tritium storage. In this section, the tritium source
terms associated with the fuel handling systems, for each fuel cycle, will be esti-
mated. They are largely be based on release estimates from TSTA (Tritium Systems
Test Assembly) given in reference [5.5].
The fueling approach used for the designs considered in this work is gas puffing.
It was assumed that one hour's supply of fuel would be held in the fueling devices at
any one time. The piping to and from the fuelers will be operated at high vacuum
and with vacuum quality seals. It is expected that tritium leakage from the fuelers
during operation will not be significant. Some release, however, may occur during
maintenance. Scheduled maintenance or repair of the fueling devices is estimated to
be necessary twice a year [5.5]. For STARFIRE, the maximum release to the reactor
building per replacement has been estimated by Cannon as 200 Ci [5.5]. The release
rate for the DT designs considered in this work can be scaled from this value, based
on the tritium inventory in the fuelers (see table 5.1). This results in a release rate
during fueler maintenance of 1440 Ci/year. The expected release is the same for
all values of beta since the required amount of tritium for fueling is the same in
each case. For the DD designs, only one tritium fueler is needed, containing a much
smaller quantity of tritium. The expected release rate is somewhat reduced, and
was estimated at 3.2 Ci/year (for maintenance of a single fueler, twice per year).
For the DHe fuel cycle, no tritium is fueled, and hence, no release will occur during
fueler maintenance or repair. It should be noted that any possible tritium release
from the fuelers during the initial phase of the pulse, when some tritium must be
injected into the advanced fuel reactors to achieve ignition, is not considered. The
DT mixture would reside in the fuelers for a short time during the initial phase of
reactor operation, when releases are expected to be insignificant. Subsequent use
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of the fueler with either deuterium or helium-3 should remove any residual tritium
so that a negligible quantity would remain and be vulnerable to release during
maintenance.
The ash removal system used in the present work is a pumped limiter. This is
composed of the limiter and limiter ducts, a plenum region, vacuum ducts and the
cryopumps. During plant operation, no significant tritium out leakage is expected
since a high vacuum will be maintained and vacuum quality seals will be used. Some
repair or maintenance of this system will take place during the scheduled outage
period. The maximum tritium release to the reactor building per maintenance
event (once per year) has been estimated at 500 Ci for STARFIRE [5.5]. This was
based on tritium contamination and available surface area of the components. An
estimate of the tritium release for the different fuel cycles can be made, assuming
that the tritium contamination is proportional to the tritium exhausted through
the vacuum system and the surface area of components. The available area in the
vacuum system was calculated for each fuel cycle. These are listed in table 5.3,
along with the tritium exhau3t rates and the release estimate.
Estimates of tritium release rates from the cryopumps can be obtained from
estimates from TSTA. During normal operation, the TSTA vacuum pumps will
contain anywhere from very small amounts up to 6 g of tritium on the cryopan-
els just before regeneration. The estimated release to the reactor hall is 80 to
150 Ci/year [5.5]. Tritium release rates for the designs considered here can be
scaled from these estimates using either the total vacuum pump inventory (0 to 6
g for TSTA) or the tritium exhaust rate (188 g/d for TSTA) [5.5]. The exhaust
rate approach is probably more appropriate because the inventory can be affected
by relatively minor changes in design and may have little or no effect on tritium
release rates. Estimates of release rates using both approaches are given in table
5.3.
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From the cryopumps, the mixture of hydrogen isotopes enters the impurity
removal system where chemical impurities are removed. It is expected that the
impurity removal system will be contained in inert atmosphere glove boxes with a
routine atmospheric cleanup system for secondary protection [5.5]. It is anticipated
that little or none of the release will reach the environment [5.5].
An inventory of tritium may be held up in the hydrogen isotope separation sys-
tem, where tritium, deuterium and protium are separated by cryogenic distillation.
All of the components of the isotope separation system are under double contain-
ment provided by the vacuum jacket. Also, the vacuum jacket is designed to hold
the entire contents of all of the columns. Surge tanks for storing evolved gas from
vaporization of the hydrogen liquids are provided in the event of refrigeration loss.
Additionally, vessels filled with uranium powder are available for storing gaseous
hydrogen isotopes as solids. Any releases to the vacuum jacket and the distillate
waste stream (containing mostly H2, HD, with very little HT) are directed to the
tritiated waste processing system before discharge to the environment. The release
rates from this system can be estimated by linear scaling from TSTA using the
tritium plasma exhaust rate [5.5]. They were found to be 45.7 Ci/year for the DT
reactors, 0.46 Ci/year for the DD reactors and 0.57 Ci/year for the DHe reactor.
The tritium waste treatment system will routinely remove tritium from all
gaseous effluents generated in the various subsystems, such as the isotope separation
system, purge streams, the impurity removal system, effluent streams, secondary
containment and exhaust from primary and secondary vacuum pumps. Catalytic
conversion of molecular tritium to tritiated water, and of organic materials to water
and carbon dioxide will be performed by this system. The water is adsorbed on
molecular sieves in drying towers and if the remaining gaseous effluents have a
tritium level low enough, they will be discharged to the atmosphere. The release
rates estimated for the cases considered here were obtained by linear scaling with
tritium exhaust rates from TSTA values. These values are listed in table 5.3.
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Provision for tritium storage must be furnished, both for fueling needs and to
provide surge capacity between several items of process equipment. It is assumed
that the tritium will be stored as uranium tritide. The uranium beds would be
stored in gloveboxes located within a vault containing an inert gas (to reduce the
fire hazard). Tritium losses to the containment system from storage would be
processed by the tritium waste treatment system. Only minor quantities escaping
from the waste treatment facility could be attributed to on-site tritium storage.
Thus, releases from storage have been assumed to be included in the releases from
the tritium waste treatment system.
5.1.2.2 Tritium Releases From the Blanket and the Breeder
Processing Systems
For the DT fuel cycle, the blanket processing systems provide anothee pathway
for the release of tritium to the environment. As described in the previous chapter,
a molten salt extraction process can be used to remove tritium from the lithium
breeder. Tritium can escape from the blanket by permeation, leaks and release
during maintenance. Tritium released from annual blanket module replacement is
due to outgassing of dissolved tritium. This has been estimated for a helium cooled
tokamak using a lithium breeder in reference [5.5]. Their estimate for the annual
quantity of tritium released was 1200 Ci/year. Scaling this by the first wall area and
tritium flux (to account for the contribution to the release from tritium adsorbed on
the surface or implanted a short distance below the surface) and by blanket volume
and tritium inventory (to account for the contribution to the release from tritium
diffusing out of the module) gives the appropriate value for the DT designs used in
this study. These are given in table 5.4. Some variation with beta is seen and is a
consequence of the geometric scalings. Tritium releases from the blanket recovery
system were also estimated in reference [5.5] to be a maximum of 1 Ci/d. This value
was scaled by the recovery system tritium inventory to give a tritium release rate
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for the DT designs in this work of 56 Ci/year.
Because of the extremely small tritium inventory in the advanced fuel blankets,
no significant release of tritium from the blanket structure is expected.
5.1.2.3 Tritium Releases From The Coolant System
The coolant system presents another potential source for tritium releases. Tri-
tium can permeate or leak from the plasma through the first wall or from the
blanket into the coolant stream. Once in the primary loop, the tritium can reach
the steam system from which removal is especially difficult. Tritium can escape
from the coolant system by permeation, leaks and releases during maintenance.
For the DT design, tritium transport rates into the coolant and loss rates from
water leakage from the steam generator can be estimated from the work done for
the BCSS [5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9]. To obtain the appropriate values for the designs
considered here, the BCSS values were scaled with tritium flux to the first wall
and the first wall area. The tritium found in the helium stream was assumed to be
entirely in the T2 form. The tritium loss rates from the steam generator given in the
BCSS are for the case without any slipstream processing of the main helium flow
for tritium removal. However, the loss rate corresponds to the addition of hydrogen
for isotopic dilution at a rate of 100 times the first wall tritium influx rate. This
creates a reducing atmosphere on the helium side of the blanket and heat exchanger
tubes, inhibiting the formation of an oxide layer. A permeation barrier factor of
only 2 was assumed in the calculations. However, the isotopic dilution is effective
in reducing the tritium losses to a large degree. The release rates for the advanced
fuels were obtained in the same way as for the DT case. The resultant values for
tritium lost rates from the plasma to the coolant and from tritium losses due to
leakage of steam generator water are given in table 5.4. The values for the advanced
fuels are roughly two orders of magnitude lower than for the DT case.
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5.1.2.4 Tritium Releases From Waste Handling
Tritiated wastes will be in both solid and liquid forms. Tritiated water, cleaning
solvents and oil will comprise the bulk of the tritiated liquid wastes. Solid wastes
will be generated from the-blanket sectors, replaced auxiliary equipment, depleted
catalysts, molecular sieve beds and miscellaneous contaminated wastes such as pa-
per, rags, tools and clothes. Contaminated equipment components removed from
the reactor must be decontaminated, probably by heating or gas flushing, before
being disposed of. Effluent from decontamination operations must be processed to
remove tritium prior to exhaust to the atmosphere. Subsequent to tritium removal,
components having a large inventory of activation products will be stored under
water in a waste handling pool. Some residual tritium may still remain on the
equipment placed in the storage pool so that contamination of the pool water may
result. This water can later be processed with other aqueous wastes from the plant if
it contains a high enough tritium content that recovery is worthwhile. Unrecovered
tritiated wastes can be solidified and stored in concrete form or adsorbed on ver-
miculite or molecular sieves. These solidified wastes along with other miscellaneous
wastes can be packaged in a nested series of watertight drums. Blanket modules
and other large pieces of equipment contaminated with tritium may be outgassed
in a chamber with good containment before being compacted and stored [5.5].
Tritiated wastes generated at the fusion plant will be greatest for the DT
fuel cycle. The volume and activity of tritiated wastes will be reduced for the
advanced fuels. In Cannon's work [5.5], he estimated that* tritium releases to the
environment from handling tritiated wastes at a DT plant would be approximately
1 Ci/d. Release rates for these activities at the advanced fuel fusion plants were
estimated by scaling with the total tritium inventory in the plant. Release rates are
found to be 1.03 x 10-2 Ci/d for the DD fuel cycle and 7.53 x 10" Ci/d for the
DHe fuel cycle.
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5.1.2.5 Atmospheric Tritium Releases From The Plant
It is desirable to contain all tritium releases, whether from normal leakage or
from an accidental release, within the confines of the plant. Different levels of con-
tainment can be used in tritium related systems to minimize releases of airborne
tritium to the environment. Effective primary containment is provided by the use
of all metal components in fuel handling equipment. Gloveboxes, vacuum jackets,
jacketed tubing and nested containers provide secondary containment and are of
special need for high temperature components. The walls of potential tritium con-
taining areas can be lined with a tritium barrier such as stainless steel or aluminium.
Equipment used within a tritium area can be constructed of materials to minimize
surface adsorption. Operating tritium areas at reduced atmospheric pressure will re-
duce tritium out-leakage. The number and length of lines used for tritium transport
between buildings should be minimized. These measures in addition to operation
of an atmospheric cleanup system can minimize routine leakage and permeation to
the environment. Major maintenance activities, including replacement o0 blanket
modules, vacuum pumps, impurity control devices and fueling equipment are, the
principal sources of tritium releases to the reactor building. Other miscellaneous
tritium releases in areas without secondary containment may also occur on a regular
basis [5.51.
The need for effective tritium containment is not eliminated by the availability
of an atmospheric cleanup system. These systems are expensive to operate and also
produce tritium contaminated waste water which must be appropriately dealt with.
The system can be activated during maintenance activities if the tritium level in
the reactor hall exceeds the 5pCi/m 3 limit for unprotected personnel access. The
normal tritium release rates into the reactor hall are not large, even for DT reactors.
Because the reactor buildings can be made very leak tight and have low leakage rates
if maintained at a slightly negative pressure, tritium discharges to the environment
from the plant should not present a significant hazard. The STARFIRE report [5.31
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estimated a tritium loss due to building leakage of less than 1pCi/d assuming a
leakage rate of 3 x 10' vol%/d and a tritium concentration of 5pCi/m 3 in the 4 x
105 m3 of tritium containing volume.
The quantity of tritium released from a fusion plant to the environment de-
pends upon the tritium level within the reactor building. A steady state tritium
concentration will be reached after commencing reactor operation, where leakage
rates from system components are balanced by stack emissions, building leakage and
removal by the atmospheric tritium recovery system. If the tritium release to the
reactor hall is below 10 Ci/d and the room concentration is below 5pCi/m 3 , direct
ventilation to the environment is possible [5.12]. Leakage rates from plant compo-
nents have been determined in the previous sections and an average tritium source
term was estimated for each fuel cycle (see table 5.4). Assuming a leakage rate of 3
x 10-5 % per day [5.3] and one atmospheric changeout per day (vented through the
stack)f, the steady state tritium concentration without the use of an atmospheric
tritium removal system was evaluated. As discussed in chapter 4, it appears unjus-
tified to maintain the reactor hall tritium level below 50piCi/m 3 [5.13]. From table
5.5, it appears that the DT reactor buildings will require continual processing to
maintain the atmosphere at the 50pCi/m 3 level. The largest atmospheric detritia-
tion system processes air at a rate of 140 m3 /min (2.3 m3 /s), at an estimated cost
of 4.6 M$ (from reference [5.14], updated to current dollars). A single unit would
be capable of maintaining the acceptable tritium level for the DT reactors. The tri-
tium level was recalculated assuming this unit would operate at full capacity. The
steady state tritium concentration, the stack emissions and the tritium leakage from
the building resulting when a single detritiation unit is used for the DT reactors
t With an assumed reactor 'Luilding volume of 4 x 101 m3 [5.3], one atmospheric
changeout per day would release 20 Ci per day to the environment if the reactor
building steady state tritium concentration was 5OpCi/m 3 . This was the recom-
mended design goal for tritium release to the environment under routine operation
for INTOR [5.12].
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are listed in table 5.5. For the advanced fuels, where the tritium release rates from
plant components are far below 10 Ci/d and the steady state tritium concentration
is much less than 5piCi/m 3 , direct venting of the reactor building atmosphere to
the environment is permitted. Tritium releases to the environment for the DD and
DHe fuel cycles are also listed in table 5.5. Further details related to the sizing of
the atmospheric tritium removal system are given in appendix D.
The projected tritium release rates for the fusion reactors examined here are
compared to releases from other nuclear installations in table 5.6. As can be seen,
the anticipated releases from the DT fusion plants exceed those from Light Water
Reactors (LWRs), but are less than those from Heavy Water Reactors (HWRs). The
projected releases from the DT fusion plants are also higher than those expected
from High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) and Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
Reactors (LMFBRs). However, the DT plant releases 3 % of the amount produced
naturally as a consequence of cosmic ray interactions with N 2 and 02 in the upper
atmosphere and from the accretion of tritons emitted during solar flares. Tritium is
also produced through the fission of natural uranium ores. However, this is a much
smaller source and leads to tritium that is bound in the earth's crust. The advanced
fuel reactors release much less tritium than any other of the nuclear facilities and a
negligible amount compared to that produced naturally in the environment.
Some provision for atmospheric clean up in the event of an accident must be
available. Emergency tritium removal capabilities were determined based on a 48
hour clean up period subsequent to the release of the maximum vulnerable tritium
inventory. The maximum vulnerable tritium inventory is located in the blanket
processing system for the DT reactors and in the cryopumps for the advanced fuels.
Eight units could reduce the tritium concentration to the level where suited person-
nel access is allowed (500piCi/m 3 ) within 48 hours for the DT designs. Four units
could accomplish the job for the advanced fuels. Because these units are expensive
to operate, they would only be used in the event of an accident. For normal condi-
tions, the DT reactor buildings will have continuous atmospheric processing using
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one detritiation unit; the advanced fuel reactor buildings will not require continuous
atmospheric processing.
A further evaluation was performed where the effect of tritium soaking into
materials was considered. Initially clean surfaces, or surfaces exposed to high room
air tritium concentrations act as sinks for tritium. If the room air concentration is
substantially lowered, outgassing of absorbed tritium may occur. This phenomenon
will prolong the duration of clean up after maintenance or accidental releases, and
may result in greater cljan up capacity requirements. A computer code has been
developed, based on difiksion theory, which takes this effect into account. A dis-
cussion of the theory an method of solution, along with a listing of the code are
given in appendix D.
Application of the code to normal conditions verified the results previously
obtained using the simpl r model. As would be expected, the steady state concen-
tration for all fuel cycle were found to agree with the earlier predictions. Thus,
the use of a single clean' up unit during normal operation for the DT fuel cycle
was confirmed. Also, the advanced fuel cycles were found not to require continual
atmospheric processing duiring normal operation. Assuming an initially tritium free
room, the steady state >om air tritium concentration in the reactor hall would
be reached ~ 6 days after initiating the source term for the DT fuel cycle; - 12.5
days would be required fdr steady state to be achieved for the advanced fuels. The
diffusion model would predict slightly longer times to achieve steady state than the
simple model because some tritium would continue to be lost from the room to the
walls until the surfaces were saturated.
Emergency clean up capabilities were also evaluated using the code. The cri-
terion of achieving a tritium concentration of 500 pCi/m 3 within 48 hours of the
release of the most vulnerable tritium inventory was applied. Consideration of dif-
fusion of tritium into solid surfaces had the effect of prolonging clean up so that the
500 LCi/m 3 level was not achieved within 48 hours with the-previously determined
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Table 5.5: Atmospheric Tritium Releases
DT
5% 10%
Tritium Source Term
(Ci/d)
Tritium Conc Without
ATRS1 (gCi/m3)
Tritium Stack Release
Without ATRS (Ci/d)
Tritium Leakage Without
ATRS (tiCi/d)
ATRS Capacity to
maintain 50pCi/m 3 (mS/min)
No. Units Operative
Under Normal Conditions
Steady State Tritium Conc
Using full ATRS capacity (pCi/m 3 )
Tritium Stack Release
Using full ATRS capacity (Ci/d)
Tritium Leakage Using
full ATRS capacity (jyCi/d)
Maximum Vulnerable
Tritium Release (g)
ATRS Capacity for
48 h Clean up (m 3/min)
No. Units Operative
Under Accident Conditions
Cost of ATRS (M$)
20%
Fuel Cycle
DD
5% -10%
24.2 23.5 23.0 0.216
60.5 58.8 57.5 0.54
24.2 23.5 23.0 0.216
7.3 7.1 6.9 6.50 x 10-2
58.3 48.6 41.7
1 1 1
40.2 39.1 38.2
16.1 15.6 15.3
0
0
N/A-
N/A
4.8 4.7 4.6 N/A
68.5 68.5 68.5
1120 1120 1120
8 8 8
36.8 36.8 36.8
1.3
560
4
18.4
0.205
0.51
0.205
20%
0.199
0.49
0.199
DHe
10%
0.233
0.58
0.233
6.1 x 10-2 5.9 x 10-2 7.0 x 10-2
0
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
1.3
560
4
18.4
0
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
1.3
560
4
18.4
0
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
1.1
560
4
18.4
t Atmospheric Tritium Removal s5ystem
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Table 5.6: Comparison of Tritium Releases to the Environment
From Fusion and Fission Plants
Source
DT Planta
DD Planta
DHe Plant'
STARFIRE [5.3]
LWRd [5.19]
HWR d
HTGRd [5.19]
LMFBRd [5.19]
Natural [5.19]
Tritium Release (Ci/yr)
5720
75
85
778
18, 000C
714
649
1.95 x 106
8 Average release rate for designs of 5 %, 10 % and 20 % beta
b Note that this is a water cooled plant which will likely have greater losses than
a helium cooled plant.
C Emissions to air from Pickering-NGSA in 1982 [5.20]
d This does not account for releases due to any fuel reprocessing activity.
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clean up capacities. One additional unit was required in each case, giving a total of
9 units for the DT fuel cycle and 5 units for the advanced fuel cycles.
The capital and operating costs indicated in table 4.6 refer to the results ob-
tained using the simple model. Capital costs would increase by 4.6 M$, or 12.5 %
for the DT fuel cycle and 25 % for the DD and DHe fuel cycles, if diffusion theory
results were used. Operating costs would not be affected since they refer to normal
plant conditions.
5.1.3 Doses Due to Tritium Exposure
Tritium will be encountered in the fusion plant wherever it is conveyed by
pumping, air flow or liquid flow, or wherever the diffusion process could result in
significant concentrations. Leakage of tritium into the reactor hall will occur from
the vacuum system, the blanket, coolant lines and tritium processing equipment.
The consequences of tritium exposure have been investigated over many years. Tri-
tium decays with a half-life of 12.35 years, emitting a low energy beta particle
(18 keV peak energy, 5.7 keV average energy). As an isotope of hydrogen, it pervades
the environment in the same chemical form as other hydrogen isotopes. Tritium in
its water form is much more hazardous than in its elemental form; the potential haz-
ard from inhalation is 25,000 times greater for HTO than for HT [5.15]. Submersion
in a cloud of HT gas will result in direct exposure to the lung tissue and internal
exposure due to HT gas absorbed in the lung tissue. External exposure is not a
serious concern because the low energy beta particle is unable to penetrate to the
basal layer of the skin. Tritiated water vapor can be inhaled or absorbed through
the skin. Both of th, se modes of uptake are very efficient. Once within the body,
the HTO is readily distributed with the rest of the body water. Through chemical
exchange processes, the tritium can be incorporated into organic molecules within
the body where it may remain for some time. In the water form, it will remain in
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the body for a nominal 9 to 12 day half-life for body water turnover. A further mode
for tritium uptake is through contact with contaminated surfaces. However, highly
contaminated metal surfaces are needed for percutaneous absorption of tritium to
become significant when compared to submersion.
Worker exposures to tritium will depend on the tritium release rates and on
the amount of time workers spend in the reactor hall. These exposures can be kept
to a minimum by processing the building air, by having the workers wear protective
clothing and by controlling exposure time. Tritium inventories and major sources
of tritium releases have been identified and estimated in the previous sections. Due
to the uncertainty with the actual operation and maintenance scenarios (i.e. when
activities which will be releasing tritium in addition to the steady state losses will be
performed), the tritium source term included both chronic and maintenance releases
and was averaged over the entire year. Tritium losses to building areas resulting
from accidents were not included in the tritium release estimates. All contact main-
tenance activities were assumed to be performed at the perfectly mixed steady state
tritium concentration given in table 5.5 (operation of a single detritiation unit was
assumed for DT). This approach may underestimate doses for activities which cause
localized releases of tritium; doses for activities which release no tritium (such as
routine operation tasks) may be overestimated.
Occupational tritium exposures for the most exposed work group were obtained
using an estimate of the total man-hours of contact maintenance (see appendix E).
Various maintenance modes were identified allowing for different amounts of con-
tact maintenance, depending on the actual task and anticipated radiation levels.
Assuming all of the tritium in the reactor hall to be in the oxide form, dose rates
due to tritium exposure were found to be 10.1 mrernr/h for DT, 0.13 mrem/h for
DD and 0.15 mrem/h for DHe. Cumulative doses for unsuited workers of the most
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exposed groupt were found to be 32.2 man-rem for DT, 0.40 man-rem for DD and
0.64 man-rem for DHe. Protective bubble suits would reduce these doses to 0.65
man-rem for DT, 0.008 man-rem for DD and 0.013 man-rem for DHe (a reduction
in dose by a factor of 50 results from a protection factor of 100 from the suits and a
work efficiency reduction by 50 %). It is very likely that protective clothing will be
worn at the DT reactors; this practice may. also be instituted at the advanced fuel
reactors as a precaution against accidental release (the release of the inventory of a
single cryopump would result in a concentration of 0.031 Ci/m 3 and a dose rate of
8.05 rem/h in the DD reactor building; a concentration of 0.026 Ci/m 3 and a dose
rate of 6.81 rem/h would exist in the DHe reactor building). It is apparent that
the occupational tritium exposures are reduced by ~ 80 times for the DD fuel cycle
over the DT fuel cycle; a reduction of ~ 50 times results for the DHe fuel cycle. The
higher cumulative dose incurred for the DHe fuel cycle compared to the DD fuel
cycle is a consequence of the increased amount of contact maintenance permitted
due reduced structural activation.
An estimate of individual doses to workers in the most exposed group and to
the total number of exposed workers in the plant can be found. The number of
workers comprising each of these groups is estimated in appendix C. Dividing the
expected cumulative dose for the most, exposed group by the estimate of the number
of workers in this group gives the individual exposure indicated in table 5.7. For
the DT plants, the average individual dose due to tritium to a member of the most
exposed group was found to be -~ 200 mrem/year. This is slightly lower that the
estimate of 250 mrem/year given by Stasko and. Wong [5.16] for the average annual
occupational tritium dose for a worker in the most exposed group. Stasko and Wong
These doses are given for the 10 % beta designs. Because of the differing
requirements for blanket changeouts (and hence entry of workers into a tritium
contaminated environment), the dose incurred for the 20 % beta designs will be
slightly greater and that incurred for the 5 % beta designs will be slightly less. A
variation of 5% about the 10 % beta design results.
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Table 5.7: Doses Incurrred Due To Routine Tritium Releases
Fuel Cycle (10 % beta)
DT DD DHe
Average Dose Rate in Reactor
Hall (mrem/h)
Annual Cumulative Dose for Most
Exposed Group (man-rem/yr)
Annual Individual Exposure to Member of
Most Exposed Group (mrem/yr)
Annual Cumulative Dose for Total Plant
Exposed Work Force (man-rem/yr)
Annual Individual Exposure to Member of Total
Plant Exposed Work Force (mrem/yr)
10.1 0.13
32.2 0.396 0.671
195 2.59
34.8 0.426
98 1.30
Offsite Dose (mrem/yr) <4.7 < 0.041 < 0.047
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0.15
4.70
0.728
2.37
[5.16] also indicate that the total exposed work force averages an individual dose
which is 50 % lower than the most exposed group. Knowing this and an estimate
of the total number of exposed workers (see appendix C), the average individual
tritium exposure and the cumulative exposure for all exposed plant personnel can
be evaluated. This information is given in table 5.7.
A very rough estimate of offsite doses to the public during normal operating
conditions has been made at this time. In the Minimars study [5.17], a design target
for chronic tritium emissions of 25 Ci/d of tritium oxide to the building atmosphere
was adopted since it would not result in doses exceeding the NRC public dose limit
of 5 mrem/year. Release rates to the building atmosphere given in table 5.4 are
below 25 Ci/d. Thus, none of the designs in this study result in unacceptable routine
offsite doses. Rough estimates of the maximum expected dose to the public were
obtained by scaling with the chronic tritium release rate to the building atmosphere.
These are indicated in table 5.7. The relative improvement of the advanced fuels
over the DT plant is roughly 100 fold.
5.1.4 Tritium Hazard Summary
The advanced fuels have a clear advantage over the DT fuel cycle in terms of
tritium hazard. The tritium circulating throughout the plant, tritium inventories
in plant components, tritium release rates from these components and tritium ex-
posures incurred during maintenance activities are all significantly reduced for the
DD and DHe fuel cycles.
The tritium fueled to the DD torus is over two orders of magnitude lower than
for the DT torus; no tritium is fueled to the DHe torus. The steady state tritium
concentration in the plasma chamber is one to two orders of magnitude lower for DD
and DHe. The higher fractional burnup of tritium for the advanced fuels contributes
to the tritium exhausted from the plasma being two orders of magnitude lower. This
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is important because the tritium inventories established throughout the plant are
strongly dependent on the tritium exhaust rate from the plasma.
Concerns associated with tritium in the breeding blanket and blanket process-
ing systems are completely eliminated for the advanced fuels. First wall tritium
inventory is reduced by two orders of magnitude; tritium retained in the blanket
structure is reduced by three orders of magnitude. Although the quantity of tritium
found in the coolant is small for all fuel cycles, the two orders of magnitude reduc-
tion for the DD and DHe fuel cycles is significant because permeation of tritium
into the steam cycle and subsequent leakage from this system is a major tritium
pathway to the environment. There is a large reduction in the quantity of tritium
found in the cryopumps for the advanced fuels. The inventory in the fuelers for the
DD fuel cycle is reduced by two orders of magnitude over the DT fuel cycle; the
DHe fuel cycle requires no tritium fueling so that this hazard is completely elimi-
nated. As indicated in table 5.5, the total vulnerable tritium inventory is reduced
by over a factor of twenty for the DD and DHe fuel cycles. The presence of any
radioactive species, in any form, may be judged undesirable (the public will likely
not distinguish between vulnerable and non-vulnerable inventories). Thus, in the
public's eye, it would be the total inventory at the site which would be of concern.
This places the advanced fuel reactors in a more favorable position because the
total inventory is reduced by nearly two orders of magnitude over the inventory
associated with a DT reactor.
The impact of eliminating the tritium breeding blanket should be examined
more closely. The relative contribution of the tritium inventory in the blanket to
the total DT plant inventory is depicted in figure 5.2a. The tritium inventory in
the blanket and blanket processing system is somewhat less than that in the ex-
haust processing system and much smaller than that in storage. For the advanced
fuels, as shown in figures 5.2b and 5.2c, the bulk of the inventory is also located in
the exhaust processing systems. From a tritium handling viewpoint, the advanced
fuels are much more desirable because of the reduced quantities of tritium passed
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Fueler
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(b) DD
(c) DHe
s 1.7 %
,Blanket & Processing Systems 6.0 %
Storage 83.2 %
First Wall & Structure 0.3 %
Exhaust Processing 8.8 %
,Fuelers 0.6 %
Exhaust Processing 58.8 % Storage 40.5 %
First Wall & Structure 0.1 %
Storage 15.9 %
Exhaust Processing 83.8 %
First Wall & Structure 0.3 %
ow
Figure 5.2: Relative Contributions to Total Tritium Inventory
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through the exhaust system. The quantity of tritium bred in the DT reactors is
634 g/day. The tritium flow rate out of the reactor is significantly higher than this
being 1598 g/day. This compares to 16 g/day for DD and 20 g/day for DHe. Thus,
the reduction in tritium handling by the elimination of tritium breeding is not as
significant as may have been expected. Tritium breeding and processing are not
the major contributors to the plant tritium inventory, making up only 6 % of the
total. The elimination of the tritium breeding function with the advanced fuels does
not eliminate the need for tritium extraction systems from the coolant or the need
for cryopumps, molecular sieves, cryogenic distillation columns and fuelers. These
components are required whether or not tritium is bred. However, the quantity of
tritium handled by these components for the DT fuel cycle is much greater than
for the advanced fuels. With regards to the DT fuel cycle, it is the fuel handling
systems and not the breeder and breeder processing systems which have the greatest
tritium throughput and inventory.
The occupational tritium hazard and tritium releases to the environment are
dependent upon the releases to the reactor building during normal operation and
maintenance. As can be seen in tables 5.3 and 5.4, a significant improvement in
this respect is evident for the advanced fuels. The average tritium source term
is two orders of magnitude lower than for DT. Because of this, the steady state
tritium concentration in the reactor hall is low enough that unprotected personnel
access is permitted, and the building atmosphere can be directly vented to the
environment without processing. It is also evident that for the DT fuel cycle,
the greatest tritium hazard is associated with the fuel handling systems due to
the large tritium throughput. Release rates from the fuel handling systems total
~ 2400 Ci/year, compared to - 400 Ci/year from the blanket and blanket processing
systems. The release rate from the fuel handling systems for each of DD and DHe
is ~ 17 Ci/year, a considerable reduction from the DT fuel cycle.
An earlier study concluded that the tritium throughput for a catalyzed DD ma-
chine would be a factor of 100 less than for a DT machine, and that the throughput
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for a DHe machine would be reduced by a factor of 1000 [5.18]. For the semi-
catalyzed DD reactors studied here, a reduction by a factor of 100 in tritium
throughput is indeed seen. However, the tritium throughput for the DHe reac-
tor is very near to that for the DD reactor. A reduction in tritium throughput by
100 times from DT is seen, not by 1000 times as indicated in the previous work.
The details on which this earlier conclusion is based were not given. In the present
work, the plasma exhaust rate is based on the tolerable level of alpha ash in the
plasma. Since alpha particles are produced from D- He reactions and from D-T re-
actions, their formation rate is high in the plasma of a DHe reactor. A large plasma
exhaust rate is needed to maintain the alpha ash concentration in the plasma at an
acceptable level. This results in relatively high recirculation rates of all species and
a relatively high tritium inventory throughout the plant.
5.2 Induced Radioactivity Hazards
Although the fusion reactions considered in this study do not produce any
non-fusable radioactive products, the neutrons released can activate the materi-
als surrounding the plasma chamber. This results in an inventory of radioactive
by-products in the reactor materials. In this section, estimates of the inventory
of activation products that will result from the operation of fu-ion reactors em-
ploying the various fuel cycles is provided. These estimates have been made using
one-dimensional 'neutron transport calculations. Dose rates in the fusion reactor
environment and their potential impact on the occupational work force are also
estimated. Routine offsite releases are also discussed.
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5.2.1 Activation Product Inventories
The level of activation that occurs in a fusion reactor depends on the neutron
wall loading, the neutron flux spectrum, the operating history of the reactor and
the elements that are activated. The neutron wall loading is dependent on the
fuel cycle. For the DT fuel cycle, 80 % of the fusion energy is released in the
form of neutrons; for the semi-catalyzed DD fuel cycle, this fraction is reduced to
60 %. Although no neutrons are produced directly from the fusion of deuterium and
helium-3, unavoidable DD and DT side reactions result in some neutron production.
In the present study, 7.7 % of the fusion energy resides with the neutrons for the
DHe fuel cycle. The lower energy carried by the neutrons coupled with the fact that
the advanced fuel reactors must be larger than their DT counterparts for the same
thermal power production results in a much lower neutron wall loading for the DD
and DHe fuel cycles. The neutron flux energy spectrum is also dependent on the
fuel cycle. For the DT fuel cycle, the fusion neutrons are essentially all released
at an energy-of 14.1 MeV. For the advanced fuels, a large fraction of the neutrons
have substantially lower energy: for the DD fuel cycle, -- 51 % are released at 2.45
MeV, the balance being released at 14.1 MeV. For DHe, the fraction released at 2.45
MeV is - 60 %. The interaction of the neutrons of different energies and different
flux levels with the materials surrounding the plasma chamber will lead to different
activation products, activation levels and decay times. These will also be affected by
the operating history of the plant. Different fluence limits and reactor availabilities
lead to a characteristic operating history for each fuel cycle. The use of the same
structural material (HT-9) for all fuel cycles will expose the same elements to the
neutron flux (except for the additional exposure of a lithium bearing material for the
DT fuel cycle for the purpose of breeding tritium). Thus, the radioactive inventories
will be a direct reflection of the fuel cycle. The use of an alternate blanket material
for the DD fuel cycle (reduced activation ferritic (RAF) first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket)
will provide additional information on the impact of changing the structural material
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on activation product inventories.
The neutrons escaping from the plasma will migrate through the reactor. The
majority will be absorbed in the blanket region surrounding the plasma chamber,
where their kinetic energy will be recovered and converted to usable power. Some
reaction of neutrons with the structural-material of the blanket will result in the
transmutation of stable nuclei into radioactive nuclei. Neutrons leaking out of the
blanket will also react in the shield, TF coils and other reactor components, pro-
ducing additional radionuclides. The production of any radionuclides is a major
consideration for designers who aspire to achieve favorable safety and environmen-
tal features. Maintenance procedures, waste management operations and plant
effluents will be affected by activation product levels. These, in turn, will deter-
mine the degree of occupational and public exposure. Hence, it is important that
these inventories be quantified.
Activation product inventories have been evaluated for the three fuel cycles us-
ing neutron fluxes from ONEDANT 1 [5.211 and the activation code REACt [5.22].
The concentration of major activation products in the first wall at the end of the
blanket life for the different fuel cycles are given in table 5.8. The blanket lifetime
depends on the total neutron fluence to which it has been exposed. This is deter-
mined by the energy of the impinging neutrons and the displacement limit of the
material. Fluence limits corresponding to 250 dpa for HT-9 are 25.0 MW -yr/m 2
for DT, 14.6 MW -yr/m 2 for DD and 12.7 MW -yr/m 2 for DHe. For a given fuel cy-
cle, the total activity at shutdown is seen to increase with beta and wall loading (wall
t The One-dimensional Diffusion Accelerated Neutron Transport code solves
the linear Boltzman transport equation using the method of discrete ordinates with
the diffusion approximation to accelerate coi.vergence, in order to obtain the neutron
fluxes as a function of position and energy.
The REAC code folds the multi-grc ap cross sections for the materials of inter-
est with the multi-group fluxes to obtain transmutation rates and activation product
inventories at various exposure times.
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loadings are given in table 2.2). The high beta DT case presents the greatest hazard
in terms of activity concentration in the first wall of all the cases examined. This
is a consequence of the higher neutron flux to the first wall for this design. As is
apparent in the table, the advanced fuel designs do result in a non-negligible level of
activity in their first walls. This may not have been expected, especially in the DHe
case. The relative improvement of the HT-9 DD first wall activity concentration
over the DT levels is best at lower beta. This is due to the greater relative increase
in wall area for DD than for DT in going from 20 % beta to 5 % beta. Thus, the
flux at low beta is reduced by a larger factor from that at high beta for DD than
for DT. With 5 % beta, the DD total activity is reduced by a factor of -~ 4 over
DT; with 10 % beta it is reduced by and factor of 3, and with 20 % beta it is
reduced by a factor of -~ 2. The DHe activity at 10 % beta is 4 % of that of DT,
and ~ 15 % of that of DD.
Table 5.8 lists the major contributors to the first wall activity, categorized as to
whether they present a short term, long term or very long term hazard. Short lived
isotopes dominate the activity at shutdown. In all cases 55 Fe is the isotope of high-
est concentration in the first wall at the end of the blanket lifetime. Two isotopes
of manganese, 5 6 Mn and 5 4Mn, are the next major contributors. For the advanced
fuels, the fractional contribution to the activity of isotopes such as 55Fe, 54Mn and
51Cr is reduced from that of DT. As indicated in table 5.9, the production rates* of
such isotopes due to (n,2n), (n,a) and (n,p) reactions are somewhat reduced in the
softer DD spectrum. Isotopes produced from molybdenum and tungsten contribute
a greater fraction of the activity for DD (HT-9 blanket) than for DT. In fact, levels.
of 1 88Re, produced from tungsten, are over an order of magnitude greater for the
HT-9 DD designs than for the DT designs. The quantities of isotopes such as 9 9 Mo
produced in the HT-9 DD reactors are nearly the same as the quantities produced
in the DT reactors, at the same. value of beta, despite the reduction in total flux.
This effect is due to the softer neutron spectrum associated with the DD fuel cycle.
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The isotopes 93 Mo and 9 3mNb, produced from molybdenum, are important when
considering long term hazards. Although these isotopes represent a small fraction
of the shutdown activity, they are dominant in the long term and hence, present
a waste management concern. Production of 93 Mo in the HT-9 blanket through
radiative capture'in 92 Mo is enhanced in the softer DD neutron spectrum (see table
5.9). Of concern in the very long term are 9 9 Tc and 59 Ni, which are produced at
similar, although small, levels in the DT and HT-9 DD reactors. This is partially
a result of the longer blanket lifetime for the DD machines. The build up of these
long lived isotopes increases linearly with operating time [5.23], whereas the shorter
lived species reach saturation within a few years of commencing operation. The DHe
reactor shows a reduced level of activity of the long lived species. Thus, it appears
that the first wall activity concentration of the shorter lived radionuclides, which
constitute most of the activity at shutdown, are reduced for the advanced fuels.
The softer spectrum of the DD and DHe fuel cycles appears to enhance neutron
capture in isotopes producing longer lived nuclides. The DHe fuel cycle results in a
lower concentration of both short and long lived species in the first wall, and hence
presents the least hazard.
When comparing activity levels for the two first wall materials for the 10 %
beta DD designs, similar levels of the short lived species are seen. This would
be expected from the similar levels of parent nuclides (iron and manganese) and
the similar wall loads. A significant reduction in the inventory of the longer lived
species, is seen for the RAF first wall. Species resulting from molybdenum, which is
greatly reduced in RAF, (9 9Mo, 9 3Mo, 93 mNb, 9*Tc) are reduced by roughly four
orders of magnitude. Nickel produced isotopes (6 3Ni, "9Ni are roughly two orders
of magnitude less concentrated in the RAF first wall as a result of the reduction
in the nickel content. This will have a major impact on long term waste disposal
concerns.
Decay heating levels in the first wall at the end of blanket lifetime are indi-
cated in table 5.10. The greatest heating occurs in the DT first walls, and is seen to
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Table 5.10: Major Contributors to First Wall* Decay Heat Levels at
End of Blanket Lifetime t (W/cm3 )
DT
Halflife 5 % 10 %
DD
20 % 5 % 10 % (HT-9) 10 % (RAF)
DHe
20% 10%
5 4 Mni
58 Mn
58 c
51 Cr
49 v
55 Fe
99Mo
18 5w
Total Heating
313 d
2.58 h
70.8 d
27.7 d
331 d
2.7 y
66.0 h
75.1 d
144
1070
6.96
5.37
4.60
2.58
4.16
2.11
1560
172
1450
9.52
7.34
6.20
3.22
7.09
2.96
1970
234
1890
12.5
9.52
7.97
3.61
7.39
3.87
2570
25.4
243
1.54
1.05
0.748
0.565
2.94
1.50
347
* first wall region is 12 % HT-9, 88 % He by volume
1 all values have been multiplied by 104
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Isotope
38.3
448
2.38
1.86
1.32
0.949
6.61
2.96
620-
52.1
490
0.071
1.86
0.0066
0.935
0.0016
16.5
688
86.1
792
4.92
3.21
2.34
1.49
9.05
5.17
1100
5.57
59.2
0.383
0.277
0.193
0.146
1.09
0.415
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increase with beta. An improvement by a factor of ~- 4 occurs for the DD design at
5 % beta; at 10 % beta the HT-9 DD decay heating is reduced by roughly a factor
of 3 (for both materials). At 20 % beta, the decay heating in the DT first wall is
twice that in the DD first wall. The greater improvement at low beta is again a
result of the larger relative increase in the DD first wall area in going from 20 % to
5 % beta compared to DT, resulting in a larger decrease in the flux. For DHe, the
first wall decay heat level is ~ 25 times below that for DT at 10 % beta.
The main contributors to decay heating at shutdown for all fuel cycles are
two isotopes of manganese. Initially, 5"Mn produces the greatest amount of heat.
However, because of its relatively short half life (2.56 h), it soon decays away and the
main isotope responsible for heating would be 54 Mn. The enhanced production of
"Mo in the softer DD spectrum results in its fractional contribution to the shutdown
decay heating being larger than for DT for the HT-9 first wall. The heating due to
the decay of tungsten produced isotopes is greater in the RAF first wall compared
to the HT-9 first wall for the 10 % beta DD designs. This is a consequence of the
greater quantitiy of tungsten in RAF steel compared to HT-9.
As noted above, the local decay heat level at the first wall is largest for DT.
This would appear to present the greatest hazard in the event of a Loss of Flow
Accident (LOFA) or Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), when cooling of the first
wall would not take place. However, one needs to consider the effect of the adjacent
blanket material before arriving at any conclusions in this regard. The relatively
high thermal conductivity of the lithium in the DT blanket material may assist
in the heat removal, mitigating the consequences of such an event. For.DD, the
absence of such a highly conductive material and the greater fraction of steel in the
blanket (and therefore activated material) may lead to more severe consequfences
from a LOFA or LOCA than expected.
The radioactivity decreases in components behind the first wall as the neutron
flux is attenuated through the blanket. Activation levels towards the rear of the
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blanket are much lower than those at the front of the blanket. The average value
for the activity concentration in the inboard blanket region and the total inboard
blanket activity are given in table 5.11. Information is given for the inboard region
only, where the activity will be most concentrated (due to the smaller volume of ma-
terial). The sum of the average activity concentrations of the isotopes of short term,
long term and very long term concern, are also given. For the DT fuel cycle, the
average blanket activity concentration is lower than for the first wall. This would be
expected, as the flux attenuates through the blanket. For the advanced fuels, this is
not the case. The activity concentration is larger in the blanket than in the first wall
due to the increased fraction of the region occupied by structure. For the HT-9 de-
signs, the first wall is only 12 % HT-9, while the blanket is 80 % HT-9. Thus, despite
the attenuation of the flux, the increased atomic density in the blanket results in
higher activation levels. The blanket for the DT designs is 6.3 % HT-9 (compared to
12 % in the first wall). Since the lithium does not highly activate, compared to the
steel, this reduction in the amount of steel (in addition to the flux attenuation)
contributes to the decreased activation in the blanket compared to the first wall
for this fuel cycle. The effect of the larger structural volume fraction of steel in
the DD machine is significant; the average concentration of the inboard blanket
activity is greatest for DD. As indicated in table 5.9, the larger number of reactive
target nuclei per unit volume in the DD blanket leads to a higher production rate
of certain species. Once again, the short lived isotopes dominate the total activity.
The major contributors to the blanket activity are 55 Fe, 5 4 Mn and 5"Mn. Isotopes
produced from molybdenum and.tungsten contribute a greater fraction of the total
activity in the HT-9 blanket for the advanced fuels than for DT. The concentration
of long lived isotopes is greater for the advanced fuels than for DT. This is true
even in the case of DHe. After considering the total volume of blanket material, the
DD blankets appear even less attractive (DD blankets are larger). Although most
of the activity is due to short lived isotopes, there is a significantly larger quantity
of longer lived species in the DD blanket. This is also true for the DHe fuel cycle,
whose blanket will contain more longer lived radionuclides at the end of its life than
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its DT counterpart. It should be noted, however, that the DT blankets must be
replaced more frequently. Hence, handling and storage of more radioactive material
is associated with this fuel cycle. This will be reflected in the average annual dose
incurred during blanket changeouts and during waste handling activities.
Upon examining the two blankets for the 10 % beta DD designs, a slightly
higher concentration of short lived species is seen in the Fe2Cr1V blanket compared
to HT-9. This is largely a result of the higher iron content of the alternate mate-
rial. A major difference between these materials is in the production of long lived
isotopes. Over an order of magnitude reduction in long lived species is seen with
the Fe2Cr1V blanket. This will have important implications for long term waste
disposal hazards.
Although radionuclides will be produced in the shield, TF coils and other com-
ponents, time constraints limited the scope of this study to activity levels in the
blanket. This region, however, represents a greater concentration of activation prod-
ucts and is therefore of greater concern. Some activation of materials in the shield
will take place. Activation levels here are expected to be several orders of magni-
tude below that in the blanket region [5.5]. An even lower level of activity will be
produced in the TF coils. Thus, the contribution of the activation products in these
regions to the total inventory should not be significant.
The average and total blanket decay heat levels at shutdown are also given
in table 5.11. The greater fraction of structure in the DD blanket leads to higher
levels of decay heat compared to DT. Although the fraction of structure is still large
(80 %) for DHe, the reduction in neutron flux leads to lower decay heat density for
this fuel cycle. The shutdown decay heat level in the Fe2Cr1V DD blanket is slightly
higher than for the HT-9 DD blanket. This may be important in the-event of a
loss of coolant accident. Also given in the table is the magnitude of the decay heat
relative to that produced by neutron multiplication in the blanket. The DD blankets
produce the most heat in their blankets via neutron energy multiplication (largest
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blanket multiplication factor due to many (n,'y) reactions). The fact that the decay
heat represents a larger fraction of this power compared to the other fuel cycles
makes the DD fuel cycle appear more hazardous. The total decay heat available
in the blanket at shutdown is much larger in the DD blanket that the other fuel
cycles. The DD blanket thus presents a greater hazard in this respect since it has
the potential of providing a greater amount of energy for mobilization of activated
species.
5.2.2 Releases of Activated Material
Routine releases of radioactive effluents will occur during the normal opera-
tion of commercial fusion power reactors. These effluents will consist of activated
corrosion products and tritium. Tritium effluents have been treated in an earlier
section. An estimate of the source term for routine releases of activated products
is the object of this section.
Releases of activation products during routine operation of a helium-cooled
device are expected to be much less than their water-cooled counterparts [5.51. The
dominant source of radioactive effluents is activated material carried in the primary
coolant loop. The'degree of this hazard is greatly reduced by the use of helium
as the coolant, where sputtering is the significant mechanism by which activated
materials enter the coolant stream (as opposed to the much greater levels which
would occur due to corrosion if water was the coolant). Leakage of the primary
coolant to the secondary side of the steam generators provides a release pathway for
small quantities of radionuclides. Based on studies of the primary coolant circuit of
High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors (HTGR), no routine releas s of radioactive
materials from the primary circuit of a helium cooled fusion reactor are expected
[5.24]. Some releases may occur from purification systems which are designed to
maintain acceptable levels of coolant purity and remove activated materials from
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the coolant loop. Other releases will-occur from the ventilation systems of buildings
where various radioactive waste management operations are performed.
The activated species in the helium coolant take the form of erosion/sputtered
particles. Bickford [5.25] discussed direct-daughter recoil and bulk neutron sputter-
ing mechanisms for transfer of radionuclides from coolant channels into a pressurized
helium coolant. This material may adhere to the interior surface of the primary
coolant piping or be transported to and trapped in the primary side of the steam
generator. Waste processing systems are provided to remove activated suspended
material which may be entrained in the coolant. Studies performed for High Tem-
perature Gas Reactors have led to the expectation that there will be essentially
no routine releases of radioactive materials from the primary circuit of a helium
cooled fusion reactor [5.24]. Some leakage of the primary coolant through steam
generator components into the secondary loop may occur before cleanup. A sepa-
rate processing system is provided for the secondary loop to limit the possibility of
further radioactive releases. It is anticipated that the only routine releases from a
helium cooled fusion plant, excluding tritium and gaseous activation products, will
be aqueous streams from decontaminating equipment. Leaks through valve stems,
pumpshaft seals, and other equipment may also contribute to releases. Auxiliary
cooling systems include continuous systems used for cooling highly radioactive com-
ponents (such as limiters and plasma heating devices) and low-activity components
(such as magnets and power supplies). Radioactive material may also be entrained
in these auxiliary cooling systems and may contribute to releases through leakage.
Further routine releases may result from laundry water, ion exchange regenerant
solutions and other minor sources of contaminated water. The activity levels of
these sources cannot be specified as accurately as they are for a water-cooled toka-
mak, but it is expected that the aqueous released from a helium-cooled tokamak will
be less than 10 % of the corresponding releases from a water-cooled tokamak [5.5].
Cannon [5.5] has estimated an upper limit of 15 mCi/yr for the release in aqueous
streams from a DT plant. Based on activity levels in the blanket, an upper limit
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available. The total flux at any point should be small. Thus, the activity in the re-
actor hall due to direct activation of the atmosphere will not be large. Occupational
doses will be dominated by tritium exposures and gamma exposures from activities
such as steam generator maintenance. The probability of a release of radioactive
cover gas from the reactor building is quite low [5.5]. If such a release does occur,
public doses will be insignificant [5.26], especially after considering dispersion effects
in the environment. Hence, doses due to activation of the reactor hall should not
have a significant effect on the outcome of this study, and were not considered.
5.2.3 Occupational Doses
During operation of the fusion reactor, neutron bombardment of the reactor
structure and impurities in the primary coolant will result in the production of
radioactive species. Activated products in the structure will not present a hazard
during normal operation of the plant. However, during maintenance of blanket
sectors or fueling, heating, pumping and instrumentation components, personnel
may be exposed to high levels of radioactivity. Proper procedures and protective
measures must be instituted to minimize doses. Circulation of material in the pri-
mary coolant will result in activation products being transported from the reactor
and deposited in other components of the power cycle, such as the steam genera-
tor, pumps, valves and piping. Procedures to minimize personnel exposure during
maintenance in these areas are required. In this section, worker exposure to activa-
tion products during plant maintenance will be examined. It should be pointed out
that a large fraction of the radiation dose accumulated by fusion facility staff will
not be the result of exposure in high field areas. Experience in the fission industry
indicates that the greater proportion of the dose is the result of integrated expo-
sure to lower radiation field areas such as those encountered in heat exchanger and
circulating equipment rooms, auxiliary equipment rooms and waste handling/clean
up system rooms [5.16]., Activated corrosion products are transported outside the
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primary reactor shield leading to radiation fields in these locations which, while not
high enough to justify the cost of remote systems for maintenance, are significant
enough to require radiological work planning and dose control.
During normal maintenance at a typical PWR, more than 75 % of the exposures
occur during maintenance of the reactor coolant loop, due to the radiation fields
produced by activated corrosion products [5.27]. Radioactive material may enter
the coolant channels by three basic mechanisms: corrosion of activation products
in the channel walls, activation of coolant impurities and neutron sputtering of
channel walls. With the use of helium as the coolant, as in the present work,
neutron sputtering of wall material has been identified as the primary source of
activation products in the coolant channels [5.25]. The other two source terms
are relatively unimportant because helium is an inert gas with a very low corrosion
rate, and purification techniques are capable of maintaining impurity levels very low.
Neutron sputtering occurs as a result of two processes: lattice dynamic sputtering or
bulk sputtering of atoms, and fast neutron induced recoil sputtering of radioactive
daughter nuclei near the surface of-the coolant tubes. High energy neutrons have
a greater impact on sputtering yield [5.25] (since the displacement cross section
scales roughly linearly with energy [5.28]). Bickford [5.2] has modeled the transport
and deposition of sputtered activation products in a helium cooled fusion power
plant. He found that about 17 % of the inventory deposited out in the blanket
modules themselves, 8 % deposited in the larger pipe runs of the hot leg, and the
remaining 75 % deposited in the steam generator. Negligible quantities were found
to be deposited in the circulator and cold return leg. Contact dose rates on hot
pipes coming from the blanket were as high as 10 rem/h. Contact doses at the
steam generator were estimated at 100 mrem/h, despite the much larger fraction
of the radioactive inventury which is deposited here. This can be attributed to the
large self shielding of the steam generator. Although Bickford's calculated values of
radioactivity at the steam generator for the helium-cooled fusion reactor are slightly
lower than those found at a PWR, they are of the same order. It is expected that,
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without special clean up procedure, occupational doses at a helium cooled fusion
plant would only be slightly less than those experienced at PWR stations.
Dose rates to which workers are exposed during maintenance on the coolant
system and steam generator have been estimated using the information given by
Bickford [5.2]. The design used in his analysis is similar to the 5 % beta DT design
of this work. Thus, in lieu of repeating Bickford's involved analysis, a contact dose
rate of 100 mrem/h was adopted for the 5 % beta DT design. Contact dose rates
for the other designs were estimated from this value by scaling with the Remote
Maintenance Rating (RMR) of the blanket structure one day after shutdown. The
RMR is defined as the radiation dose rate at the surface of a uniformly activated,
infinite slab with the same composition and density as the specific machine com-
ponent. The values used for scaling are those at one day after shutdown, and are
given in table 5.12. Scaling in this manner was thought to be appropriate since the
sputtered material originates from the structure. The RMR of the structure should
then also reflect the health hazard of sputtered material in the coolant. Estimates
of coclant/steam generator maintenance dose rates are given in table 5.12.
As discussed in section 5.1.3, doses incurred by the most exposed work group
can be evaluated using an estimate of the total man-hours of contact maintenance
(see appendix E). Time estimates for maintenance and doses incurred during these
activities are listed in table 5.13. As indicated here, steam generator/coolant sys-
tem maintenance doses are greatest for the DT fuel cycle. The reduced dose rate
encountered during steam generator/ coolant system maintenance for the advanced
fuels allows for an increased amount of contact activity. Despite this fact, the lower
dose rate results in the total cumulative dose for the DD and DHe fuel cycles being
much lower than for DT. Because of the slightly higher concentration of short lived
isotopes in the DD RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket compared to the DD HT-9
blanket, it is expected that the sputtered material from the coolant tubes of the
alternate design will also have slightly higher levels of these species. Thus, the dose
rate and total exposure during coolant/steam generator maintenance will be higher
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for this design, compared to the HT-9 design.
Some degree of personnel exposure will result from contact maintenance car-
ried out in the vicinity of the plasma chamber. Extensive diagnostic and other
support equipment will be located adjacent to the reactor, and it is unlikely that
all maintenance on this equipment can be carried out remotely. The reactors were
designed with shielding capable of reducing the radiation dose level to the level of a
few millirem per hour or less, one day after shutdown. At these levels, plant person-
nel could work up to 40 hours per week within the reactor containment during an
outage period. Tasks performed would not include any work within the outboard
shield or on components with penetrations (e.g. fueling devices) since these would
be more highly activated than the components protected by the outboard shield
due to the higher neutron fluxes to which they are exposed. Nevertheless, access
to the toroidal field coils, cryogenic systems and other components external to the
outboard shield appears feasible. Values for the gamma dose rate at this location
were obtained from the REAC output. The dose rate midway through the outage
was chosen as the representative dose rate during these activities at this location.
In all cases, the dose rate beyond the shield at this time was found to be below
1.0 x 10-2 mrem/h. This value is below the mean background radiation level of
1.5 x 10-2 mrem/h [5.29]. It was therefore thought appropriate to use the higher
background value of 1.5 x 10-2 mrem/h for the dose rate encountered during main-
tenance near the plasma chamber. The greatest dose, although not large itself, is
incurred for the DHe fuel cycle, as a consequence of the increased amount of contact
maintenance permitted.
A major operation carried out during fusion plant outages will be that of first
wall and blanket replacement. Some contribution to the total cumulative dose in-
curred at the plant is expected as a result of these procedures. Operations associated
with this activity include disconnecting coolant lines and support equipment, dis-
connecting first and second walls, preparation and installation of new blanket assem-
blies and reconnecting coolant and support equipment. An estimate of 75 mrem/h
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for the dose rate during these activities was given for STARFIRE in reference [5.30].
Scaling this by the RMR of the structural materials (PCA for STARFIRE vs HT-9
for the designs here) as given in the BCSS [5.8] (where STARFIRE is the reference
tokamak design) gave an estimate of 26 mrem/h as the dose rate during blanket
changeouts. This value was taken to represent the 5 % DT design. Estimates of
the dose rate encountered during blanket changeouts for the other designs were
obtained by scaling this value with the RMR of the blanket structure. Table 5.12
lists the anticipated dose rates. Estimates of exposure times and cumulative doses
incurred for all designs are given in table 5.13. Despite the greater concentration of
activity in the DD blanket, a lower dose rate is expected during blanket changeouts
than for DT due to the self shielding effect of the blanket material. This effect will
not be observed for the DT blanket module since the breeder will be drained prior
to changeout and there is much less steel present to act as shielding. Once again, a
slightly higher dose rate is expected during these operations for the DD RAF first
wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket design compared to the DD HT-9 design, due to the higher
activity levels of short lived species. As indicated in table 5.13, a shorter blanket
changeout time is expected for the advanced fuels because of the elimination of
procedures dealing with the breeder. More contact maintenance will be permit-
ted for the DHe fuel cycle, due to the lower dose rate encountered during blanket
changeouts.
An additional area for exposure exists for the DT plants. Workers may be
exposed to radiation fields during maintenance activities on blanket processing and
tritium extraction equipment. It was assumed that shielding would be provided
to reduce the dose rate during these operations for the 10 % beta DT design to
2.5 mrem/h. Values for the 5 % and 20 % beta designs were estimated by scaling
with the RMR of the breeder at shutdown. Table 5.12 gives the RMR of the
breeder and dose rate expected during maintenance activities of breeder processing
equipment. Estimates of the exposure time and cumulative doses incurred during
these procedures for these designs are given in table 5.13. As expected, a greater
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dose rate and cumulative dose results for the high beta design.
The total occupational dose incurred and the fractions attributed to tritium
exposure and gamma exposure are summarized in table 5.13. The design presenting
the greatest hazard is the high beta DT; the DHe design is the least hazardous.
Gamma exposures account for 69 - 78 % of the total dose for DT; this increases to
94 - 98 % of the total dose for DD. For DHe 21 % of the dose is due to tritium
and 79 % due to structural activity. Even in the worst case, however, the dose
incurred at the fusion plant (- 150 man-rem) is significantly lower than current
doses at fission plants. In 1986, the total annual radiation dose at the Pickering
Nuclear Station in Canada was 900 man-rem [5.31]. According to Ontario Hydro
statistics, the average collective dose over the five year period from 1979 to 1983
for U.S. LWR's was about four times that incurred at Ontario Hydro units. Thus,
when compared to fission, even the worst case fusion plant considered here appears
attractive.
5.2.4 Waste Management
During the operating life of a reactor, radioactive materials requiring disposal
will be removed from the plant at regular intervals. Primary wastes will be derived
from disassembly of the torus sectors. These operations are expected to dominate
waste handling activities, essentially because of the large volume, large weight, high
activity level, and processing requirements associated with these items. Secondary
wastes will be generated from processing of the torus sectors and from clean up
of the coolant and other circulating streams. These low level wastes, which may
include tritiated wastes, will consist of contaminated work clothes and tools, resin
beds, solidified concentrates of ion exchange regenerant solutions, pumps, pump oils,
filters, sludges and suspect trash. Additional waste materials will become available
at the end of the plant's operating life when decommissioning takes place.
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The non-tritiated low level wastes produced at a water cooled fusion plant
are expected to be very similar in quality and quantity to that produced at an
LWR [5.5, 5.32, 5.33]. More than 90 % of the radioactivity in the waste processing
streams is expected to originate from the primary coolant [5.5]. For a helium cooled
system, the radioactivity in the primary coolant loop is generated and transported
by different mechanisms. It is anticipated that when using helium as the coolant,
significantly less solidified concentrates, filter sludges and resins will be produced.
Cannon [5.5] suggests that the total volume of low activity wastes from a helium
cooled fusion reactor will be about half of that from a water cooled reactor. Fur-
thermore, he expects that the radionuclide concentration will be about two orders
of magnitude less. Thus, the need for handling, storage and transportation of these
wastes will also be less than for a water cooled plant.
As a result of the low level waste handling activities, some occupational ex-
posure will occur. Easterly [5.33] states that waste management operations of this
type at a fission plant give rise to a relatively small occupational exposure, resulting
in ~ 5 to 7 % of the total dose. A similar dose would be expected due to these
activities at a water cooled fusion plant. The anticipated reduction in volume and
activity level of the low level wastes generated at a helium cooled fusion plant will
result in an even lower dose. It was thus assumed that the dose attributable to the
handling of these wastes at the plants considered in this work will be of no major
consequence and no attempt was made to evaluate it.
A unique waste management task for fusion will be the regular partial replace-
ment of the first wall/blanket structure of the reactor. This operation will occur at
several times at predetermined intervals during the lifetime of the plant. Activities
involved will include removal of the blanket sector to the processing cell, disas-
sembly, bakeout, cutting, compacting, packaging and temporary storage. These
procedures will be undertaken routinely during the normal operation of the fusion
facility. At the end of the reactor lifetime, removal and processing of all the blanket
sectors will be necessary. Structural members and magnets must be dismantled
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and stored for reuse or packaged for disposal. After completion of the dismantling
actions, decommissioning of the reactor site can take place.
Radioactive wastes produced by operating fusion plants will require disposal
at sites licensed for this purpose. Low level wastes from fission power plants are
currently being disposed of in shallow pits at designated locations. Much of the
low level waste generated at a fusion plant will be of the same character. Hence,
it can be envisioned that these sites will also be used for the disposal of low level
fusion plant radioactive wastes. Much of the blanket sector wastes will be unsuit-
able for near-surface burial. The regulations governing land disposal of radioactive
wastes, are given in 10CFR61. Four categories of waste are defined: Class A is
the least hazardous, followed by classes B and C as the radiation hazard increases.
If radioactivity levels exceed those allowable for class C, the waste is not accept-
able for near surface burial. These regulations were designed with fission reactors
in mind. Hence, the properties of fusion reactor wastes have not been explicitly
considered. Inappropriate application of the standard to fusion wastes may lead
to faulty guidance. Inadequacies in the current regulations include the omission of
several important fusion specific isotopes and the lack of attention given to acti-
vated metal wastes. Some effort has been given to formulating limits for isotopes
such as 53 Mn 93 Zr and 93 Mo , which are not currently included in the regulations
[5.34]. Other recommendations for making these regulations more suitable to fu-
sion include reevaluation of the scenarios for inadvertent intrusion into the disposal
facility after closure (since a large fraction of the wastes are activated solids) and
establishment of a separate waste class for activated metals and ceramics [5.32].
Nuclides of concern for which 1OCFR61 regulations exist are listed in table
5.14, along with the limiting concentration for shallow land burial and the expected
average concentrations in the inboard first wall/blanket structure of reactors be-
ing examined in this study. The additional nuclides of 53 Mn, 9 3 Zr and 93 Mo are
also included. Concentrations of these nuclides at one year after shutdown exceed
the limiting values for all fuel cycles with HT-9 blankets for 9 4 Nb and 9 3 Mo. For the
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HT-9 DD blanket wastes, class C disposal limits are also exceeded for 9 9Tc and
"
3 Ni; the DHe blanket wastes just exceed these limits as well. A considerable
improvement is seen for the alternate material DD design in terms of activity levels
of several of the long lived species. The concentrations of 94Nb, 9 9Tc and Mo are
reduced below the class C disposal limits. The level of 1 3 Ni is still slightly above the
disposal limit after 30 years. Thus, none of the blanket wastes qualify for shallow
land burial. An alternative disposal method, such as deep geologic disposal, which
would afford greater and longer term isolation is required.
In lieu of disposal of all wastes, recycling of material is being considered. The
decision to recycle components will hinge upon the value of the raw material, dis-
posal costs, costs of separation processes and fabrication under conditions hindered
by radioactivity, rates of decay of, important radionuclides to manageable, levels and
the magnitude of the resource depletion by the fusion reactor system in the absence
of recycle. Significant amounts of potentially strategic metals are contained in the
structure and equipment of a fusion reactor. Conservation of raw materials will
become increasingly important in the future. The rejected components from fusion
power reactors may be regarded as a valuable reserve; recovery of these materials
may be important. Knowledge of the rate of decay of major species is needed to
determine if safe, hands on refabrication can be accomplished within a reasonable
time after shutdown (e.g. contact dose rate < 2.5 mrem/h at 30 years or less after
shutdown). An economic evaluation must also play a role in the decision to recycle.
This would examine the relative costs of separation and refabrication versus those
for disposal, procurement of new raw materials and fabrication of new components.
After the useful life of a fusion reactor, it will be necessary to dismantle many
components and prepare them for recycle or disposal. The degree of dismantlement
will depend on the future use intended for the site and the degree of modifications
required if a new fusion reactor is to be constructed on the site. Decommission-
ing alternatives to immediate dismantlement include mothballing and entombment.
Mothballing will leave the facility virtually intact; the nuclear island will be sealed
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and the site will be maintained. Afteragiven period of time, dismantling may
then be undertaken. This approach provides a time delay, allowing for the decay of
radionuclides. Doses incurred will be reduced compared to immediate dismantle-
ment and greater freedom of movement of workers around the plant will be allowed
in subsequent dismantlement procedures. Entombment involves encasement of con-
taminated material and equipment, and provision of shielding of sufficient durability
to allow radioactive decay to innocuous levels before failure. The final decision as
to which decommissioning approach to take will largely be based on an economic
comparison of the alternatives.
The level of radioactivity and the specific radionuclides generated by neutron
activation can be significantly affected by the selection of materials and the design
of the blanket [5.34]. This was evidenced by the comparison between the Fe2Cr1V
and HT-9 DD blankets. The level of activation will determine remote handling
needs for waste handling procedures, disposal methods for the waste and accident
severity. It is clear that several materials may provide a lower induced activity of
specific nuclides than the HT-9 structure used here, most notably modified ferritic
steels (RAF or Fe2Cr1V), vanadium alloys and ceramics such as silicon carbide. If
steel is to be used, elemental and isotopic tailoring have been proposed as means
of reducing the activation [5.35]. Elemental tailoring refers to the elimination of a
particular element which leads to high levels of radioactivity and replacing it with
another element which will reduce the activation and not significantly alter the
properties of the original material. This has been partially undertaken with RAF
and Fe2Cr1V, where the levels of Mo and Ni have been largely reduced. Isotopic
tailoring involves the removal of only particular isotopes of an element which give
rise to the daughter products of concern in the waste. Conn and Okula [5.35] have
investigated the contribution of specific isotopes of molybdenum and nickel (the two
major elements preventing near surface burial) to blanket activity and suggest that
isotopic tailoring of steels to include only 6 1Ni, 9 6 Mo and 97Mo will minimize the
induced activity. Once again, it must be determined how the cost of tailoring the
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material compares with radwaste disposal costs. If it is more costly to tailor the
material, theh it must be determined if the additional expense can be justified by
the consequent reductic'i in waste hazards.
The risk from radioactive wastes depends on the activity level of the waste, the
biological hazard of the radioisotopes involved, the pathways available for transport
of the radioactivity to the environment, the rate at which radioisotopes enter the
public domain and the time elapsed before public exposure occurs. The last three
concerns depend on the particular mode of waste handling and are not easily incor-
porated into simple hazard indices. The activity level and hazard associated with
waste materials can be compared on the basis of the Remote Maintenance Rating
(RMR) and the Waste Disposal Rating (WDR). The RMR gives a measure of the
gamma ray contact dose at the surface of a thick infinite slab of activated material.
The units of this index are mrem/h. If the RMR is less than 2.5 mrem/h, work-
ers can be in contact with the material without having any special protection for
gamma radiation. The WDR gives a measure for classifying wastes in accordance
with 10CFR61 regulations for land disposal of radioactive wastes. These regulations
were intended to protect an inadvertent intruder at a disposal site from incurring a
radiation dose greater than 500 mrem/yr. The WDR is defined as the sum of the ra-
tios of the actual concentration of each nuclide in the waste divided by its allowable
concentration limit for a given waste class. Near surface land disposal is possible if
the WDR is less than one. Since the concentrations of many of the isotopes listed
in table 5.14 exceed the class C disposal limit, the WDR of the blanket wastes for
all of the fuel cycles exceeds one. Thus, processing (e.g. dilution) is required to
reduce the specific activity before near surface burial will be permitted. Otherwise,
another disposal option must be employed. It should be noted that dilution may
not always be an attractive solution for it increases the total volume of waste to be
disposed of. This may be a problem if the capacity of the burial site is.limited.
Another alternative would be to temporarily store the wastes onsite, allowing
for some decay before disposal. Table 5.15 gives the activity concentrations of the
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nuclides of interest 30 years after shutdown. It is evident that there is no benefit to
delaying disposal, for some nuclides still exceed the limit, disqualifying the waste
for shallow land burial.
Upon removal from the reactor, blanket sectors will be placed in the cool down
region of the blanket disposal area. As indicated in table 5.11, average decay heat
levels in the blanket modules at shutdown may range from 4 to 74 MW. Looking
at the worst case of the 20 % beta DD design, a rough calculation indicates that
the average temperature of the module could rise-~ 210 C due to the decay heat
generated within the first two days subsequent to removal (this considers only the
isotopes contributing more than 0.1 % to the shutdown decay heat, and assumes no
cooling). This temperature rise may be tolerable if the sector is not to be reused.
However, if a sector removed due to operational problems is to be reused.after cor-
recting the difficulty, special provisions for cooling may be needed to avoid distortion
of the blanket assembly. The expected temperature rise in the other blankets will
be lower than for the 20 % beta DD design, and cooling is not as important a
concern. In any case, a cool down period of one year was assumed for all designs.
At this time, the contact dose rates of the blanket modules will be 5 % or less of
the shutdown values (due to decay of many short lived species). The module can
than be moved to the disassembly region of the blanket disposal area, allowing for
a newly removed module to be placed in the cooldown region. After cooling, the
spent blanket sectors are separated into their various components. Some cutting
may be involved to reduce the size of some of the pieces. Because the contact dose
rates are still relatively high (as given by the RMR at one year, see table 5.16),
most of this will be performed remotely, although some contact assistance is pos-
sible with adequate shielding. Compacting of pieces of the steel structure may be
accomplished by pressing. The waste can then be placed in sealed steel canisters
for storage under water until they are ready for shipment to a final disposal site.
It is expected that very little radioactivity will enter the cooling water of the stor-
age pool [5.5]. The DT blankets also contain lithium. The breeder will be drained as
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Table 5.16: Wastes Generated from Fusion Plant Operation
DD
20 % 5% 10 % (HT-9) 10 % (RAF)
DHe
20 % 10 4
Number of complete
blanket changeouts
Number of complete
limiter changeouts
Annual volume of
lithium waste (m3/yr)
Volume of Lithium
waste at EOL (m3 )
Annual volume of
Structural waste (m 3/yr)
Volume of Structural
waste at EOL (m3 )
Fraction of Lifetime
consumed at EOL
Total volume of Blanket
wastes during plant life (m3 )
Volume of low level and
tritiated wastes (m3/yr)
Blanket RMRt at
1 year (mrem/h)
Blanket RMR t at
30 years (mrem/h)
Breeder RMRt at
1 year (nrem/h)
Breeder RMRt at
30 years (rnem/h)
2
1
3
2
4
2
0
1
1
1
1
1
2 0
9
36 41 43
535
3
408
4
325
4 0.61
48 36 29 1952
0.37 0.25 0.22 0.89
1,753 1,794 2,124 1,970
581 582 582 539
39
1185
0.66
2,355
546
4.2x108  5.5x10 8  6.9x108  2.8x10 7  5.Ox107
2.3x105 2.6x105 2.8x10 5 1.1x10 5 1.7x10 5
36
1092
0.57
2,172
546
25 0.6'
761 361
0.64 0.31
1,511
549
379
546
7.x107 8.Ox107 8.6x10E
2.8x105 2.2x10 5 2.4x10 4
9.9x10 4 1.2x10 5 1.4x10 5
45 56 63
* limiter waste
t evaluated using FUSEDOSE package, created by S. Fetter '5.33, 5.34]
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5 %
DT
10%
part of the blanket changeout procedure. It may then be processed for immediate
disposal or recycled to remove activated impurities and to reestablish the desired
'Li content. As indicated in table 5.16, the breeder contact dose rates are lower
than those for steel, but still to high to permit unprotected contact maintenance.
The volumes of the, blanket materials scheduled to be discharged at regular
annual intervals (some fraction of the blanket is removed during each shutdown), the
quantities discharged at final plant shutdown and the accumulated volume removed
over the plant lifetime are given in table 5.16. In addition to the blanket sectors,
a large volume of much less radioactive material from shielding, magnets, dewars
and coils will also be removed at shutdown. It is expected that the total activity
associated with these components is much less than that associated with the blanket
[5.5]. These levels have not been quantified at this time.
Inspection of table 5.16 reveals several things. The total volume of waste
removed from the DT and DD plants is nearly the same. The volume of blanket
waste ejected from the DHe plant is significantly smaller. The contact dose rates
for the DT structure are highest, increasing with beta. After a one year cooldown
period, the DD blanket RMR's are an order of magnitude less; the DHe blanket
RMR is two orders of magnitude less than DT. However, a large majority of the
waste from the DT plants will be lithium, which has a contact dose rate two orders
of magnitude below the blanket RMR for DD. Thus, the hazard encountered during
handling of DT blanket wastes may actually be less than that encountered during
DD blanket waste handling. The contact dose rates at 30 years for the blanket
structure and breeder are also given in table 5.16. These are seen to decrease by
about three orders of magnitude from the one year value for the DT structural
waste, and by about two orders of magnitude for the DD and DHe blanket wastes.
The larger decrease for DT is a reflection of the greater fraction of activity due to
shorter lived species produced from exposure to the DT neutron spectrum. This is
also seen in the breeder RMR, which decreases by about three orders of magnitude
over 30 years. For all blanket materials, the RMR at 30 years exceeds 2.5 mrem/h
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so that recycle of the materials at this time would likely not be considered.
A problem encountered in assessing the hazards associated with waste disposal
is the fact that the maximum hazard to society may occur hundreds or thousands of
years after disposal of the waste. It is difficult to postulate the use of disposal site
at this time in the future or to predict the condition of the waste. To overcome this
problem, the NRC has proposed that at no time in the future should any individual
receive a dose greater than the maximum permissible dose (MPD) for public ex-
posure (0.5 rem). This should include contributions from the possible construction
and occupation of a house on the waste disposal site and the consumption of meat,
milk, and vegetables produced on the site. An inde indicating the magnitude of
this hazard is the maximum dose to an inadvertent intruder constructing and oc-
cupying a house on a waste disposal site after institutional controls have collapsed.
Values for the maximum dose to an inadvertent intruder at 500 years after disposal
of the waste are given in table 5.14. The intruder dose is highest for the DD HT-9
designs. This is a consequence of the greater quantity of longer lived species in this
waste, specifically 9 4 Nb, 6 3 Ni and 9 9 Tc. The intruderi dose is significantly reduced
with the use of the Fe2Cr1V DD blanket due to the large reduction in the quantity
of the previously mentioned isotopes in the waste. The intruder dose is based on the
specific activity of the waste. The probability of an exposure occurring is propor-
tional to the surface area covered by the waste. For a constant disposal depth, this
is proportional to the waste volume. Fetter [5.36] suggests that a more appropriate
index of hazard which would also reflect the probability of exposure is the Intruder
Hazard Potential (IHP). He defines this as the intruder dose-multiplied by the waste
volume divided by the MPD. Values are given in tab le 5.14. The IHP is seen to
decrease with beta for a given fuel cycle, reflecting the volume consideration. The
hazard posed by the advanced fuels, as indicated by this index, is still greater than
for DT for the HT-9 blankets. The hazard is greatly reduced for the DD design with
the Fe2Cr1V blanket. Some reduction in this index would also be expected for the
other fuel cycles if this material was used in their blankets. However, a thorough
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investigation of the materials impact was beyond the scope of the present work.
An attempt to roughly estimate the doses incurred during handling of blanket
wastes was made. Dose rates were determined by scaling dose rates encountered
during maintenance by the ratio of RMR at one year to RMR at shutdown. For
the advanced fuels, the maintenance dose rate used for scaling was that expected
during blanket changeouts (see table 5.12). For DT, both the dose rate during
blanket changeouts and during breeder processing were used. The scaled dose rates
were then weighted by the relative volumes of breeder and structure (which should
roughly reflect the time spent on processing ) to be handled to give an overall
estimate for the dose rate during handling of DT blanket wastes. The dose rates
are listed in table 5.17. To evaluate the cumulative dose incurred during waste
handling activities, it was assumed that the amount of contact maintenance involved
was equivalent to twice the annual amount estimated for blanket changeouts. The
time estimates and doses incurred are also given in table 5.17. The DD blanket
waste handling appears to give the greatest range of expected doses. This is largely
a consequence of the greater increase in the blanket lifetime as beta decreases from
20 % (11 year lifetime) to 5 % (30 year lifetime) for DD (HT-9 designs), compared
to the increase for DT (7 year lifetime at 20 % beta, 12 year lifetime at 5 % beta).
A larger dose is incurred during waste handling for the RAF first wall/Fe2CrlV
blanket DD design than for the HT-9 DD design, due to the greater quantity of
short lived isotopes found in the alternate material blanket. Although more time is
expected to be spent on blanket changeouts for DT, the fact that a large portion
of the waste is lithium as opposed to activated structure, results in lower doses
than one might anticipate for waste handling activities. The low dose expected for
handling of DHe blanket wastes is a combination of the lower volume and low'r
specific activity of the waste.
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5.2.5 Induced Radioactivity Hazard Summary
The results of this section indicate that for the HT-9 designs considered in this
work, there is no distinct advantage in terms of induced radioactivity hazard of the
advanced fuels over the DT fuel cycle. This conclusion may not apply to optimized
designs where different materials and/or energy conversion schemes are employed.
In fact, the use of a reduced activation ferritic (RAF) steel first wall and a Fe2Cr1V
alloy blanket for the DD fuel cycle indicated that a major reduction in long term
hazards would result. This, however, is accompanied by a modest increase in the
short term hazards.
The level of activation resulting in the the first wall is dependent on the neutron
energy spectrum and the magnitude of the flux. The higher energy neutrons and
greater flux intensity associated with the DT designs lead to a greater concentration
of radionuclides in their first walls. As would be anticipated with the reduction in
reactor size, and consequent increase in flux, activity concentrations are greatest
at high beta. The design presenting the most concentrated first wall activity level
is the 20 % DT design. Despite the reduction in flux and average neutron energy,
significant activity levels are still seen in the first walls of the DD and DHe designs.
In all cases, short lived species dominate at shutdown. The relative contribution of
these isotopes to the total shutdown activity is greatest for DT. Isotopes dominating
long term activity concerns are present in equal or greater amounts in the HT-9 DD
first walls compared to the DT first walls. The quantities of these species are largely
reduced for the RAF DD first wall. The DHe first wall (HT-9) also contains a non-
negligible amount of long lived species. This is both a consequence of the softer
neutron spectrum characteristic of the advanced fuels and of the longer blanket
lifetime. As would be expected from the higher level of activity associated with the
DT designs, decay heating levels at shutdown are greatest for this fuel cycle.
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A different situation exists in the bulk of the blanket as opposed to the first
wall. The DT blanket is composed largely of lithium, with smaller amounts of
helium coolant and structure. The advanced fuels employ a solid structure for their
blankets, with some helium provided for cooling. The average blanket activity is
lower than the first wall activity for the DT designs because of the reduced amount
of HT-9 structure located here. The case is reversed for the advanced fuels, where
the volume fraction of steel is much greater in the blanket than the first wall.
As with the first wall, short lived species dominate the shutdown activity of the
blanket. Both short and long lived species are present in greater quantities for the
DD fuel cycle when an HT-9 blanket is used. Thus, the DD HT-9 blankets present
a greater concern for both. short term (i.e. maintenance and other onsite activities
dealing with blanket modules) and long term (i.e. waste management) issues. A
considerable reduction in long lived isotopes, and therefore waste disposal hazards,
is seen with the use of the Fe2Cr1V blanket. Long term species may present a
concern for the DHe fuel cycle. The activity concentrations and decay heat levels
in the blanket are greatest for the 20 % beta DD design. The contribution of
the blanket decay heat will play an important role in determining consequences of
offnormal events, such as loss of coolant or loss of flow accidents. The advahced
fuels appear to be at a disadvantage in this regard for the materials used in this
study.
The most accurate indicators of radiological hazard during normal operation
are dose rates encountered by plant workers. These were found to be highest for
the DT fuel cycle. Steam generator dose rates were found to be higher because of
the greater hazard associated with the sputtered, activated material expected to be
entrained in the coolant. Dose rates encountered during blanket changeouts were
estimated to be higher for the DT fuel cycle, mainly because of the lack of self
shielding provided by the blanket. A slightly higher dose rate is expected during
these activities for the Fe2Cr1V DD design, compared to the HT-9 design, due
to the slightly higher level of short lived species present. The DT fuel cycle also
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presents an additional hazard during processing of the breeder material, although
the dose incurred during these activities contributes a small amount to the total
dose. Steam generator doses, followed by those incurred during blanket changeouts,
dominate occupational exposures in all cases.
Examination of the wastes produced from the fusion plants indicates that none
qualifies for shallow land burial. This is true even after a 30 year cool down period.
The total volume of waste removed from the DT and DD plants is nearly the
same, while that removed from the DHe plant is significantly less. The activity
concentration of these wastes is greatest for the DD fuel cycle when an HT-9 blanket
is employed. Considerable reduction is observed with the use of the Fe2Cr1V alloy
in the blanket. Because the quantities of long lived species are greater for the HT-9
DD designs, they pose a greater waste disposal hazard than does DT. The use of
an alternate material (RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket) significantly reduces the
waste disposal hazard. The activity concentrations of nuclides in the wastes ejected
from the DHe plant are equal to or slightly greater than that for DT for an HT-9
blanket. This may not be the case if the alternate material had also been examined
for this fuel cycle. However, the much reduced volume of waste produced over the
plant lifetime results in the DHe fuel cycle with an HT-9 blanket presenting the
least hazard in terms of waste disposal.
Offsite impacts of induced radioactivity are expected to be negligible for all
fuel cycles. Routine releases of aqueous effluents are expected to be less than
100 mCi/yr. Releases of activated atmospheric gases should also be low. The
hazard presented to the public from induced activity under normal conditions was
not evaluated,but is expected to be small for all fuel cycles.
It must be emphasized that the conclusions reached in this section are depen-
dent on the specific designs used in this analysis. These were not optimized designs;
they were based on a consistent set of design criteria. As has been illustrated with
the RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket DD design, the conclusions regarding activation
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and afterheat levels are strongly dependent on the materials used. This material
resulted in higher levels of short lived species and decay heat levels at shutdown,
but also led to a significant reduction in long lived isotopes and long term hazards.
Short term hazards could be reduced by employing a different blanket material (e.g.
SiC), but this would compromise some of the blanket neutron energy multiplica-
tion advantage seen with the DD designs. Blanket energy multiplication is less
of a factor for the DHe design. Use of a lower activation material in this design
may have significantly reduced the hazard, without losing much in terms of blanket
energy gain. For all fuel cycles, the use of a different low activation material may
have resulted in wastes qualifying for shallow land burial. In addition to the less
hazardous wastes, there would be a cost savings if shallow land burial was in fact
possible. Finally, the use of a low activation material with lower short term hazards
for the advanced fuels has the potential of significantly reducing occupational expo-
sures. Most of the maintenance doses for the advanced fuel reactors are a result of
gamma exposures, as opposed to tritium exposures. Thus, utilizing a low activation
material, resulting in lower gamma radiation fields,.would have a greater impact on
reducing total doses for the advanced fuels compared to DT. This would improve
the position of the advanced fuel designs relative to DT with regards to safety.
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Chapter 6
Accident Hazards of Fusion Fuel Cycles
As part of any safety evaluation, an investigation into potential accident haz-
ards must be performed. This involves quantifying sources of radioactivity, identi-
fying sources of stored energy, postulating accident scenarios that could liberate the
energy and mobilize the radioactivity and assessing the consequences of the most
credible accident scenarios. Inventories of radioactive species have been estimated
in the pr-vious chapter. In this chapter, sources of stored energy will be identified
and their magnitude will be evaluated. A brief discussion of possible mechanisms
for the release of the stored energy will be given. A loss of cOolant accident will
be examined in detail. The safety and economic consequences of this event will be
compared amongst the fuel cycles.
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6.1 Sources of Stored Energy
In order for the public to be seriously affected by a reactor accident, dispersal
of volatile radioactive substances or airborne radioactive particulates outside the
containment must occur. A plume containing these materials can be formed by the
escape of materials through a breached containment followed by the release of these
effluents from the containment building into the atmosphere. The requirements
for a hazardous accident include: mobilization of radioactive species, breach of
containment structures, and transport of radioactive materials out of the ruptured
containment. Any scenario in which these requirements are fulfilled will involve the
release of stored energy in an uncontrolled and destructive manner. It is of interest
to identify and quantify what the sources of stored energy are, and the mechanisms
capable of freeing this energy.
The sources of stored energy have been identified for the various fuel cycles
and are summarized in table 6.1. The stored energy is in several forms including
radiological, thermal, electromagnetic and chemical forms. The fusion power gen-
erated by each device during operation is also included in the table. The DD fuel
cycle presents the greatest decay heat source. As discussed in section 5.2.1, this is a
consequence of the larger amount of structural material relative to DT, and a higher
neutron flux relative to DHe. If released in an uncontrolled manner, the subsequent
temperature rise could result in component damage and volatilization of radioactive
species. The plasma kinetic (!kT) and magnetic ( ILP) stored energies are greater
for the advanced fuels than for DT because of the higher operating temperature
and magnetic fields associated with these designs. This energy, if deposited in a
sufficiently localized area, could melt or vaporize a small portion of the first wall.
The higher fields of the advanced fuels also result in a greater amount of energy be-
ing stored in the magnetic field (f -dV). This is a larger source of stored energy
for all of the fuel cycles. It could possibly melt or vaporize a significant -fraction of
activated structure if a localized energy dump were to occur. Additionally, large
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forces could be produced if this energy were released and the integrity of the first
wall could be threatened. However, an event such as this would be improbable. The
chemical energy stored in the lithium in the breeder blanket of the DT reactors is
a source of energy not present for the advanced fuels. It is of significant magnitude
(note that it is larger than the thermal and magnetic energy contained in the DT
plasma) that it could possibly cause structural damage and mobilization of induced
activity.
In addition to the magnitude and form of stored energy, the time constant for
the release phenomenon is important. With this additional information available, an
attempt to predict and understand possible abnormal events can be made. Actions
to protect against the energy release can be taken and designs can be chosen to
mitigate the effects of such a release. A detailed assessment of the events which
may occur subsequent to the release of all of the sources of energy identified in
table 6.1 has not been made. However, the information given does reveal the relative
potential for mobilization of radioactivity for the fuel cycles.
6.2 Mechanisms for the Release of Stored Energy
Given the sources of energy which could mobilize the radioactivity held within
the fusion plant, a mechanism for the release of this energy must be available before
any harm results. It is possible to postulate scenarios in which the stored energy
of the system is directly liberated or converted to thermal or mechanical energy
as a result of system or component failures. These accidents may include plasma
disruptions, magnet system accidents, breeder system failures leading to lithium
fires, cryogenic depressurization, auxiliary system failures, hydrogen explosions and
coolant system failures. The first six scenarios are discussed -briefly in this sec-
tion. Coolant system failures, in particular a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), are
discussed in the next section.
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6.2.1 Plasma Disruptions
Of major concern in tokamak devices is an event in which there is a very rapid
and often very violent loss of plasma confinement due to the collective behavior of
the particles. Disruptions may occur due to plasma instabilities including balloon-
ing modes, kink instabilities and tearing modes. External events, such as a first
wall LOCA, a TF magnet failure or other event modifying the plasma operating
conditions could initiate a disruption within the plasma. This process results in
almost all of the plasma kinetic energy and some of the associated magnetic energy
being dumped in a short time on part of the first wall or limiter. It should be em-
phasized that neither the causes of disruptions nor their effects are well understood
at this time. It is thought, however, that the thermal and magnetic energy of the
plasma is deposited onto the first wall in two distinct phases [6.1]. During the ther-
mal quench phase, most of the plasma kinetic energy is deposited and the plasma
temperature rapidly decreases. This is followed by the current quench phase during
which the plasma current decays and the remainder of the plasma thermal energy
and all of the stored magnetic energy are released. Surface heating of the first wall
as a result of this deposition may result in partial melting or vaporization. Also,
induced currents will lead to volumetric heating of the first wall. The resultant
non-uniform temperature rise may cause excessive structural strains. Additionally,
the perturbed magnetic field may interact with currents producing magnetic forces
on structural members which could lead to breach of containment and release of
radioactivity.
Of critical importance in determining the effects of a plasma disruption is the
disruption time. The thermal and electromechanical effects of the disruption are
dependent on the disruption time scales [6.21. Current devices have disruption times
less than one millisecond, increasing with reactor size and particle density [6.31. A
longer disruption time would lead to less severe consequences for the event.
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Selcow [6.4] has examined the effects of plasma disruptions in high beta DD
tokamak reactors. She indicated that disruptions should be minimized in these
reactors; some means of control must be found for the operation of high beta DD
tokamaks to be feasible. Such an analysis was not performed as part of this study.
However; it can be implied that the larger amount of stored energy in the DD and
DHe plasmas relative to that stored in the DT plasmas will result in inore severe
consequences after a disruption.
6.2.2 Magnet System Accidents
Magnetic fusion reactors require large magnetic fields for operation. The reac-
tors being examined in this work employed superconducting magnets. The magnets
present a safety hazard in that the liberation of their stored energy could initiate an
accident sequence that would release toxic or radioactive materials. Of concern for
a safety analysis, are abnormal operation of the magnets which could lead to dis-
ruption of the magnetic field, and accident situations which could result in damage
to the magnet and/or other reactor systems.
The principal abnormal operating event is the 'quench', where the conductor
suddenly transforms from the superconducting to the normal state. A quench can
be triggered by cryogenic instabilities resulting from either loss of adequate cool-
ing or sudden localized heating exceeding the cooling capabilities. Subsequent to
a quench, rapid heating of the coil can occur resulting in unacceptable thermal
stresses, conductor damage and helium boiling leading to cryostat overpressuriza-
tion. Systems can be designed to protect against cryogenic instabilities by providing
adequate cooling to remove all the Joule hez'ting of the conductor when the magnet
operates in the normal state. Other consequences of quenching, such as current
discharge, asymmetric mechanical forces and inductive current increases, can be
minimized by proper design. Thus, quenches are not considered to be accidents
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that could result in mechanical damage to other parts of the fusion reactor or lead
to release of radioactivity. However, they are costly in that they result in reactor
downtime, and a high frequency of occurrence must be avoided.
The release of the energy in the magnets could be coupled to other systems
through major structural failure. A magnet accident sequence which could lead
to moderate damage is the arcing across current leads or the rupture of a single
conductor. Multiple-current arcs can occur if one or more of the adjacent conduc-
tors rupture due to the heat produced by the first arc. The major consequence
envisioned for these events is vaporization of the conductor material, probably re-
quiring complete replacement of the entire magnet. Additionally, adjacent cables
and piping could be damaged, and coolant' lines or tritium processing lines may be
disturbed, resulting in the release of potentially hazardous material. Simultaneous
ruptures of the entire winding and casing at two different locations would result in
more severe damage and consequences. Loosened broken sections could be acceler-
ated, generating missiles. Arendt and Komarek [6.5] estimated that if the distance
between the ruptured ends of the winding and casing is greater than 1 m, missile
generation will occur. Although the energy carried by the missile will be less than
that assumed for airplane crashes into containment structures, it would be large
enough to cause significant damage to peripheral equipment and cause breaks in
coolant and tritium processing lines.
Selcow [6.4] investigated two possible magnet accidents in a superconducting
TF coil of a high beta DD tokamak to determine their dependence on field strength.
She found that it. is the lower field magnets which have the greater probability of
failure for either event (i.e. a greater heating rate in the copper stabilizer occurred
for the lower field magnets subsequent to the accident). A strong dependence of
the time for magnet failure to occur, as measured by the heating rate, was found
for a magnet loss of coolant accident. 'Magnet failure was found to be only weakly
dependent on field for a shorted turn accident. An investigation of possible magnet
system accidents was not undertaken as part of this study. However, in light of
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Selcow's findings, it would appear that the lower field DT designs pose a greater
threat.
6.2.3 Lithium Fires
The material chosen for tritium breeding in the DT designs was liquid lithium
metal. Although lithium has both good breeding and thermal properties, a ma-
jor drawback of this material is its high reactivity with water, air and concrete.
Exothermic reactions also occur with nitrogen, carbon dioxide and hydrogen. A
peak theoretical flame temperature of - 2400 K has been calculated [6.6]. At such
high temperatures, melting and possibly volatilization of the activated first wall
materials could occur. More realistic assumptions lead to a maximum flame tem-
perature of 1200 'C [6.7]. This flame temperature was confirmed by tests performed
on lithium pools at the Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory (HEDL) [6.8].
It has been shown that this temperature would result in the volatilization of less
than 0.014% of the mass of a reduced activation ferrutic steel first wall [6.9]. Aerosol
formation and release was observed during the HEDL lithium pool reaction tests.
Aerosols generated from a spill at a reactor may contain activated impurities or
corrosion products. It is felt, however, that collection and control of these lithium
aerosols is possible [6.8].
Calculations by LITFIRE have shown that a spill of ~ 22 Mg of lithium onto the
floor of a plant containment the size of UWMAK III can raise the air temperature
from ambient to about 300 *C within a half hour after the accident occurrence
[6.10]. The maximum lithium pool temperature observed was 950 *C. The results
were shown to be somewhat dependent on the containment volume and strongly
dependent on the amount of lithium spilled. Barnett also assessed the consequences
of a lithium spill and fire inside the vacuum torus [6.10]. He found that the effects
of the fire were relatively minor because the large heat capacity of the blanket and
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shield were able to absorb most of the heat conducted through the lithium pool and
first wall. His results, however, did-not include the effects of decay heating. This
consideration may alter the conclusions somewhat.
If lithium in a reactive form is used in reactors, engineering design can probably
eliminate or mitigate lithium fire accidents. Some design strategies include: using
steel liners for concrete, having independent breeder modules, reducing the lithium
inventory per breeding loop, reducing the oxygen concentration in the reactor build-
ing, using a structural material with a high heat removal potential, installing a
containment atmosphere cooling system, using a larger containment volume and
employing a dump tank below likely spill areas. Because helium is used as the
primary coolant in the DT designs considered in this study, lithium-water reactions
are less of a concern than they would be for a water cooled plant. However, the
shield is water cooled and the potential for lithium and water coming in contact
does exist. An investigation of the consequences of lithium reactions with water,
air or concrete at the DT fusion plants considered in this study was not performed.
However, it is important to keep in mind that a relatively large source of energy
which is present at the DT plants is not present at the DD or DHe plants.
6.2.4 Cryogenic Depressurization
Liquid helium will be used in the cryopumps for the vacuum and fuel handling
systems and for maintaining the cryogenic temperatures of the superconducting
magnet coils. Subsequent to a coil or helium pipe break, the liquid helium could
be spilled into the reactor building. The liquid will flash into a vapor, extracting
heat from reactor structures, causing thermal strains. -A certain degree of pres-
surization of the reactor building will result from the production of the helium
vapor. An analysis performed for the Fusion Engineering Device (FED) to deter-
mine the consequences of a toroidal magnet inlet helium header break indicated
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that the containment atmosphere pressure would rise by 0.08 MPa [6.11J. Contain-
ment buildings should be designed to withstand overpressures of this magnitude.
The loss of helium coolant to the magnets will lead to the dissipation of the magnet
energy, causing the temperature of the conductor to rise. This may lead to melting
of the coils thereby aggravating the effects of the helium spill. A further concern
for helium cooled reactors is that loss of helium may imply a loss of coolant if all
helium is drawn from the same reservoir.
6.2.5 Auxiliary System Accidents
There are a number of other sources of energy that were not quantified in section
6.1 which could serve as initiators for radioactive releases. These include plasma
heating equipment, fueling equipment, vacuum pumps and vacuum chamber, high
voltages and eddy currents. The energy associated with these auxiliary systems
present a hazard in themselves in addition to the fact that they could mobilize
radioactive species.
As a consequence of current passage through the plasma, some ohmic heating
of the plasma particles will take place. As indicated in table 2.2, the temperature
achieved by ohmic heating of the DT plasmas falls short of that required for ig-
nition. Radiofrequency heating was assumed to be employed to supplement the
ohmic heating to achieve ignition. Because of the larger fields and reactor sizes of
the advanced fuel designs, the temperature achievable by ohmic heating is higher.
Ignition of a DT plasma followed by thermal runaway will heat the plasma close
to the ignition temperature of the advanced fuel. As the temperature is rising,
some supplemental heating will be applied and the fueling mixture will gradually
be changed to that of the advanced fuel. Although the quantities of rf heating
actually required were not evaluated, the power of the rf sources required for this
purpose will be much larger than that of contemporary rf broadcast transmitters.
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Thus, special precautions mu t be taken.
Several mechanical safet issues are presented by the vacuum pumps and vac-
uum chamber in addition tol cryogenic concerns. The cryopumps will be backed
by turbomolecular pumps wlich contain high speed rotors that could fracture and
generate missiles. In the eve' t of a vacuum chamber failure, the cryopumps could
heat up and release their inventory of deuterium, tritium and helium. This could
lead to a potentially flammale mixture being present in the reactor, depending on
the concentration and the infiltration of air into the vacuum chamber.
6.2'.6 Hydrogen Explosions
Hydrogen can combine explosively with oxygen under certain conditions. This
is of concern at at fusion plant because large quantities of the hydrogen isotopes,
deuterium and tritium, will be found on site. Explosive mixtures in air result with
hydrogen concentrations in the range of 4 to 59 %. The consequences of a hydrogen
explosion are strongly dependent on the total amount of hydrogen available, the
building geometry and volume, and the cover gas used in the reactor building. It
is possible to design fusion reactor containments to accommodate these accidents
[6.12]. For the reactors of concern here, the room air concentration of hydrogen
(D 2 and T 2 ) would be far below the lower explosive limit assuming release of the
entire tritium inventory and the deuterium in storage into the reactor building
volume. Hence, it is not expected that this issue will present a safety problem.
6.3 Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident
It was not possible to carefully examine and assess the consequences of the
entire spectrum of accidents envisioned at a fusion plant. It was felt, however, that
at least one accident scenario should be investigated to give an indication of the
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relative consequences of an off-normal event for the various fuel cycles. A loss of
coolant accident was selected for this comparison. In this section, the consequences
of such an event for the different fuel cycles are examined. Results for both the
economic and health impacts, onsite and offsite, are given. The analysis was per-
formed only for those designs employing an HT-9 blanket. However, the-impact of
this accident for the RAF first wall/Fe2Cr1V blanket DD design can be inferred
knowing the decay heat and activation levels.
6.3.1 Discussion of the Problem
The function of the primary coolant system of a fusion reactor is to remove the
heat energy deposited in the first wall/blanket region surrounding the plasma. En-
ergy enters the blanket region through the first wall either in the form of neutrons
or direct radiation. The neutrons transfer their kinetic energy into thermal energy
through collisions and nuclear reactions with the blanket material. Incident radia-
tion is conducted away from the first wall by the blanket medium. Conduits within
the blanket structure contain the primary coolant to which the energy deposited
in the blanket is transferred. The primary coolant, being helium in this case, then
passes to a steam generator where the energy is transferred to steam. This can then
be utilized to produce electricity.
A loss of coolant accident (LOCA) may result from an individual tube plugging
or the rupture of a coolant line. For an individual plugged tube, the effects of the
LOCA in the blanket would be localized in the vicinity of the inactive cooling
tube. A temperature rise would be expected in this area, but removal of heat by
adjacent, operative cooling tubes would assist in the heat removal and limit the
extent of the transient. In the event of a ruptured or leaking coolant line, loss
of the coolant serving an entire module could result. The other modules would
still operate normally, providing cooling. A worst case, wherein the entire coolant
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inventory to all modules is lost, can be envisioned. This event is much more serious
in that there is no buffer to remove the heat load. All modules would experience
the same transient. The potential for damage and loss of structural integrity exists.
Subsequent to a loss of coolant accident, there are two heat sources of concern.
If the plasma is not extinguished, it will continue to deposit energy in the blanket
by neutron and surface heating until it is terminated by either entry of impurities
into the plasma (e.g. volatilized first wall material, blanket coolant or breeder), the
cause of the accident itself (e.g. magnet quench) or an active shutdown mechanism.
Prompt and reliable shutdown of the plasma within a short time would minimize
the impact of the LOCA. Regardless of whether or not the plasma is terminated, the
decay afterheat due to induced structural activity will exist as a heat source in the
blanket. In both cases, the consequences at the first wall are the major concern, for
it receives the highest surface heating and it is located in the region of highest decay
heat density. Large temperature excursions leading to first wall/blanket structural
failure and possible radioactive releases can occur if an auxiliary cooling system is
not provided, or if an emergency cooling system becomes inoperative.
The magnitude of the first wall temperature increase subsequent to a LOCA
is dependent on the length of time of continued plasma burn, and the decay heat
density in the blanket and first wall. It is expected that the plasma will terminate
within seconds after the accident has been initiated. The decay afterheat source,
however, will be present over many hours to years, so that the transient may extend
over a long period of time. The first wall temperature may rise high enough to result
in melting or volatilization. If the vacuum vessel is breached, oxygen may enter and
oxides may form. These are generally more volatile than the elements from which
they are formed, so that they may become mobilized at a lower temperature. With
a breached vacuum vessel, there is a direct pathway to the reactor hall. If the
reactor building has not maintained its integrity, the released activity can enter the
environment and reach the public domain.
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6.3.2 Assumptions Involved and Method of Analysis of the
Loss of Coolant Accident
The investigation was performed to assess the response of the first wall/blanket
of the various fuel cycles to a loss of coolant accident and to examine the poten-
tial consequences of the ensuing transient. The scenario envisioned is a complete
loss of coolant to all modules. This is the simplest approach since all modules will
experience the same transient. The accident took place at the end of blanket life
in all cases, representing a worst case scenario (note that the end of blanket life
does not occur at the same point in the operating life of the plant for each design).
It was further assumed that there was an immediate loss of cooling capacity; no
time was allowed for drainage of the coolant from the modules. This is not being
overly conservative as Piet [6.21 indicated that the loss rates of coolants (partic-
ularly pressurized coolants like helium) under severe LOCA's are sufficiently high
that there will be no direct effect on cooling of the blanket for time scales of in-
terest in afterheat calculations. Concurrent with the loss of coolant, the vacuum
boundary was assumed to lose integrity (perhaps due to failure of some penetration
e.g. vacuum pump duct, auxiliary heating duct) and the building atmosphere'was
assumed to stream into the torus. The possible release of radioactive sputtered
material entrained in the coolant into the reactor hall was not considered. Tritium
releases from the structure were not assessed. It was assumed that pressurization of
the vacuum vessel occurred rapidly so that the torus back pressure was high enough
to maintain the tritium permeation rate out of the structure at a negligible level.
Furthermore, during the pressure equilibration period, when any tritium release
would occur, temperatures would actually be lower than indicated here as some
heat would be removed during coolant drainage. The lower temperatures would
result in lower tritium permeation rates. After consideration of these two effects, it
was assumed that an insignificant amount of tritium was released as a consequence
of this accident. Termination of the accident occurred after 10 hours. At this time,
326
Table 6.2: Assumptions Made for the Loss of Coolant Accident
Accident Assumptions:
* accident occurs at the end of blanket life
* loss of coolant to all modules with continued plasma burn for equivalent
of three full power seconds (one second at full power, followed by a four
second linear ramp down)
* coolant is lost immediately; no allowance for drain time is given
9 breach of the vacuum vessel with entry of air into the torus
0 oxidation of the first wall and the release of radionuclides (see table 6.3)
at a rate given by EG&G data
e worker entry (crew of 3) at t=9:45 for 10 minutes to reestablish cooling
* 45 minutes of remote activity prior to initial entry to perform preparatory
tasks
0 the accident terminates after 10 hours
0 clean up based on Three Mile Island decontamination effort
e degree of damage to components based on thermal creep during the tran-
sient
* release of any radioactive material entrained in the coolant is not consid-
ered
Scenarios Considered:
(1) radioactivity is contained until 10 hours after accident initiation when release
to the environment begins at the normal ventilation rate (over 100 h)
(2) all radioactivity is contained within the reactor building; no release to the
environment
(3) all radioactivity is released immediately to the environment (over 10 h)
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some form of intervention was assumed to occur such that cooling of the first wall
was reestablished and releases of radionuclides ceased. The assumptions involved
in the accident assessment are given in table 6.2.
6.3.2.1 First Wall Temperature Response
The first wall temperature response to the loss of coolant was obtained using
HEAT1D [6.13]. The basic geometry for the analysis was the same as that used
for the ONEDANT analysis (see figure A.1), in determining the spatial variation
of neutron fluxes. Subsequent to the accident occurrence, plasma operation con-
tinued for an equivalent of three full power seconds. The decay of the plasma was
assumed to occur over five seconds, with full power for the first second followed
by four seconds of a linear ramp down. Values of the operational surface heat flux
corresponding to each design were used as input to the code. An initial first wall
temperature of 530 *C was assumed in all cases. Cooling of the magnets continued
during this event so that the magnet assemblies served as a constant temperature
heat sink (373 'C). Because the blanket model used smeared materials' properties,
and the coolant tube locations were not specified, heat transfer throughout the blan-
ket region was via conduction only. In regions where there were gaps (e.g. between
the blanket and shield, and from the back of the shield to the heat sink), radiation
heat transfer played a vital role. Convection was not included in the model for this
analysis. Temperature dependent conductivities, heat capacities and densities were
used. Properties for lithium and HT-9 were taken from the BCSS (see table G.1,
appendix G). For radiatio; heat transfer in the gap regions, an emissivity of 0.5 was
assumed, representative of a partially oxidized surface. The analysis was performed
in one-dimensional slab geometry, so that view factors were equal to one. The volu-
metric heat generation rate was specified both during operation, when the neutron
* HEAT1D is a one-dimensional finite difference heat transfer code developed at
M.I.T.
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flux is still present, and after plasma termination, when nuclear decay is the only
heat source. The operating nuclear heating rate was obtained from the ONEDANT
(the neutronics code) output; the decay heat source was obtained from the REAC
(the activation analysis code) output. The decay heat levels for the inboard region
were used in the analysis. Information from the first and last nodes within each
region was employed to obtain the spatial variation of the heating rate, using an
exponential attenuation of nuclide concentration. The time dependence of the heat
generation rate is a function of the quantities of the specific nuclides present and
their decay constants, both of which are known at the onset of the accident.
6.3.2.2 Mobility of Oxides
Once the temperature history of the first wall subsequent to the LOCA has
been determined, an assessment of the quantities of radionuclides mobilized must
be made. If the vacuum vessel is breached, ingress of air into the vacuum region will
occur. The presence of an oxidant in combination with the high wall temperature
may result in rapid oxidation and volatilization. Piet et al. [6.14] give an estimate of
the oxidation rate for SS 316 in dry air at 1000 'C as -10-3 mm-h'. They indicate
that oxidation of TZM alloy and vanadium alloy proceed at a much faster rate and
at much lower temperatures. Piet [6.2] assumed an oxidation rate of - 0.1 mm-h-
at 1300 *C for both SS 316 and HT-9 in his analysis. The oxidation of wall material
may cause severe reactor damage and loss of structural integrity. Furthermore, the
oxidation takes place in the region of highest specific radioactivity. Thus, volatile
chemical species produced by this process could serve as a carrier of radioactivity
to the environment.
The quantities of neutron induced activation products that can be mobilized
under potential accident conditions are largely uncertain. To gain some insight into
this problem, experiments have recently been conducted at EG&G at the Idaho
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National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) [6.151. The volatilization of constituents
resulting from oxidation of PCA and HT-9 in air was investigated. Tests were
conducted at temperatures of 600 to 1300 0 C for 1 to 20 hours. The results showed
that molybdenum, manganese, copper, phosphorus, titanium and chromium are
most readily volatilized. In terms of radiological hazard, the most important of
these are molybdenum and manganese.
In the tests performed at EG&G, the variation of the volatilization rate with
temperature was studied. Although there was a large degree of scatter in the data,
an Arrhenius type temperature trend was observed. This type of temperature de-
pendence of the rate is very often exhibited by chemical reactions [6.16]. Assuming
this relationship to be valid, the volatilization rate can be expressed as:
Q=A exp RBT (6.1)
where
Q = rate of volatilization of a particular element in the steel
( atoms
(h-m 2 of first wall)
curve fit constant (-atoms
Ah-m2 of first wall)
B = curve fit constant (;;)
R = ideal gas constant
8.314 ( m K)
T = temperature (K)
The constant B represents the activation energy for the reaction of interest. Most
reactions proceeding at reasonable rates (i.e. the time required for half of the
limiting reactant to be consumed, as measured by the half life of the reaction, is
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on the order of minutes or hours) have values of B in the range of 50 to 100 kJ
[6.16]. The pre-exponential factor Ahas been shown to have some temperature
dependence for certain chemical reactions, although no common relationship has
been found to exist.
Curve fit constants for the elements of interest in the HT-9 first walls used in
this study are given in table 6.3. These were obtained using the average mobilization
rates from the EG&G data at 800 'C and 1000 'C (since this was the temperature
range of interest for this accident scenario - see section 6.3.3). Because of the wide
scatter in the data and the uncertainty in the form of the temperature dependence
of A, the pre-exponential factor was taken to be a constant for the present purposes.
The isotopes of each element to which these rates were applied are also given in
table 6.3. These isotopes were selected from the inventory in the first wall based
on concentration and half life. The fraction of the total release of each element for
a specific isotope was obtained from the isotopic compositions given in the REAC
output.
Isotopes of Other elements formed during irradiation which were not originally
found in the HT-9 (e.g. magnesium, scandium) were not included in the release
because mobilization rates were not available. However, it is expected that they
would be responsible for only a small amount to the radiological hazard, since
they are not major contributors to the first wall activity (see table 5.8). Thus, their
neglect should not largely affect the outcome of this analysis. In the case of rhenium,
which is a product of tungsten, the quantities formed in the softer spectrum of the
advanced fuels are much larger than for DT. Neglect of this element in the releases
can be justified on the basis of it being a refractory material with a melting point
higher than that of tantalum, whose oxides were shown to have-a low mobilization
rate in tests run for PCA.
In the EG&G experiments, the volatilization*rate was also studied to determine
the variation with the gas flow rate past the sample and the time of exposure of the
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Table 6.3: Mobilization Rates of HT-9 First Wall Elements
Mobilization Rates of the Form : Q=A exp ()R -T
Radioisotopes Included
Phosphorus
Titanium
Chromium
Manganese
Iron
Nickel
Molybdenum
Tungsten
Vanadium
3.81x10 2 1
1.47x10 1 "
1.55x10 2 2
2.86x10a'
3.86x10 2 2
2.62x10 20
1.32x10 3 0
1.50x10 20
3.73x10 2 1
14.9 32 p, 3 3p
14.5 41Ti
60.7 4 9Cr, 5 1Cr, 55 Cr
4.72 52*Mn, 52 Mn, 54 Mn, 56 Mn, 57 Mn
58.8 5 3 Fe, 55 Fe, 59 Fe
59.9 57Ni, 59 Ni, 6 3Ni, 65 Ni
286 9 1Mo, 93*Mo, Mo, 99 Mo, 10 1 Mo
23.4 181W, 18 5 W, 1 7 W
62.8 4 8V, 49 V 52 V7 53 V
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Element A (atom!)
sample to air. Since the temperature is the primary parameter of concern in the
LOCA analysis, these effects were not considered in the present study.
6.3.2.3 Structural Creep Considerations
Structural temperatures during operation will be as high as practical because
good thermal efficiency is desired. During the accident, the temperature will rise
from the operating level and the strength of the metal structure will decrease. At
the same time, thermal stresses due to non-uniform heating will be generated. A
general weakening of alloys, as measured by the yield strength and ultimate tensile
strength, will occur with increasing temperature. A further alteration will occur
with the microstructure. Alloys are typically subjected to heat treatment prior to
use, to obtain a particular microstructure. A degradation of the material perfor-
mance concurrent with microstructure alteration may occur during the temperature
transient. This degradation could have serious consequences at a later time dur-
ing the accident, or prevent future operation of the reactor. The onset of melting
represents a higher temperature rise than for the onset of structural damage. It is
clear that if the melting point is reached, severe consequences are imminent.
The degree of structural damage resulting from the temperature transient can-
not be precisely known. Since the exact condition of the torus after the accident
is not available, a detailed structural analysis to determine loads and resulting de-
formations and fractures could not be performed. For the purposes of this study, a
very simple analysis, based on thermal creep effects (see appendix G) was carried
out. This analysis followed a methodology proposed by Massidda [6.13]. During
operation, both pressure and thermal stresses will exist in the first wall. The mag-
nitude of the thermal stress will decrease from its initial value at the beginning of
operation as a result of relaxation. With the loss of coolant at the onset of the
accident, the pressure stress will be eliminated. Due to the relatively rapid ther-
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mal response time of the first wall (< 1 sec), the front and back faces of the first
wall will experience nearly the same rapid rise in temperature at the beginning of
the accident. From this point on, however, the first wall temperature gradient will
decrease in magnitude, as no heat is being removed from the back face, and the
front and back face temperatures equilibrate. This alters the temperature gradient
and a new stress results which will be opposite to that which initially existed in
the first wall. Its magnitude will not exceed the initial first wall thermal stress
at the beginning of operation since the maximum change in temperature gradient
possible is from the operational value to zero, which would occur if the front and
back face temperatures became equal. Thus, it is expected that the thermal stress
due to the change in temperature gradient will be tolerable. What is of concern
then, is thermal creep which will result from the presence of a stress at an elevated
* temperature for an extended period of time. If the stress and temperature are high
enough, and are present over a long enough period of time, damage to the first wall
may occur due to creep rupture. The basis for this damage assessment for the first
wall subsequent to the LOCA is discussed in more detail in appendix G. Given an
expression for the creep rate as a function of temperature and knowing the first wall
temperature throughout the transient, the degree of elongation and stress relaxation
can be followed as a function of time. Using relations for time to creep rupture as
a function of temperature and stress, and progressing in a series of time steps over
the transient, the fraction of the rupture lifetime consumed over each time interval
can be determined. If at any point during the transient, the fraction of the rupture
lifetime consumed exceeds one, then failure will result. It was therefore assumed
that the torus underwent structural damage due to the initial breach of the vessel,
followed by any damage due to thermal creep effects.
The immediate consequences of the accident include the quantities of radionu-
clides mobilized and the degree of structural damage. These are discussed in the
next section.
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6.3.3 Immediate Consequences of the Coolant System Accident
The primary issue subsequent to a LOCA is the rise in temperatures due to
inadequate cooling. Concern arises in two areas: (1) volatilization of radioactive
species, and (2) damage due to thermal stresses and weakening material strength
at elevated temperatures. It is the radiological aspect which is of most concern
here, although some attention was given to the structural damage for estimation of
economic consequences.
Of major importance with regards to volatilization is the mobilization of mate-
rial which may be radioactive. Loss of structure may further aggravate the situation
if it results in significant weakening. Volatilization can occur over a range of tem,
peratures. The resulting first wall temperature responses to the transient being
considered here are shown in figures 6.1 to 6.6. During the plasma heat phase (fig-
ures 6.1 to 6.3), the initial temperature response is dominated by the surface heat
flux. Most of the heat goes into raising the temperature of the first wall, resulting
in a temperature spike. The height of the spike is seen to increas with the first wall
thermal heat flux. After plasma termination (5 seconds), the first wall temperature
gradient relaxes, lowering the first wall temperature. Once this has occurred, the
wall temperature again begins to rise (see figures 6.4 to 6.6), at a rate determined
by the decay heat generated in the first wall/blanket region and the thermal prop-
erties of the materials. The consequence of continued plasma operation, since it
occurs over a relatively short time range, is effectively to raise the initial first wall
temperature at which the afterheat response begins. The peak temperatures expe-
rienced in the first wall during the plasma heat phase and over the entire transient
are summarized in table 6.4. The maximum temperature reached is seen to increase
with beta for a given fuel cycle, as would be expected from the increased specific
activity (see table 5.8). The temperature rise in the DT first walls is lower than
would be expected from the shutdown decay heating levels (see table 5.10). This
reflects the good thermal sink performance of lithium in conducting the heat away
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from the critical first wall area. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the blanket temperature as
a function of position midway through the transient, for the various fuel cycles and
values of beta. As can be seen, the DT blanket temperature profile has flattened,
while a gradient still exists in the advanced fuel blankets. The decay heat density
of the DD blankets is somewhat greater than that of the DT blankets (see table
5.11). However, the heat capacity per unit volume is greater for DD by about the
same factor. Thus, the expected temperature rise would be roughly the same in
both cases.
Given the temperature of the first wall as a function of time and the mobi-
lization rates of the elements as a function of temperature, the quantities of each
isotope released during the 10 hour transient can be determined. These are given
in table 6.4 for each fuel cycle. No releases were assumed for temperatures below
600 'C. The quantities of nuclides released served as input to computer codes
used to evaluate onsite and offsite health impacts of the event. These impacts are
discussed in the next section.
The second major impact of the LOCA will be that of structural damage. This
can be estimated by examining the combined effects of the elevated temperature
and the presence of a stress on the first wall. The expected structural impact as
described by the fraction of the rupture lifetime consumed is given in table 6.5.
The residual stress and creep rate are also given. It can be seen that in all cases,
a significant margin exists between the condition of the torus at the end of the
transient and the point where rupture would occur. This is largely a consequence
of the rapid relaxation of the stress. Thus, it appears that no further damage to the
vacuum vessel other than the initial breach will result. An attempt to quantify the
economic impact of this structural damage for all designs is made in section 4.3.5.
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6.3.4 Health Effects due to the Loss of Coolant Accident
The amount of the first wall that is mobilized and transported out of the reac-
tor will determine the health consequences of this accident. In this assessment, it
was assumed that all of the material that was volatilized from the first wall escapes
from the vacuum vessel and enters the reactor hall. Three scenarios were envisioned
to give the range of possible onsite and offsite health consequences. Case (1) rep-
resents the anticipated course of action subsequent to the accident. Here, it was
assumed that the radioactivity was contained within the reactor building until the
accident was over and further mobilization has ceased. At this time, it was assumed
that the ventilation system was re-activated and some release to the environment
begins. It was also assumed that at 9 hours 45 minutes after the accident had
occurred, 3 workers entered the reactor hall for 10 minutes to reestablish cooling of
the torus (e.g. forced convection). As many of the operations as possible involved
in reestablishing cooling will be performed remotely prior to this. However, it is ex-
pected that some contact assistance (a minimal amount) will be needed. Preceeding
the time of worker entry, plant management would be assessing the situation i.e.
determining the cause of the accident, estimating the consequences and devising .
plan to minimize releases and occupational exposures. After worker entry, it was
assumed that within 5 minutes, the situation was brought under control. At this
time, it was assumed that plant management would decide to vent the building at-
mosphere to the environment at the normal ventilation rate. Workers were allowed
to reenter the torus hall to begin clean up and repair operations once the dose rate
fell to 1.25 rem/h. This would allow an unprotected worker to remain in the reactor
building for 4 hours without exceeding his annual dose limit of 5 rem. These doses
can be reduced through the use of protective equipment. Also, if there is a large
labor pool to draw from, the dose can be spread out amongst workers, minimizing
the individual exposures.
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The other two scenarios examined served to bracket the maximum anticipated
onsite and offsite effects. Case (2) assumed that the ventilation system was not
re-activated after that accident so that all radioactivity was contained within the
reactor building with no release to the environment. As will be shown, this results in
high dose rates in the reactor hall over extended periods of time. The third scenario
assumed immediate release of all radioactivity mobilized during the accident to the
environment. This case would represent the worst offsite effects of the accident.
Onsite doses were assessed by following the decay of the released radionuclides
(and build up of any radioactive daughters) from the beginning of the accident
and during the time of worker entry into the reactor hall. External exposures
are related to the activity concentration of the nuclide of concern through dose
conversion factors. The total external dose due to exposure to this nuclide can be
found from the dose rate if the time of exposure is known. External dose conversion
factors are given in units of Cim. The internal dose is related to the total quantity
of a nuclide inhaled. To obtain the total dose incurred, knowledge of the breathing
rate, airborne nuclide concentration and exposure time are needed. Internal dose
conversion factors are given in units of r". Fetter [6.17] gives whole body dose
conversion factors for internal and external exposures as part of his FUSEDOSE
package. Additional nuclides have been added to his library since the publication
of the initial FUSEDOSE documentation (see appendix G). These factors have
been used in determining doses incurred for this study. Knowing the time varying
activity level of the nuclides, one can obtain the, dose incurred by using the dose
conversion factors and integrating over the exposure time. A breathing rate of
3.5 x 10' m 3 /s was assumed. Additionally, the radionuclides in the reactor hall
were taken to reside entirely in the air at a uniform concentration (i.e. no reduction
in airborne conceatrations was made to account for surface adsorption/absorption
of radionuclides). The OCCDOSE code was written to follow the time variation of
radionuclide activity in the reactor hall (see appendix G). The code calculates the
total integrated dose to workers in the reactor hall subsequent to the release for a
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specified exposure time.
Occupational exposures will result from decontamination and repair activities
subsequent to the accident. Decontamination was assumed to begin as soon as the
reactor hall dose rate fell below 1.25 rem/h. The duration of clean up was estimated
from the clean up efforts performed at TMI. An appropriate estimate was obtained
from the TMI clean up time by scaling with the total quantity of activity released
(see section 6.3.5.2.3). After completion of the decontamination program, repair
procedures began. It was assumed that the decontamination program removed
surface adsorbed radionuclides only, and the airborne activity was unaffected by
this effort. Hence, the dose rates encountered during repair would be reduced from
those during decontamination. by an amount determined only by the decay of the
radionuclides and the building ventilation rate. Damaged equipment to be repaired
includes only the single first wall/blanket module (not including breeder) which was
damaged upon breaching the vacuum vessel. Single module repair/replacement time
estimates were based on the times given in table 5.13 for blanket changeouts during
maintenance outages (different fractions of the blanket are replaced annually for
each design, depending on the blanket lifetime; a total of 20 modules comprise the
blanket). The expected occupational exposure times for decontamination and repair
for each of the fuel cycles for case (1) are given in table 6.6. Doses were evaluated
using the OCCDOSE code, knowing the start and end times for decontamination
and repair tasks (note that the unprotected worker doses are given). The 10 minute
exposure of three people (0.5 man-hour) who entered to reestablish cooling of the
first wall is also included. Onsite doses were not evaluated for case (2), where all
radioactivity is contained in the reactor building. However, the dose rate after 2
years is indicated in table 6.6. As can be seen, the dose rate in some cases is still
too high to allow worker entry for a useful amount of time. It is unlikely that this
course of action will be chosen because of the long outage time (and hence, very
large replacement power costs).
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Table 6.6: Occupational Exposures Due to LOCAt
DT DD
5 % 10 % 20 % 5 % 10%
Reestablish Cooling:
Crew. Size
Exposure Time (man-h)
Initial Dose Rate (rem/h)
Cumulative Exposure (man-rem)
Clean Up:
Crew Size
Exposure Time (man-h)
Initial Dose Rate (rem/h)
Cumulative Exposure (man-rem):
Clean up
Waste Handling
Repair/Replacement:
Crew Size
Exposure Time (man-h)
Initial Dose Rate (mrem/h)
Cumulative Exposure (man-rem)
Total (man-rem):
Dose Rate in Reactor Hall after
2 yr with no purge (rem/h) (case 2)
3
0.5
40.9
20.4
12
583
1.27
3
0.5
70.8
35.4
12
1074
1.31
3
0.5
93.1
46.6
12
1535
1.34
3
0.5
39.1
19.6
12
790
1.19
3
0.5
55.9
28.0
12
1105
1.32
3
0.5
74.0
37.0
12
1560
1.37
155 178 184 155 180 189
26 29 30 26 30 31
6
198
128
13.5
215
6
192
22.9
2.4
245
6
187
4.44
0.45
261
6
237
57.2
6.2
2 07
6
198
20.8
2.2
240
6
194
4.17
0.43
257
0.52 1.22 2.24 0.5: 0.95 2.13 - 0.0002
release of activity to the environment begins after 10 hours for all but last row of the table,
where no release to the environment occurs (case 2)
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Task 20%
DHe
10%
3
0.5
0.011
0.0056
12
0
0
0
6
147
11.2
1.02
1.53
Public doses were assessed for cases (1) and (3). The release for case (1) was
assumed to begin at the 10 h mark. The total quantity of radioactivity in the
reactor hall at this time was assumed to be vented over a 100 h period at a rate
equal to the normal ventilation rate of the reactor building (one air change per day
or 4.6 m3 /s). All nuclides were assumed to be uniformly mixed in the reactor hall
atmosphere prior to release. Decay during the release period was considered. For
case (3), immediate release to the environment upon volatilization was assumed.
Offsite health effects were evaluated using the accident hazard analysis code
(DOSE) included in the FUSEDOSE methodology developed by Fetter [6.17] t.
The DOSE code applies the Gaussian plume dispersion model to a specified release
of radionuclides under a specified set of meteorological conditions. The whole body
doses to an individual downwind are calculated after consideration of radioactive
decay, production of daughter products, plume rise, inversion layers, building wake
effects, plume deposition and plume depletion. The code calculates doses for two
exposure scenarios: (1) the acute dose to an adult, standing in the open performing
light activity during the plume passage, who leaves the area afterwards; (2) the
chronic dose to an adult who stays in the contaminated area for a specified length
of time. Two dose integration times are considered for the acute exposure scenario:
(1) the 50-year dose commitment resulting from the initial exposure, or the total
dose during the lifetime of the individual, and (2) the critical dose, defined in
reference [6.18] as the dose in the first seven days after the accident plus half the
dose in the next 23 days. For the chronic exposure scenario, only the 50-year dose
commitment is calculated. In the acute exposure scenario, inhalation of and direct
radiation from contaminated air during the plume passage, and direct radiation
from radionuclides. deposited on the ground are considered. The calculation of
the chronic dose considers the above mentioned pathways as well as inhalation of
resuspended radionuclides. Exposures due to radionuclides deposited directly on
f Some new nuclides have been added to the libraries since the original docu-
mentation was published (see appendix G).
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skin or clothes, or on vegetables that are subsequently consumed, are not included.
Casualtiest estimated by the DOSE code include the number of early illnesses and
deaths and late cancer fatalities. Sterility, birth defects and genetic effects are not
considered.
Input to DOSE includes the inventory of nuclides to be released at t=0, times of
start and finish of the release, release height, initial plume size (i.e. size of building
from which the release takes place) and weather conditions. The duration of the
release determines the length of the plume and therefore the initial dilution of the
activity in the direction of the wind. The atmospheric conditions during the release
determine the dispersal of radioactivity. They include stability, plume centerline
height, wind speed, deposition velocity and inversion layer height. Evacuation is
not considered, so the population density is constant with time. The conditions
assumed for the present study are summarized in table 6.7.
The results for the public health effects for cases (1) and (3) are given in table
6.8. The maximum dose rate at the site boundary (1 km) occurs at the onset of
cloud passage. Because the release was assumed to take place over the same period
of time (100 h for case (1) and 10 h for case (3)), dilution would occur to the same
degree for each fuel cycle. Thus, the site boundary dose rate is a direct reflection of
the radioactivity mobilized during the accident. For the average weather conditions
assumed here, the critical, 50 year and chronic doses to an individual residing at
the site boundary during plume passage are as given in table 6.8. As can be seen,
the resulting doses are not large, being far below the NRC emergency guideline of
25 rem. In fact, the chronic dose to an individual, which considers effects over a 50
year period, only marginally exceeds the acceptable annual dose of 500 mrem for
$ The dose response data used in FUSEDOSE were obtained from the Reactor
Safety Study [6.18]: assuming supportive medical treatment, 200 rem would produce
radiation sickness in 50 % of the exposed population; 510 rem would be lethal to
50 % of the exposed population after 60 days.
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Table 6.7: Weather Conditions Assumed During LOCA
Stability Class:
Release Height:
Wind Velocity:
Deposition Velocity:
Height of Inversion Layer:
D (neutral)
0 m (ground release)
5mS
0.01 T
250 m
100 m (building y-dimension)
o-2: 50 m (building z-dimension)
a
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-1
-4
Table 6.8: Offsite Health Impacts of LOCA for Scenarios (1) and (3)
DT.
Effect 5% 10% 20% 5%
DD
10% 20%
Maximum Dose Rate at
Site Boundary (mrem/h):
(1)"
(3)t-
Individual dose at site boundary:
(mrem)
Critical:
(1)
(3)
50 year:
Chronic:
(1)
(3)
(1)
(3)
0.31 0.53 0.70 0.38 0.48 0.62 1.2 x 10-4
2.37 4.83 6.36 2.98 4.08 5.32 9.04 x 10-4
17
17
26
27
29
29
45
47
38
38
60
62
22
18
31
27
27
24
40
38
34
31
52
50
360 510 690 400 400 640
370 520 690 410 420 680
0.007
0.005
0.009
0.008
0.17
0.17
Dose* (man-rnrem):
50 year:
(1)
(3)
(1)
(3)
Chronic:
(1)
(3)
Cancer Fatalities:
(1)
(3)
68
66
110 150 81
110 150 67
110 180 240 120
110 180 240 110
1600 2300 3100
1600 2300 3100
1700
1800
100 130
92 120
150 200
150 200
1800 2900
1900 3000
0.20 0.28 0.38 0.22 0.22 0.36 , 8.9:
0.21 0.29 0.39 0.22 0.23 0.37 9.2.
0.025
0.020
0.035
0.030
0.72
0.74
x 10-5
x 10-5
release occurs 10 h after accident initiation; release duration is 100 h
immediate release occurs; release duration is 10 h
population density of 100 persons/km 2
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DHe
10%
Population
Critical:
the worst case (high beta DT). Population doses were based on a density of 100
persons/km2 . These are also not large for the accident being considered here. There
are no early deaths or illnesses, and less than one late cancer fatality expected in
all cases. The time at which the release occurs (t=10 h for case (1) and t=0 for
case (3)) and the release duration (100 h for case (1) and 10 h for case (3)) do not
have a large impact on the accident consequences.
6.3.5 Economic Consequences of the Loss of Coolant Accident
Associated with fusion reactor accidents is. a range of economic consequences
and a certain level of economic risk. Generally, a risk spectrum in which low cost
- low severity events are relatively frequent and high cost - high severity events
are relatively infrequent can be envisioned. A recent study [6.19] categorized the
economic consequences over the spectrum of possible events according to onsite
and offsite impacts. These may range from minor repair and decontamination costs
to significant costs associated with replacement of major plant components, re-
placement power and offsite evacuation and land decontamination costs. The cost
components expected to contribute to the economic risk associated with the loss of
coolant accident being considered here are outlined in this section. Estimates of the
economic impact of the LOCA for each of the reactor designs are given. Evaluation
is based on the methodology outlined in reference [6.19].
6.3.5.1 Onsite Economic Consequences
Onsite economic consequences are those cost elements which either occur at
onsite locations or directly affect the plant licensee, the fusion power industry or the
electric utility. These may include replacement power costs, plant decontaminktion
costs, plant repair costs, plant capital costs, early decommissioning costs, plant
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worker health impact costs, fusion power industry costs, electric utility business
costs and litigation costs. It is expected that replacement power, decontamination,
plant repair and health impact costs'will contribute to the onsite costs due to the
LOCA being studied here. These are discussed and estimates are made below.
The other cost elements either don't apply or are difficult to quantify, and are not
evaluated here. A discussion of these components can be found in reference [6.191.
6.3.5.1.1 Replacement Power
A significant contributor to onsite costs of reactor accidents is that of replace-
ment power due to plant outage time. A simple model developed for fission plant
outages can be used to estimate the replacement power costs [6.20]:
CRP GC(GC) jf t ou tC ap  ~0' o Fo ert dt
Cap = present value of the replacement power cost over the outage period ($)
G = electrical generation rating of the reactor (MWe)
C = actual capacity factor of the plant had the outage not occurred
C' = average capacity factor of the plant, obtained from operating data
tout = outage duration (yrs)
Fo = unit production cost increase of outage (M$ yr
r = real discount rate
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where
(6.3)
4The model assumes that the option to purchase power during the outage is chosen
and that no other methods for compensating for the lost generating capacity are
I ~implemented. Replacement power cost estimates for each design are given in table
6.11. The values assume a unit power production cost of 0.21x10 (fromMWe yr(fo
[6.20) updated to current dollars), corresponding to the expected mix of oil-fired
and non-economy power sources for mid United States. The outage time runs from
accident initiation until all clean up and repair operations have been completed.
6.3.5.1.2 Decontamination Costs
Decontamination and clean up operations will remove sources of potential ra-
diation exposure posing risks to the health and safety of station workers and the
public. Sources of radiation exist as airborne and surface contamination, as well
as the damaged reactor. The clean up activities include building and equipment
decontamination, treatment of radioactive liquids and packaging, handling, storage
and disposal of radioactive wastes. Some general considerations are outlined here.
Following a radiation accident, radioactive contaminants may be transported
or spread to areas other than locations immediately affected by the release. Air-
borne radioactivity may be spread via ventilation systems; liquid-borne radioac-
tivity may leave the accident site as surface runoff. Additional mechanisms of
spreading contamination include resuspension of radioactive particulates that have
settled on floors and surfaces, transfer to the shoes, clothing or skin of personnel
and transport to uncontaminated areas, and movement of contaminated equipment
to uncontaminated areas. The control of the spread of radioactivity can greatly
reduce subsequent decontamination efforts. The control problem can be minimized
by using a minimum amount of equipment. Clean equipment will reduce contar-
ination pick up as will minimizing equipment contact with contaminated surfaces
4W (i.e. equipment should never be placed directly on the ground). Decontamination
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of vehicles immediately after use can be accomplished by water hosing and brush-
ing or vacuum cleaning. Proce ures involving personnel should be well thought
out beforehand. The use of aniicontamination clothing and respiratory devices,
and the establishment of proper area controls will effectively reduce the problems
of personnel contamination and raid in preventing the spread of contamination to
radiologically clean areas. Decontamination of persons subsequent to working in
contaminated areas prevents further inhalation, ingestion or absorption of radioac-
tivity through the skin. Procedjres include removal of contaminated clothing and
showering, with special effort gi en to scrubbing of skin and hair.
In highly contaminated are' , heavy-duty close-weave cotton-twill single-piece
coveralls that cover all but the 1feet, hands and head can be worn by decontami-
nation workers. These are effective in preventing most of the contamination from
penetrating to the underclothing and skin. A second pair of coveralls is usually worn
over the first pair to allow removal of highly contaminated clothing before preceed-
ing to a primary decontamination facility. Plastic suits may be worn instead of the
coveralls. These afford good protection from water and many gaseous toxic agents.
Expendable shoes should be worn in highly contaminated areas; shoe covers may
be sufficient in areas of low-level contamination. A surgeon's cap can be worn to
minimize contamination of the hair and scalp. In grossly contaminated areas or
areas with a great deal of airborne contamination, plastic or cloth hoods are worn.
Gloves of cotton, canvas, leather or plastic are used, the type depending on the task
and the level of contamination. To protect against radioactive air contaminants,
present as either gases or particulates, respiratory protection may be needed. Their
use should be minimized because they subject the wearer to additional stress and
increase the risk of injury by impairing vision, freedom of motion and ability to
communicate. Protection factors for respir-tors range from 10, for a facepiece with
a haff-mask and air-line respirator to 10,000 for a full facepiece with a self-contained
breathing apparatus [6.21]. Selection of the appropriate respirator is influenced by
the physical, chemical and radiological hazards present in the accident area, as well
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as the nature of the task.
Decontamination efforts for buildings, equipment and other surfaces following
an accident should be undertaken after considering whether the benefits would be
sufficient to justify further exposure to personnel. Surface decontamination methods
are summarized in table 6.9. For liquid contaminants, the surface to be decontam-
inated should be kept-moist. Leaching several times with a minimum amount of a
suitable reagent can provide decontamination factors of at least 100 on most non-
porous surfaces. For dry powdered contaminants on porous surfaces, it is more
8 efficient to try to remove as much contamination as possible by sweeping or vacu-
uming, provided this will not produce an inhalation hazard or spread contamination
to unwanted areas. These methods require workers to wear protection clothing and
respirators. The use of adhesive tapes or strippable paints can be effective for de-
contamination without causing air contamination or the spread of contamination
to other areas. Wet methods on porous surfaces, such as concrete, will probably
be effective only on the very 'loose contamination on the surface. Strong agents
and excessive scrubbing may be effective to a certain extent, but may also tend to
wash the contaminant further into the porous material. Removal of surface layers
by abrasion or erosion may be effective in complete decontamination of porous ma-
terials. Coating of porous surfaces with varnished, lacquers or paints may increase
future decontaminability by three or four orders of magnitude.
Because a release of radionuclides into the reactor hall occurs as a consequence
of the LOCA being considered here, there is a need for decontamination subsequent
to the accident. Costs incurred due to the decontamination effort will include the
cost of removal and disposal of radioactive materials, decontamination materials
and equipment operating costs and labor costs. Health detriment costs due to radi-
ation exposure will also result; these are evaluated in section 6.3.5.1.4. It would be
advantageous to implement and complete the clean up program in as short a time
as possible. Regulatory concerns and financing issues may delay the program's
commencement (these impedements to the clean up program were not considered
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here).
The decontamination program assumed here was modeled after that followed in
the TMI decontamination effort [6.22, 6.23]. The magnitude of the program should
be somewhat reduced from that at TMI because there would be no need to remove
fuel or decontaminate the primary coolant system. Also, different radionuclides
would have been released, so slightly different techniques and procedures may be
used (the ease of removal of the different radionuclides from surfaces is difficult
to postulate). Methods used for decontaminating building and fixed equipment
surfaces include washing with a high-pressure water jet, wet and dry vacuuming,
and manual wiping (see table 6.9). The TMI staff estimated that decontamination
of the reactor building would require a work effort in the range of 300,000 to 900,000
man-hours [6.23]. It is expected that the magnitude of the clean up effort for the
accident considered here will be less than that for TMI, although similar activities
are to be performed. The quantity of radioactivity released from TMI was calculated
to be 2.4 MCi, based on readings from a stationary gamma monitor located at the
base of and external to the stack [6.22]. It was assumed that the labor requirement
for decontamination at the plants being considered here wotld scale from the lower
TMI manpower estimate (300,000 man-hour) with the total quantity of radioactivity
released during the accident. The manpower estimates for clean up are summarized
in table 6.10. As with TMI, a 50 % productive in-building effort was assumed; the
labor estimates given in table 6.10 refer to time spent in radiation fields.
It would be advantageous to begin the clean up effort as soon as possible. This
would be allowed if radiation fields were not excessive (i.e. lethal for short exposure
times), if workers were adequately protected, if there existed a labor force to draw
from so that occupational exposure limits were not exceeded, if extra time was not
needed to prepare for the decontamination program and if regulatory and financing
considerations did not preclude immediate implementation of the program. Clean
up efforts were assumed to begin when the dose rate fell to the 1.25 rem/h level.
The cooldown time required before this dose rate is achieved is indicated for each
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design in table 6.10. A crew of 12 men was used to perform all tasks, and crew
replacement was assumed to occur when each crew member had incurred a dose of
5 rem. The total number of workers needed, assuming all crew members to replaced
at the same time, is given in table 6.10 as well. Doses incurred are summarized in
table 6.6 for case (1). Shielding would be used to protect workers from the ambient
radiation fields while they are performing clean up tasks. Any reduction due to
shielding or protective clothing has not been considered for the doses given in table
6.6.
Liquid wastes from decontamination must be treated prior to transport and dis-
posal at a low-level radioactive waste disposal site. Processing alternatives include
filtration, ion exchange, evaporation and bitumenization. The decontamination so-
lutions must also be processed and stored or shipped offsite. Additional wastes
will result from the accident and from decontamination activities. Blanket modules
and other equipment can be handled as in the usual manner during regular blanket
changeouts. No additional handling equipment or new procedures will be required
for dealing with this waste (as is the case for many TMI tasks). Combustible trash
can be incinerated to reduce volume; the resulting ash can be immobilized prior
to disposal. Non-combustible trash can be compacted to reduce volume. Contam-
inated equipment and hardware can be disassembled and mechanically sectioned
for volume reduction. These wastes must then be appropriately packaged before
shipment to the waste disposal site.
The estimated occupational dose for building and equipment decontamination
at TMI ranges from 1000 to 3600 man-rem [6.23]. Treatment of radioactive liquids
and wastes is expected to result in a dose ranging from 115 to 640 man-rem. It can
be anticipated that the same ratio of doses for building decontamination to waste
handling will also result at the plants under consideration here. Thus, the dose for
waste handling during decontamination can be taken as 16.5 % of that incurred
during building decontamination. This factor has been applied in arriving at the
dose estimates given in table 6.6.
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Table 6.10: Decontamination Program
DT DD
5 % 10 % 20 % 5 % 10 % 20 % 10%
Time Spent in Radiation
Fields (man-h)
Crew Size
Cooldown Time (d)
Total No. Workers
292 537 768 395 553 780 0
12 12 12 12 12 12 0
3.75 4.25 4.5 3.75 4.0 4.25 0
36 36 48 36 36 48 0
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Task
DHe
Labor costs for decontamination were based on a remuneration rate of 30 $/h.
In addition to these costs, other costs will be incurred due to: additional services,
materials (chemicals, shielding, filters etc.), and additional equipment. These costs
are roughly 25 % of the labor cost for decontamination [6.231. The total cost for
decontamination is given in table 6.11. This compares to ~ 25 M$ estimated for
TMI contamination.
6.3.5.1.3 Repair Costs
Some damage to major components requiring replacement and/or repair will
result from the LOCA. It was assumed that the damage was not extensive enough
to render decommissioning the more attractive alternative (as opposed to repair).
Repair was assumed to be possible. The repair costs include the replacement cost
of any damaged components, the labor cost to replace them. The cost of health
detriment for any worker exposure during the repair job is included in the estimate
made in section 6.3.5.1.4. Before evaluating this cost, it was necessary to estimate
the degree of damage to the reactor. From the temperature information, an esti-
mate of the damage due to thermal creep was made (see discussion in section 6.3.3
and appendix G). In all cases, it appeared only necessary to replace the blanket
module damaged during the initial breach of the vacuum vessel. Cost estimates
for replacement were based on the algorithms given in appendix B. Single module
replacement costs were taken to be one-twentieth of the total blanket cost. The
cost of the breeder was not included in the DT blanket replacement costs (lithium
was assumed to be reusable after the accident). Labor costs were assumed to be
25 $/h (slightly lower than decontamination labor costs because of the reduced
risk). Labor requirements are listed.in table 6.6 and were based on estimates given
in chapter 5 for module replacement. Since the -repair costs are not incurred until
after the completion of clean up, discounting to obtain the present value of this cost
should be included. However, because of the relatively short duration of the decon-
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Table 6.11: Economic Impact of LOCA
DT
Cost Contributor
DD
5 % 10 % 20 % 5 % 10 % 20%
Replacement Power
Costs (M$)
Outage Duration (d)
Decontamination Costs:
Labor (M$)
Materials (M$)
Total (1$)
Repair Costs:
Equipment (M$)
Labor (M$)
Total (M$)
Health Effects
Costs (M$)
5.2 6.7 8.0 5.9 6.6 7.9
7.6 9.7 11.6 8.6 9.6 11.4
0.017
0.004
0.021
0.924
0.005
0.929
0.032
0.008
0.040
0.703
0.005
0.708
0.046
0.012
0.058
0.561
0.005
0.566
0.024
0.006
0.030
37.9
0.006
37.9
0.033
0.008
0.041
23.1
0.005
23.1
0.047
0.012
0.059
14.8
0.005
14.8
1.0
1.5
0
0
0
0.553
0.004
0.557
0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.010 6.0 x 10-5
Total (M$) 6.16 7.46 8.62 43.8 29.8 22.8
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DHe
10 %
1.56
tamination effort (on the order of days, as opposed to years), it was not necessary
here. Estimates are given in table 6.11.
6.3.5.1.4 Health Effects Costs
The entry of workers into contaminated areas to perform clean up operations
or repairs will result in exposure to radioactivity. There is an actual societal cost
associated with the exposure of any individual to radiation. Studies have been car-
ried out to estimate the costs and risks of radiation exposure [6.24, 6.25]. These
are based on the costs associated with an incidence of cancer, including medical
costs and lost income, and with genetically inherited abnormalities, including insti-
tutional care and lost earnings. The cost for exposure taken from reference [6.19]
and updated to 1986 dollars is 40 S/man-rem. Health detriment costs, as indicated
in table 6.11, are relatively minor.
6.3.5.2 Offsite Economic Consequences
As the results of section 6.3.4 indicate, offsite impacts of this accident will be
very small. It is expected that the only cost which will result is the societal cost
due to radiation exposure. From the population dose under the most conservative
conditions, which assumes immediate release of all volatilized material to the envi-
ronment, with no delay due to hold up in the reactor building, the cost is found to
be insignificant relative to those incurred onsite.
Offsite accident costs are generally associated with population protective mea-
sures. Due to the negligible offsite dose, these costs are expected to be non-existent
for the accident considered here. Nevertheless, a brief outline of the costs which may
be considered for more severe events is given below. A more detailed discussion,
along with models for estimating the costs, is given in reference [6.191.
368
Evacuation costs will result if there is the need to immediately move a pop-
ulation out of a threatened area. Evacuation may be invoked before a hazardous
situation arises as a precautionary measure. If an area does receive unsafe radiation
levels, it may be necessary to temporarily or permanently relocate the population.
In addition to transportation, shelter and food costs for temporary relocation, a per-
manent relocation will involve lost income and productivity costs. Decontamination
costs may be incurred to clean up and restore the land of an affected area. This is
accomplished through the implementation of techniques which remove surface de-
posited radionuclides. Agricultural products in an affected area must be disposed
of. A cost will result from the actual disposal of the contaminated material plus the
cost to the farmers from the loss of produce or loss of feed for livestock. If an area
is extremely contaminated, clean up may not be possible for an extended period of
time. Prohibition of inhabitation or use of an area of land for an extended period
of time may be necessary if decontamination efforts cannot reduce the activity to
acceptable levels. "Land interdiction" costs can be evaluated using the concept of
land wealth as outlined in references [6.26, 6.27, 6.28]. Other secondary offsite im-
pacts include the effects on the local land values, prices of crops and dairy products
and increased labor costs due to emigration. Additionally, the cost of electricity in a
region will increase, affecting th local economy as reflected in prices, employment,
incomes and productivity. Litigation costs will also result as affected parties will
likely attempt to receive some cmpensation.
6.4 Accident Hazard Summary
The accident hazard associated with a fusion reactor is determined by the quan-
tites of radioactive species associated with the design, the sourceo and magnitudes
of the stored energy, and the credible accident scenarios where this energy could be
liberated. The.radioactive inventories were quantified in the previous chapter. Here,
the sources and magnitudes of stored energy were examined and the consequences
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of a loss of coolant accident were investigated.
The advanced fuels appear to have a greater store of energy. This is largely
a consequence of the greater magnetic fields and the higher operating temperature
associated with these designs. The DD fuel cycle is worst in terms of storage of
decay heat, for the blanket materials used here (HT-9 and Fe2Cr1V). This is a
result of the larger amount of structural material relative to DT and the higher
neutron flux relative to DHe. An additional source of stored energy exists in the
lithium blankets of the DT designs. The chemical energy which could be released
6 upon burning lithium presents a potential concern for this fuel cycle.
To obtain some idea of the consequences of a potential accident for the vari-
ous fuel cycles, the safety and economic effects of a loss of coolant accident were
assessed. In terms of overall impact of the accident, the DHe fuel cycle presents
the least hazard. The temperatures achieved during the transient, the quantities of
radionuclides mobilized,.clean up/repair efforts, occupational and public exposures
are all significantly reduced for this fuel cycle. There is less of a disparity between
the DT and DD fuel cycles.
The total quantity of radionuclides released is dependent on the first wall tem-
peratures reached during the transient. For DHe, the declining temperature result-
ing from the low nuclear heating in the blanket leads to minimal releases. For the
other fuel cycles, the first wall temperatures increase during the transient, and the
maximum temperature reached increases with beta. There is not a large difference
between the DT and DD fuel cycles. This is a consequence of the higher nuclear
heating rate in the DD blankets due to the larger fraction of structural material
despite the lower neutron flux. Although the relative amounts of the different nu-
clides released are different, the total amount volatilized is nearly the same for DT
and DD. The total activity released for these cases is over three orders of magnitude
higher than for the DHe fuel cycle.
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The decontamination effort was assumed to be dependent on the total quantity
of radioactivity released. This was greatest for the high beta DT and DD fuel
cycles. However, it should be noted that relative to releases which occurred as a
consequence of the incident at Three Mile Island, the releases which are considered
here are orders of magnitude lower. The time at which the decontamination program
can begin depends on the dose rate level in the reactor hall. The dose rate is
determined by the quantities of specific radionuclides released, and will decrease at
a rate dependent on the decay rate of these radionuclides. Worker entry was allowed
when the dose rate had fallen to 1.25 rem/h. The longest cooldown time needed is
for the high beta DT design. The duration of the clean up effort and the resulting
occupational exposures are greatest for the high beta DT and DD designs, although
there is not a large reduction at the lower values of beta. The small quantity of
radioactivity released from the DHe reactor does not require a clean up program.
Doses incurred during repair activities depend on the time at which they take
place relative to the beginning of the accident (i.e. dose rate) and the duration
of the repair task. For those fuel cycles requiring less time for decontamination
(this refers to decontamination of surfaces, not airborne activity which is removed
through the ventilation system), the dose rate at which repair begins is higher. This
is the case for the lower beta designs. The length of time needed for repair is largely
determined by the size of the component to be replaced. This is greater for the low
beta designs which have larger blanket modules. Thus, the dose incurred during
repair is greatest for the low beta designs.
The total onsite dose incurred is due to either exposure while reestablishing
cooling, during decontamination or during repair. There is not a large difference
between the DT and DD fuel cycles. The doses are slightly greater for the high beta
designs, although the variation over the range of betas examined is less than 20 %
for both fuel cycles. There is a significant reduction in the onsite dose incurred for
the DHe fuel cycle during the accident.
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Offsite doses are small in all cases. However, if one wishes to examine trends,
the same variations are exhibited with offsite effects as with onsite effects. The off-
site impacts for the DHe fuel cycle are much reduced from the other cases. There is
not a large difference between the DT and DD fuel cycles. The effects are greater at
higher beta. It should be stressed that the impact of this accident is minimal. Even
in the worst case (high beta DT and DD), the chronic dose (dose from all pathways
except ingestion, over the individual's life) at the site boundary just exceeds the
limiting annual dose for a member of the general public.
In terms of economic impact of the LOCA, the DD fuel cycle appears to have the
most severe consequences. This is largely due to the replacement component costs.
Because it was assumed that the first wall and blanket form an integral structure,
the entire component must be replaced after the accident. This is relatively more
expensive than for DT (in addition to the fact that the DD modules are larger)
because the DT modules contain a large amount of lithium, which was assumed to
be reusable after the accident, whereas the DD blankets contain a larger volume
fraction of structure. It is the relatively more expensive structure which must be
replaced in greater amounts for the DD fuel cycle. For the DHe fuel cycle, the
replacement costs are similar to DT despite the large fraction of structure because
the blanket segments are relatively small (i.e. the blanket is thin). Replacement
power costs are also a significant contributor to the accident costs. These are fairly
similar for the DT and DD designs at a given value of beta. The cost is somewhat
lower for DHe because there is no need for a decontamination program and the
outage duration is somewhat reduced.
The assessment was not performed for the DD design having an RAF first wall
and Fe2Cr1V blanket. However, the impact of the LOCA can be inferred, knowing
the magnitude of the decay heat source and the concentration of radionuclides in
the first wall. It is expected that the first wall temperature history subsequent to
the accident will be similar to the HT-9 case. This will occur because of the similar
thermal properties of RAF and HT-9, and the fact that the shutdown decay heat
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levels in the first wall and blanket are nearly the same. The first wall temperature
rise may even exceed it because the RAF first wall and Fe2Cr1V blanket decay heat
levels are slightly higher. Since the quantities of major contributors to the shutdown
decay heat are similar in both first walls, it is expected that the decay heat as a
function of time would follow a similar pattern. It is anticipated that a similar
or slightly higher dose would result to clean up and repair crew members because
major contributors to the dose are present in the RAF first wall in about the same
concentration as in the HT-9 first wall (More may be released than for HT-9 if the
first wall temperature rise is slightly greater. This assumes HT-9 volatilization rates
are applicable to RAF). Offsite health impacts are expected to be small, as with the
other cases. Economic consequences for the RAF case would be somewhat reduced
because the cost to replace a single module in the alternate DD design is less than
for the HT-9 design.
In summary, the DHe fuel cycle results in the least health and economic impacts
due to the accident. Health hazards for the DT and DD fuel cycles are comparable
at a fixed value of beta, both being significantly larger than for DHe. The economic
impact of the DD fuel cycle is greater than for the DT fuel cycle. Thus, the DD
fuel cycle appears least attractive in terms of the consequences of this accident. An
improvement would result from using either a smaller volume fraction of structure
or a lower activation material in the DD blankets.
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